HomeMy WebLinkAbout2020-04062
CHRISTINE E. CASSEL, : THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : No. 2020-04062 CIVIL TERM
:
RONALD R. CASSEL, :
Defendant : IN DIVORCE
OPINION
Smith, J., May 12, 2021
FACTS
Christine and Ronald Cassel were married on August 18, 2000. It was the
second marriage for each of them. The parties anticipated separating in September
2019. On September 12, 2019, they signed a document (herein after “the Agreement”)
that stated in its entirety:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
As part of our impending separation and divorce, neither I, Christine E.
Cassel, nor Ronald R. Cassel, will be filing for or paying alimony to one
another. I, Christine E. Cassel, will not as for 50% of Ronald’s pension.
As we both are determined to maintain our good credit ratings, we are
working together to resolve all our personal and joint financial obligations
1
which will in no way affect our abilities to pay our debts.
The document was prepared by Wife and signed by both parties. Both parties testified
that they did not talk about the Agreement; Wife simply left it out on the kitchen counter
for Husband to read and sign. Wife then signed a lease for an apartment in anticipation
of leaving the marital residence.
The parties did not initiate divorce proceedings at that time, however. Wife
cancelled the lease for her apartment, and from September 18, 2019 through February
2020, both parties remained living together in the marital home. Wife offered several
text messages from September 18 through September 27, 2019 showing that the
parties were living together, treated each other with affection, and handled expenses as
1
See Defendant’s Exhibit 8 (emphasis in original).
Page 1 of 7
2
a married couple. Wife testified that the relationship “fell apart in November of 2019.”
The text messages showed that, as late as February 6, 2020, Wife was still residing in
3
the marital home. During that time period, the parties worked on consolidating and
paying down their debt.
At the hearing, Husband outlined the parties’ assets and debt. Husband asserted
that the parties agreed in February 2020 that Husband would retain the marital home
4
upon separation, and Wife transferred title to the Husband on April 22, 2020. Wife
testified that she transferred title to Husband because she was no longer living there
and she could not afford to make the mortgage payments. Wife stated she did not want
to be liable for any foreclosure. Husband also refinanced the home in May 2020, and
5
the mortgage is now solely in his name.
In addition to the marital home, the parties jointly own another property in Camp
Hill, which serves as a rental property. Currently Wife’s parents are living in the
property and are paying rent. Husband testified that he does not receive any portion of
the rent collected on the rental property, and it was the parties’ intentions that Wife
would keep the rental property. Wife has not, however, refinanced the mortgage, and
the parties have not transferred title to Wife. Wife testified that she has not refinanced
because there is no agreement to do so. As such, the rental property and its associated
mortgage are still jointly held by Wife and Husband.
In addition to the real estate, the parties own a number of vehicles, namely, a
2010 Toyota Tacoma, a 2019 Harley Davidson Road King, a 1998 Harley Davidson
motorcycle, and a 2019 Hyundai Santa Fe. Husband testified that the parties intended
for him to retain the Tacoma and the two motorcycles, while Wife would retain the Santa
Fe. Wife disputed the existence of any agreement, written or otherwise, with regard to
the vehicles, though the text messages presented by Wife indicate that Wife wanted
6
Husband to pay the “bike loan payments.” The Tacoma was always solely titled to
Husband, and Husband refinanced the loan on May 8, 2020 so that the loan is solely in
7
his name. The 2019 Harley is currently jointly titled with a jointly held loan, but
2
See Plaintiff’s Exhibits 10a and 10b.
3
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10c.
4
See Defendant’s Exhibit 1.
5
See Defendant’s Exhibits 2, 3, and 4.
6
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10c.
7
See Defendant’s Exhibit 5.
Page 2 of 7
Husband makes the payments. The 1998 Harley is jointly titled and there is no loan on
it. The Santa Fe is jointly titled with a jointly held loan, but Wife makes the payments.
Husband also testified that he paid a number of bills belonging to Wife that were mailed
8
to the marital residence, and took out a personal loan to finance the payment of debts.
Wife, however, testified that Husband took out the loan on his own initiative to refinance
his debts to have one monthly payment.
The crux of the dispute is Husband’s pension with the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (herein after “SERS pension”), earned through his years as an employee
of the Department of Corrections. Husband retired in July 2016 from the
Commonwealth and has been in “pay status” since approximately September 2016.
9
The marital portion of the SERS pension is valued at $531,000. Husband also has a
pension through East Pennsboro Township where he now works, although that pension
10
is not vested. Wife has a 401K through her employer.
It is Husband’s position that the separation agreement entered into by the parties
in September 2019 is an ambiguous, partial agreement, written by a non-attorney,
11
which alludes to other agreements outside the scope of the writing. Husband
contends that there is a larger verbal agreement between the parties that was not
reduced to writing. Said agreement includes the aforementioned decisions regarding
the marital property. In support of his contention that the Agreement is enforceable,
Husband presents several arguments in that Husband and Wife had valid, enforceable
12
agreements with regard to the pension and numerous other marital assets, parol
evidence can be considered to ascertain the meaning of ambiguous terms within the
13
Agreement, and that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the parties
14
reconciled. Husband believes that the written agreement should be interpreted to
mean that Wife would not seek any portion of Husband’s pension from the
Commonwealth, and in turn, he would not seek any of Wife’s retirement or alimony.
8
See Defendant’s Exhibits 6 and 7.
9
See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6.
10
See Defendant’s Exhibit 9.
11
See Defendant’s Exhibit 8.
12
See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Petition for Special Relief, 7, Cassel v. Cassel, No. 2020-
04062 (April 16, 2021)(herein after “Defendant’s Memorandum”).
13
Id. at 12.
14
Id. at 14.
Page 3 of 7
Husband is asking this Court to enforce the Agreement and any subsequent verbal
agreements, and prohibit Wife from collecting any of the SERS pension.
Wife, conversely, contends that the agreement is the complete agreement and
that the terms should be interpreted at their plain meaning, meaning that Wife will
literally not seek 50% of Husband’s pension (as opposed to seeking some other
amount). Wife believes that the Agreement signed by the parties is the only agreement
regarding their marital property and that it is unambiguous. Wife further argues that the
15
basic elements of a contract were not formed, the terms of Agreement are not clear for
1617
enforcement, parol evidence is not permitted, the Court cannot re-write the plain
1819
meaning of words, and that reconciliation voids a separation agreement. Wife is,
therefore, asking this Court to invalidate the agreement, as it did not fully settle the
parties’ marital estate, and the parties reconciled after it was written.
DISCUSSION
We find the reconciliation issue dispositive. Both parties agree that a “separation
agreement” is voided by a subsequent reconciliation of the parties whereas a
20
“postnuptial agreement” is not. Husband contends the Agreement should be
interpreted as a postnuptial agreement and/or that no reconciliation occurred. One or
both of these conditions must be true in order for Husband to prevail on this issue. Wife
contends Agreement was both a separation agreement and that the parties had
reconciled. Both of these conditions must be true in order for Wife to prevail.
Marital settlement agreements are classified as either separation or postnuptial
21
agreements. Whether an agreement is a postnuptial agreement depends on the intent
22
of the parties, as gathered from the language of the agreement. “‘Where \[the parties\]
15
See Plaintiff/Wife’s Reply Memorandum, 2, Cassel, No. 2020-04062 (April 23, 2021)(herein after
“Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum”).
16
Id. at 7.
17
Id. at 9.
18
Id. at 10.
19
Id. at 12.
20
See Defendant’s Memorandum at 15 and Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum at 12.
21
See Vaccarello v. Vaccarello, 757 A.2d 909, 911 (Pa. 2000).
22
See Carosone v. Carosone, 688 A.2d 733, 735 (Pa.Super. 1997).
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desire to settle and determine their respective property rights finally and for all time \[the
23
agreement\] should be construed as a postnuptial agreement.’” In contrast, “‘a
separation agreement does not constitute, nor is it intended to constitute, a full and final
24
determination of the separate property rights of the parties.’” Rather, separation
agreements are “‘customarily a surrender of the \[spouse\]'s right to support in
25
consideration of some property settlement.’”
26
The law of contracts governs marital settlement agreements.
When construing agreements involving clear and unambiguous terms, this
Court need only examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties'
understanding. The court must construe the contract only as written and
may not modify the plain meaning of the words under the guise of
interpretation. When the terms of a written contract are clear, this Court
will not re-write it to give it a construction in conflict with the accepted and
27
plain meaning of the language used.
The complete language of the Agreement sub judice, states:
September 12, 2019
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
As part of our impending separation and divorce, neither I, Christine E.
Cassel, nor Ronald R. Cassel, will be filing for or paying alimony to one
another. I, Christine E. Cassel, will not ask for 50% of Ronald’s pension.
As we both are determined to maintain our good credit ratings, we are
working together to resolve all personal and joint financial obligations
28
which will no way affect our abilities to pay our debts.
23
Vaccarello, 757 A.2d at 911 (quoting Makowski v. Makowski, 62 A.2d 71, 72 (Pa. Super. 1948)).
24
Wareham by Trout v. Wareham, 716 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa. Super.1998)(quoting Commonwealth ex rel.
DiValerio v. DiValerio, 82 A.2d 687, 688 (Pa. Super. 1951)).
25
Id.
26
Vaccarello, 757 A.2d at 914 (citing Sorace v. Sorace, 655 A.2d 125 (Pa. Super. 1995).
27
Id. (quoting Carosone, 688 A.2d at 735).
28
See Defendant’s Exhibit 8 (emphasis in original).
Page 5 of 7
By its plain words, the Agreement is absolutely clear. The very first sentence
reads, “As part of our impending separation and divorce…” Here the parties are to
do something in as part of an impending separation/divorce. The condition precedent is
the “impending separation.” As part of condition precedent, the parties are to perform.
If the condition does not exist, the parties do not perform. The disposition of property or
promise to perform is not separate from the impending separation.
29
Compare the terms in Vaccarello and in In re Ray’s Estate. In Ray’s Estate, the
husband executed an irrevocable trust for the benefit of wife and wife’s daughter and a
codicil cancelling all provisions for the benefit of his wife and their daughter in return for
wife’s release of all claims against husband as if they have never been married. The
terms were executed, rang with finality, and settled all claims.
In Vaccarello, the terms included mutually waiving inchoate intestate rights, full
and complete settlement and release of any and all claims, entire understanding
between the parties, and binding upon the heirs, administrators, executors and assigns
30
of the parties. Additionally, the husband executed a change in his will and deeds to
three properties.
If one looks at the promises in the instant Agreement, they do not constitute “a
31
full and final determination of the separate property rights of the parties.” It certainly
covers alimony and “Ronald’s pension,” but it does not cover the two houses, vehicles,
other marital assets and debt. Indeed, the plain language indicates the parties are still
“working together to resolve all our personal and joint financial obligations…” It is not a
final accounting of the separate property rights of the parties.
The Agreement is a separation agreement.
In order abrogate the separation agreement, however, the parties would need to
reconcile. Wife contends in support of reconciliation, she cancelled the lease on her
apartment, the parties lived together for approximately five more months, they
recommenced saying “love you,” ran errands for each other, and acted as a joint
economic unit. Husband contends Wife selectively produced only eight days’ worth of
text messages and that although there may have been some efforts at reconciliation,
the efforts were never fully realized. Further, he did start to separate assets and pay
marital debt.
29
In re Ray's Estate, 156 A. 64 (Pa. 1931)(discussed in Vaccarello, 757 A.2d at 913).
30
See Vaccarello 757 A.2d at 912.
31
See Vaccarello 737 A.2d at 911; see also Wareham, 716 A.2d at 677.
Page 6 of 7
However, the sum of the testimony supports the contention the parties
reconciled. Wife did indeed cancel her lease and the parties once again lived as
husband and wife until wife moved out of the home in February 2020. They used terms
of endearment and operated as a joint economic unit. It was only after that wife moved
out in late April/early May 2020 that Husband began to refinance the home and retitle
certain vehicles. Therefore, the Agreement was unexecuted prior to reconciliation.
Because the Agreement at issue is construed as a separation agreement,
instead of a post-nuptial agreement or marital settlement agreement, and because the
parties’ subsequent reconciliation abrogated the Agreement, Husband’s Petition for
Special Relief to Enforce Oral and Written Marital Settlement Agreement is denied. As
this rationale is dispositive of the issues raised in Husband’s Petition, the Court need
not reach Husband’s or Wife’s other arguments.
By the Court,
__________________________
Matthew P. Smith, J.
Anthony M. Hoover, Esquire
1035 Mumma Road, Suite 103
Lemoyne, PA 17043
Karen L. DeMarco, Esquire
3901 Market Street
Camp Hill, PA 17011
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