HomeMy WebLinkAbout399 S 2007 RICCI-FIBER V FIBER (2)
CHRISTINE J. RICCI-FIBER, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION
v. :
:
DANNY R. FIBER, : PACSES CASE NO. 253109192
Defendant : NO. 00399 SUPPORT 2007
IN RE: PLAINTIFF’S EXCEPTIONS TO SUPPORT MASTER’S REPORT
BEFORE HYAMS, J.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
HYAMS, J., June 22nd, 2021.
In this child support case, Plaintiff mother has filed exceptions to a support
1
master’s report which recommended a basic support obligation for one child on the part
2
of Defendant of $773.00 per month as of March 15, 2020. Plaintiff’s contentions have
been delineated in her brief in support of the exceptions as follows:
A. The Support Master erred in calculating \[Plaintiff’s\] income.
B. The Support Master erred in failing to consider \[Plaintiff’s\] request for an
upward deviation of Father’s child support obligation pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1910.16-4
\[relating to support guidelines’ assumption that child spends 30% of time with obligor\].
C. The Support Master erred in disallowing \[Plaintiff’s\] childcare expenses as of
March 15, 2020.
D. The Support Master \[consequently\] erred in calculating \[Defendant’s\]
3
arrears.
4
Oral argument on Plaintiff’s exceptions was held on April 9, 2021.For the
reasons stated in this opinion, the case will be remanded to the Support Master on one
issue.
1
Mother’s Exceptions to Support Master’s Report and Recommendation Filed May 18, 2020, filed June
8, 2020 (hereinafter Plaintiff’s Exceptions to Support Master’s Report).
2
Support Master’s Report and Recommendation, filed May 18, 2020 (hereinafter Support Master’s
Report). The recommendation was three-tiered, with monthly obligations being recommended of $901.00
for the period from July 23, 2019, through December 31, 2019, $936.00 for the period from January 1,
2020, through March 14, 2020, and $773.00 thereafter, plus a one-time charge for Defendant’s share of
the child’s extracurricular activity expenses of $1,118.00. Id., at 17.
3
Mother’s Brief, at 5-8, filed November 15, 2020 (hereinafter Plaintiff’s Brief).
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
567
Plaintiff is Christine Jean Ricci,also known as Christine J. Ricci-Fiber,48,a
8
resident of Camp Hill, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.Defendant is Danny Roy
9
Fiber, 49, a resident of Palm Harbor, Pinellas County, Florida.
The parties are the
101112
parents of a boy
born in 2006,who resides primarily with Plaintiff/Mother; the
13
parties were divorced in 2011.
Plaintiff commenced support proceedings against Defendant by a complaint for
14
support filed in 2007.As of January 19, 2017, a child support order was in effect
against Defendant/Father in the basic amount of $1,148.00 per month, premised upon a
monthly net income of Plaintiff of $1,759.14 and a monthly net income of Defendant of
15
$4,798.21.
16
On July 23, 2019, Defendant/Father filed a petition to modify the support order,
17
citing a physician’s letter submitted to the Domestic Relations Office. This letter opined
4
See Order of Court, dated April 9, 2021.
5
N.T. 55, Support Master’s Hearing, April 24, 2020, and April 27, 2020 (hereinafter N.T. __).
6
See Divorce Decree, dated July 8, 2011, No. 2007-3720 Civil Term (Cumberland County) (Oler, J.).
7
See Complaint for Support, filed May 25, 2007 (hereinafter Plaintiff’s Complaint for Support).
8
N.T. 55.
9
N.T. 8.
10
N.T. 45.
11
N.T. 92; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 26, Support Master’s Hearing, April 24, 2020, and April 27, 2020 (Custody
Order) (hereinafter Plaintiff’s/Defendant’s Exhibit __, \[___________\]).
12
N.T. 45-46; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 26 (Custody Order).
13
Divorce Decree, dated July 8, 2011, No. 2007-3720 Civil Term (Cumberland County) (Oler, J.).
14
Plaintiff’s Complaint for Support.
15
Order of Court, dated January 18, 2017 (entered January 19, 2017) (Masland, J.). The effective date of
this amount for child support was January 9, 2017. Id.
16
Petition for Modification of an Existing Support Order, filed July 23, 2019 (hereinafter Defendant’s
Petition To Modify).
17
Defendant’s Petition To Modify, ¶2.
2
that a medical condition known as ankylosing-spondylitis necessitated Defendant’s
18
relocation from Pennsylvania to an area with a warmer climate, as existed in Florida.
A Domestic Relations Office conference produced an interim order of court dated
October 3, 3019, assigning Defendant a basic monthly child support obligation of
$894.00, premised upon a monthly net income of Plaintiff of $2,006.55 and a monthly net
19
income of Defendant of $3,839.10.In response to this order, Plaintiff demanded a
20
hearing de novo,
which was held by the Cumberland County Support Master on April
24, 2020, and April 27, 2020.
At the hearing, testimony was received from both parties, Plaintiff secured the
admission of 25 exhibits, and Defendant secured the admission of three exhibits. The
evidence at the support master’s hearing, in pertinent part, tended to show the following:
21
The then-13-year-old child of the parties who is the subject of this support
22
proceeding has autism and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, as a result of which
he receives medical assistance by way of Medicaid pursuant to a determination of special
23
need by the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, takes medication in the form
2425
of Adderall prescribed by a psychiatrist, receives weekly therapy, is socially
2627
disadvantaged, and is not able to maintain a disciplined lifestyle without supervision.
According to Plaintiff/Mother’s testimony,
18
Defendant’s Exhibit 3 (physician verification form and letter).
19
Order of Court, dated October 3, 2019 (Masland, J.).
20
Letter from Plaintiff’s counsel to Cumberland County Domestic Relations, dated October 10, 2019.
21
N.T. 92.
22
N.T. 82, 89.
23
N.T. 82; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 14(Medicaid approval notice).
24
N.T. 90-91.
25
N.T. 91.
26
N.T. 90.
27
N.T. 92-93.
3
. . . \[H\]e has a hard time from eye contact to understanding what people are
saying to him. He’ll actually have a lot of arguments with people because the way we
28
hear things he’s not hearing it. . . .
* * * *
. . He has a hard time focusing. And even when he’s in regular school I have to
constantly check up and make sure he’s doing things, doing things correctly because he
doesn’t always hear the assignment right or write it down, turn in papers. . . . \[E\]ven on
29
the medication, he has a hard time focusing.
* * * *
. . . \[A\] babysitter makes sure that he does his homework. She feeds him food. If
he came home, he would play video games the whole time, and he could burn the house
down because he doesn’t know how to use the toaster, or he’d eat a whole box of
Cheez-its. . . .
And in the morning, especially when I’m working, she makes sure that he gets
up and eats breakfast and takes his pill and gets him to school because he has no concept
30
of time.
* * * *
\[The child cannot be left alone to carry out appropriate activities, b\]ecause he
won’t. There’s no concept of time, especially in the morning. We try to keep—you know,
when I’m here we have a routine, like, this is the time we do that. And nine out of ten
days it’s still a struggle to stay on the routine. We always try to get up at the same time to
keep the routine going.
Same thing with after school. He wants a snack first so he can have a 30-minute
break, but he still has to do homework. But if he was here by himself, all of a sudden he
starts looking at You Tube and playing video games, and the next thing you know it
31
would be 7:00 and nothing’s done.
* * * *
Q . . . \[I\]s \[he\] not capable of taking medication on his own?
A No.
Q And why is that?
A Because he doesn’t like it. It has to be put in candy. He doesn’t like to
swallow pills. He has the gag reflex. . . . And he’ll try to run out of the room quick. And
32
I’ll be, like, No, no. come back. Let’s do your pill.
28
N.T. 90.
29
N.T. 90-91.
30
N.T. 92.
31
N.T. 92-93.
32
N.T. 93-94.
4
In terms of income, the child receives a social security derivative benefit (arising
out of his mother’s disability) of $690 per month, for which Plaintiff/Mother is the
33
representative payee.
34
Plaintiff/Mother lives alone with the parties’ child.
As a result of a medical
35
condition, she has been deemed permanently disabled for purposes of social security.
She described her medical situation as follows:
In 2008 I was diagnosed with Crohn’s Disease, and it was something that I
apparently had for a while. And shortly after my diagnosis my health actually went
downhill quickly. In January of 2009 I was admitted into the hospital where I spent the
next five months. And what happened is the Crohn’s actually ate through my colon, and
they had to remove it. And then my body went into septic shock and lots of other
complications. And that's what started all my health issues and why I’m on disability
36
right now.
* * * *
Q \[Your doctor\] lists on \[a physician verification form\] the nature of your
illness and injury is—hopefully, I’ll pronounce this right—ulcerative colitis, SIP
colostomy \[sic\] with—maybe you can pronounce it—i-l-e-o-a-n-a-l. What is that?
Anamosis?
A Yeah, it’s adding a day pouch.
Q What is a day pouch?
A I had my colon fully—the whole thing is—I had my colon fully
removed, and all I have is my—the ileum is the small intestine. So all I have is the small
intestine which is still ruptured. That’s what that is, which causes me the chronic
pouchitis.
Q What are the symptoms of chronic pouchitis?
A Cramping—cramping and the extensive diarrhea. Sometimes the pain is
37
so bad I can’t even get out of bed.
* * * *
Q . . . \[Y\]our doctor indicated here that you’re permanently disabled and
can only work a few hours per week due to diarrhea and rectal bleeding. Is that accurate?
38
A Yes.
33
N.T. 69-70; Plaintiff’s Exhibits 8-9 (social security statements).
34
N.T. 55-56.
35
N.T. 67.
36
N.T. 66-67.
37
N.T. 77-78.
5
Diarrhea and rectal bleeding make it impossible for Plaintiff to work more than a
39
few hours per week.
In the past, an accommodating employer has facilitated her part-
40
time engagement as an on-air radio personality,although a four-or-five hour shift at the
41
radio station will cause her “difficulties” fifty percent of the time.
“Fortunately,”
42
according to her testimony, “the bathroom is close by, but I’ve had accidents.”
43
The hourly rate of pay for Plaintiff at the radio station has been about $11.00,
and she testified that on average in the past ten years she worked about 10 or 11 hours a
4445
week, but more recently has averaged about 16 hours a week.The number of hours
she worked in 2019 was unusually high, according to her testimony, due to an increase in
46
hours attributable to layoffs of other employees, commencing in October of that year.
Thus, for instance, it appears that during the second half of October, 2019, she worked 50
47
hours (about 25 hours a week); on the other hand, it appears that during the second half
48
of November, 2019, she worked only 28.5 hours (about 14.25 hours per week). In any
event, Plaintiff testified that
I cannot commit to working 20 hours a week consistently. I get flares the more I
try to work, and then I’m back at the doctor’s office. In fact he scolds me if I work more
than ten because of all of the issues I can have. . . . I have serious issues where I can’t
49
even hold it the more I try to do.
38
N.T. 79.
39
N.T. 79.
40
N.T. 126; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 (e-mail from employer).
41
N.T. 77.
42
N.T. 77.
43
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 (pay stubs).
44
N.T. 155.
45
N.T. 155.
46
N.T. 155-56; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 (2019 W-2 form).
47
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 (pay stubs) The parties have treated Plaintiff’s semi-monthly pay periods as bi-
weekly pay periods, and the court will do likewise for the sake of consistency. See, e.g., N.T. 154-55.
48
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 (pay stubs).
49
N.T. 149.
6
50
Plaintiff’s wages in 2019 totaled $8,182.45,of which $7,182.45 was attributable
51
to her hourly rate.
This suggests an average workweek of about 12.6 hours.
Unfortunately, as of March 15, 2020, her access to her place of employment was
52
suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
and her income thereafter has included
53
neither wages nor unemployment compensation.
In addition to her employment income, averaging $681.87 per month in 2019,
Plaintiff effectively received $239.75 per month under the federal government’s tax-
54
related “earned income credit” and “additional child tax credit” programs. She also
55
receives $1,380.00 per month in social security disability payments. Her monthly net
income available for support thus totals $2,301.62 prior to suspension of her employment
on March 15, 2019, and $1,380.00 thereafter.
5657
Defendant/Father is remarried. He has a degenerative arthritic medical
condition known as ankylosing-spondylitis, which affects the joints and spine and can
50
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 (2019 W-2 form).
51
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 (pay stubs).
52
N.T. 72; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10 (e-mail from employer).
53
N.T. 72-75.
54
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (2019 federal income tax return).
By way of explanation, Plaintiff’s 2019 income tax obligation, in the absence of credits, would have
been $560.00, of which $453.00 had been paid via withholding, leaving a putative balance due of
$107.00. However, she was entitled to a payment from the federal government under the earned income
credit program of $2,644.00 and a payment of $793.00 under the additional child credit program, for a
total credit payment of $3,437.00. This obligation of the federal government was, in effect, applied (a) to
pay the balance due on Plaintiff’s federal income tax ($107.00), (b) to finance a refund to her of the
money withheld for taxes ($453.00), and (c) to pay to her the balance due on the federal obligation
($2,877.00). Stated more simply, if less comprehensively, Plaintiff’s credit ($3,437.00) was applied to her
putative tax liability ($560.00), prior to distribution to her of the balance ($2,877.00), which represented
the actual increase in her disposable income.
55
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 (social security statement). Inadvertently, at one point in the Support Master’s
Report this figure is given as $1,390.00. See Support Master’s Report and Recommendation, at 8, filed
May 18, 2020.
56
N.T. 27.
57
N.T. 51.
7
58
cause inflammation and severe chronic pain.To ameliorate this condition, he
reasonably moved from Pennsylvania to a warmer climate in Florida in late 2016 or early
5960
2017,where he resumedhis employment as a police officer,albeit at a somewhat
61
reduced salary level.
His wages have since become comparable to what he was earning
62
in Pennsylvania.
As of July 23, 2019, when his modification petition was filed, Defendant’s
monthly net income available for support was $4,253.97; since January 1, 2020, this
6364
figure has risen to $4,505.34. His wife’s gross monthly income is about $4,386.00.
With respect to custody of the child, an agreed-upon custody order dated May 28,
2019, provides for the parties to have shared legal custody by the parties, for
Plaintiff/Mother to have primary physical custody, and for Defendant/Father to have
65
partial physical custody. Under the order, Defendant is entitled to physical custody (a)
in even-numbered years at Thanksgiving for a most of the child’s Thanksgiving vacation,
at Christmas for 48 hours, and during the summer for 35 days, and (b) in odd-numbered
years at Thanksgiving for 48 hours, at Christmas for most of the child’s Christmas
vacation, and during the summer for 35 days; provided, that during the summer of 2019
66
his entitlement period was 27 days.
Notwithstanding this rather limited entitlement to partial physical custody,
Defendant in 2019 did not exercise his Thanksgiving custodial period, exercised only
58
Defendant’s Exhibit 3 (physician verification form and letter).
59
N.T. 30, 36-39, 52.
60
N.T. 9-10.
61
N.T. 52.
62
Defendant’s Exhibit 1 (2019 W-2 form).
63
Support Master’s Report, at 15-16, filed May 18, 2020. Inasmuch as Plaintiff’s exceptions do not
challenge these figures, their derivation will not be discussed in this opinion.
64
N.T. 26-27.
65
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 26 (Custody Order).
66
Custody Order, ¶3.
8
three overnights during his Christmas period, and relinquished ten days of his summer
67
custodial period,
as a consequence of which he had fewer than 30 overnights with the
68
child in 2019.Nor, as of the support master’s hearing in late April of 2020, had he
69
provided notice, due more than a month earlier,
of plans for exercise of his 2020
70
summer custodial rights.
This lack of custodial contact was consistent with an established pattern, according
71
to Plaintiff,
and she characterized communications between Defendant and the child as
“aloof”:
THE MASTER: . . . When was the last time—to your knowledge when was the
last time the father and the child spoke?
THE WITNESS: I don’t believe \[Defendant\] and \[the child\] have had a phone
conversation since Christmas. I know the last time \[the child\] had a texting talk with him
72
was Easter. And they are very aloof. They are nothing of importance.
In requesting a deviation upward from the support guidelines with respect to
Defendant’s support obligation, Plaintiff said
. . . \[E\]very day I have to feed him and I have to clothe him and I do everything
to provide for this child versus spending two and a half, three weeks with him and having
73
fun visits.
Following the hearing, utilizing the parties’ monthly net income figures cited
previously, and applying the prescribed methodology, the support master recommended
standard guideline support obligations for Defendant in the basic monthly amounts of
$901.00 for the period from July 23, 2019, through December 31, 2019, $936.00 for the
period from January 1, 2020, through March 14, 2020, and $773.00 thereafter, plus a one-
time charge for Defendant’s share of the child’s extracurricular activity expenses of
67
N.T. 45-46.
68
N.T. 46, 109.
69
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 26 (Custody Order, ¶3).
70
N.T. 109-10.
71
N.T. 112-13.
72
N.T. 162.
73
N.T. 109.
9
74
$1,118.00.In this regard, the master largelyaccorded Plaintiff/Mother the benefit of the
75
doubt on issues related to (a) the reasonableness of her childcare expenses,
excluding,
76
however, such expenses following suspension of her employment,(b) Defendant’s
77
responsibility for a share of various extracurricular activity expenses,
(c) the extent of
78
Plaintiff’s disability in terms of employment,
and (d) the effective date of the
79
modification order to be entered.
However, the report did not discuss the question of whether an upward deviation
from the guidelines in Defendant’s support obligation would be warranted under the
circumstances. And, for a variety of reasons, the record does not appear to have been
fully developed on this issue.
Plaintiff’s exceptions to the support master’s report and recommendation sub
judice were filed June 8, 2020. Plaintiff challenges the master’s use of her 2019 wages
for purposes of calculating her net monthly earning capacity, noting her testimony that
80
“she typically works on average about 10-11 hours per week,” and, in addition, she
“believes it was unfair to add back in her tax refund to the income available for support
81
purposes” and to disregard childcare expenses following her suspension of
82
employment. Further, she challenges the failure of the master to consider and
recommend an upward deviation in Defendant’s child support obligation from the
guideline figure inasmuch as
74
Support Master’s Report, at 17.
75
Support Master’s Report, at 7-8.
76
See Support Master’s Report, Exhibit “F”.
77
Support Master’s Report, at 8-15.
78
N.T. 6-7.
79
Support Master’s Report, at 3-5.
80
Plaintiff’s Brief, at 5.
81
Plaintiff’s Brief, at 5.
82
Plaintiff’s Brief, at 7-8.
10
\[t\]he record clearly shows that \[Defendant\] does not spend 30% parenting time with the
Child and that \[Plaintiff\] is the one who pays for a majority of the child’s expenditures
without contribution from \[Defendant\]. \[Defendant\] admitted that he only exercised 27
overnights with the child in 2019 even though the Custody Order that he fought for
provides him with more custodial time. . . . He conceded that he cancelled his second
week of custody time in summer of 2019, failed to exercise his time at Thanksgiving and
exercised less time than what he was entitled to at Christmas. . . . Additionally, as of
April 2020 he had not provided any notice to \[Plaintiff\] of his intentions to exercise
83
custody for summer 2020.
Finally, Plaintiff suggests a recalculation of Defendant’s arrears in accordance
84
with the requested revisions.
DISCUSSION
Statement of law. In Pennsylvania, a support master’s “report and
recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration,
particularly on the question of credibility of witnesses, because the master has the
opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties. . . . However,
it is advisory only, and the reviewing court is not bound by it and it does not come to the
85
court with any preponderate weight or authority which must be overcome.”
As a general rule, “the support guidelines \[set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure\] determine the amount of support that a spouse or parent should pay
based on the parties’ combined monthly net income, as defined in Pa.R.C.P. No.
1910.16-2, and the number of persons being supported.” Pa. R.C.P. 1910.16-1(a)(1). The
purpose of the guidelines is to ensure that “persons similarly situated shall be treated
similarly,” and they “place primary emphasis on the net incomes and earning capacities
of the parties.” 23 Pa. C.S. 4322(a). To this end, “\[i\]f the trier-of-fact determines that a
party has a duty to pay support, there is a rebuttable presumption that the guideline-
calculated support amount is the correct support amount.” Pa. R.C.P. 1910.16-1(d).
83
Plaintiff’s Brief, at 6-7.
84
Plaintiff’s Brief, at 8.
85
Frey v. Frey, 1 Pa. D. & C.5th 116, 121, 2006 WL 5166597 (Monroe Co. 2006) (citations omitted); see
also Goodman v. Goodman, 375 Pa. Super. 504, 507, 544 A.2d 1033, 1035 (1988); Wiser v. Wiser, No.
1076 Support 2009 (Cumberland Co. 2010).
11
However,
(1) The presumption is rebutted if the trier-of-fact concludes in a written finding
or states on the record that the guideline support amount is unjust or inappropriate.
(2) The trier-of-fact shall consider the children’s and parties’ special needs and
obligations, and apply the Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-5 deviation factors, as appropriate.
Id.
With respect to deviations from the guidelines, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 1910.16-5 provides as follows:
(a) Deviation. If the amount of support deviates from the amount of support
determined by the guidelines, the trier of fact shall specify, in writing or on the record,
the guideline amount of support, and the reasons for, and findings of fact justifying the
amount of the deviation.
(b) Factors. In deciding whether to deviate from the amount of support
determined by the guidelines, the trier of fact shall consider:
(1) unusual needs and unusual fixed obligations;
(2) other support obligations of the parties;
(3) other income in the household;
(4) ages of the children;
(5) the relative assets and liabilities of the parties;
(6) medical expenses not covered by insurance;
(7) standard of living of the parties and their children;
(8) in a spousal support or alimony pendente lite case, the duration of the
marriage from the date of marriage to the date of final separation; and
(9) other relevant and appropriate factors, including the best interests of the child
86
or children.
Finally, “\[t\]he basic support schedule incorporates an assumption that the children
spend 30% of the time with the obligor and that the obligor makes direct expenditures on
their behalf during that time.” Pa. R.C.P. 1910.16-4, Explanatory Comment—2010.
Variable expenditures, such as food and entertainment, that fluctuate based upon
parenting time were adjusted in the schedule to build in the assumption of 30% parenting
time. Upward deviation should be considered in cases in which the obligor has little or no
contact with the children. However, an upward deviation may not be appropriate if an
obligor has infrequent overnight contact with the child, but provides meals and
entertainment during daytime contact. Fluctuating expenditures should be considered
rather than the extent of overnight time. . . .
86
Pa. R.C.P. 1910.16-5.
12
Id.
Application of law to facts. In the present case, after a careful review of the record,
the court is of the view that the master’s assessment of Plaintiff’s net monthly earning
capacity prior to the suspension of her employment was consistent with her work-
tolerance level, as indicated by the factual recitation above, and that the inclusion of her
income tax refund as a component of disposable income was correct, as also indicated by
87
the recitation.
It further appears to the court that the suspension of Plaintiff’s
employment in March of 2019 warranted an exclusion of childcare expenses from the
support calculation as of that date.
With respect to Plaintiff’s request for an upward deviation from the amount of
support determined by the guidelines, it is clear that both parties can be described as
valiant in their responses to harsh medical conditions, and Plaintiff’s conduct in raising
an autistic child while suffering from a crippling illness and struggling to maintain
employment seems little short of heroic. Given the fact that Defendant’s court-ordered
entitlement to partial physical custody falls well below the 30% assumption upon which
the guidelines are based, and that his practice has been to exercise even less than
authorized, and that his household income is augmented by that of his wife, an upward
deviation would appear to be within the intended ambit of the rules.
However, as noted, the record has not been fully developed on this issue. For this
reason, the case will be remanded to the master for further hearing and consideration of
Plaintiff’s request for an upward deviation.
ORDER OF COURT
nd
AND NOW, this 22day of June, 2021, upon consideration of Mother’s
Exceptions to Support Master’s Report and Recommendation Filed May 18, 2020, which
was filed June 8, 2020, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the case
is remanded to the Cumberland County Support Master for purposes of further hearing
87
See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
13
and consideration of Plaintiff’s request for an upward deviation from the support
guidelines.
BY THE COURT,
_______________
Carrie E. Hyams, J.
Jeff R. Lawrence, Esq.
Cumberland County Support Master
13 North Hanover Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Debra R. Mehaffie, Esq.
Suite 102
The Executive Offices at Rossmoyne
5000 Ritner Road
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
Attorney for Plaintiff
Nathan C. Wolf, Esq.
WOLF & WOLF
10 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Defendant
14