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HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-8799 equitySHAWN WESTHAFER & JUANITA & PAUL WESTHAFER, his parents, Petitioners Vo CUMBERLAND VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT By its Superintendent, ANTHONY J. COLISTRA, Ed.D., Respondent · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · ·NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY o IN RE: PETITION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND NOW, this BEFORE GUIDO, J. ORDER OF COURT day of JANUARY, 2001, for the reasons stated in the attached opinion, Petitioner's request for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. By Edward E. Guido, J. John M. Glace, Esquire 132-134 Walnut Street Harrisburg, Pa. 17101-1612 C. Roy Weidner, Jr., Esquire P.O. Box 109 301 Market Street Lemoyne, Pa. 17043 :sld SHAWN WESTHAFER & JUANITA & PAUL WESTHAFER, his parents, Petitioners V· · CUMBERLAND VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT By its Superintendent, ANTHONY J. COLISTRA, Ed.D., Respondent · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ·NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY TERM · · IN RE' PETITION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,. BEFORE GUIDO, J. OP1NION AND ORDER OF COURT Shawn Westhafer (hereinafter "petitioner") has filed this equity action seeking to enjoin the Cumberland Valley School District (hereinafter "District") from preventing his ~ Before participation in the interscholastic wrestling program for the 2000-2001 season. us is petitioner's request for a preliminary injunction seeking his immediate reinstatement on the wrestling team pending the final outcome of this litigation. A hearing was held on January 3,2001. The parties have filed briefs in support of their respective positions and the matter is now ready for disposition. FACT[ JAL BACKGROUND Petitioner is an 18 year old senior at Cumberland Valley High School. He is an accomplished wrestler who qualified to wrestle at the state championship level last year. ~ Although the action was commenced by petitioner and his parents, we will refer to Shawn as the petitioner for ease of reference. NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY He has been ranked as one of the best wrestlers in the area at his weight. He is hopeful of attending college on a wrestling scholarship, In June of 1997, respondent adopted Cumberland Valley School District Policy No. 122 which governs student participation in extracurricular activities, including interscholastic athletic events.2 Section 5 of the Policy contains a code of conduct. It also contains a procedure for the imposition of sanctions for violations of that code. In July of 2000, petitioner attended a three day wrestling camp at Lock Haven University. Thirty-nine other members of the District's wrestling team also attended that camp. Pursuant to PIAA roles, the District could not require its wrestlers to attend, nor could it pay their way or allow them to wear team uniforms while at the camp. Therefore, each attendee was there on a voluntary basis and paid for his own tuition, room and board. While attendance at the camp was voluntary, we are satisfied that all of those who attended from the District did so as part of its wrestling team. The camp was promoted to the members of the team by the District's coaches. The head wrestling coach and two of his assistants attended, as did a parent helper.3 The District rented a van to transport some of its wrestlers.4 Others were given rides with the head coach in his private vehicle, or made their own travel arrangements. All members of the team stayed in the same dorm along with the District's coaches and the parent helper. The coaches and the parent helper took an active role in coaching the team members, as well as making sure they got to training sessions and meets on time. 2 Joint Exhibit # 1. 3 They all paid their own expenses as required by PIAA regulations. 4 The van was paid for out of the travel portion of the District's athletic budget. NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY While at the camp, petitioner repeatedly hazed a younger (and much smaller) wrestler. The hazing could best be described as obscene and disgusting. It continued well after petitioner knew that it was deeply disturbing to the young wrestler. In fact, it did not stop until the young wrestler's big brother, who like petitioner is a senior wrestler, came to his aid. Even then, it took two physical confrontations, the second involving fisticuffs, to get petitioner to lay off. Petitioner's conduct crossed the line from obnoxious bullying into the realm of criminality.5 The second physical confrontation between petitioner and the victim's big brother was witnessed, and broken up, by the parent helper. This resulted in a cursory investigation by the wrestling coach, with no disciplinary action being taken. The young wrestler's parents were not willing to let petitioner's conduct stand without consequence. They reported the matter to the police and to Dr. Anthony Colistra, the District Superintendent. Following the procedures established in District Policy No. 122, Dr. Colistra caused a thorough investigation to be conducted. Administrative reviews and hearings were held, resulting in petitioner's expulsion from the wrestling team for the 2000-2001 season. PetitiOner appealed to Dr. Colistra, who sustained the expulsion.6 This suit followed. 5 He pled guilty to the summary offenses of harassment and disorderly conduct as a result of his conduct toward the young wrestler. 6 For purposes of this preliminary injunction proceeding, petitioner has agreed that the District complied with the administrative procedures set forth in the Policy. Further, the parties have agreed that petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies. NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY DISCUSSION We start our discussion with a matter of procedure. Petitioner commenced this action by filing a "Petition for Equitable Relief in the Form of a Preliminary Injunction". Pursuant to Pa. Rules of Civil Procedure 1007 and 1501, the appropriate procedure for commencing this action would have been to file a complaint in equity asking for a permanent injunction. The complaint should have been accompanied with, or followed by, a petition for a preliminary injunction in accordance with Pa. R.C.P. 1531. We note that the District has agreed to overlook this Procedural error in order to expedite this matter. The standard we must apply in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction has been clearly set forth by our appellate courts. As the Commonwealth Court has stated: [A] court may grant a preliminary injunction only where the moving party establishes the following elements: (1) that relief is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm which cannot be compensated by damages; (2) that greater injury will occur from refusing the injunction than from granting it; (3) that the injunction will restore the parties to the stares quo as it existed immediately before the alleged wrongful conduct; (4) that the alleged wrong is manifest, and the injunction is reasonably suited to abate it; and (5) that the plaintiff's right to relief is clear .... Lewis v. City of Harrisburg, 158 Pa. Comm. 318, 631 A.2d 807, 810 (1993). Further- more, our courts have long recognized that the grant of a preliminary injunction is a "harsh and extraordinary remedy". League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v.. Commonwealth, 683 A.2d 685,688. (Pa. Comm. 1996). Therefore, "it is to be granted only when and if each criteria has been fully and completely established." Id. (emphasis NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY in original). Since we are neither persuaded that petitioner's expulsion from the wrestling team is manifestly wrong, nor that his right to reinstatement is clear, we must deny his request for a preliminary injunction. The Public School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. § 1-101 et seq., grants the board of school directors broad authority to adopt roles and regulations regarding the conduct of its students. Specifically, pursuant to Section 510 (24 P.S. § 5-510) it "is empowered... to adopt and enforce such roles and regulations as it deems necessary and proper regarding.., the conduct and deportment of its pupils." Flynn-Scarcella v, Pocono Mountain School District, 745 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa. Comm. 2000). Furthermore, it may adopt reasonable roles and regulations regarding extra curricular activities and may provide for the "suspension, dismissal, or other reasonable penalty" in the case of a student who violates those roles or regulations. 24 P.S. {} 5-511. Local school boards have broad discretion in the adoption of such disciplinary policies and the courts should not interfere unless the school board's actions are "arbitrary capricious and prejudicial to the public interest." Flynn-Scarcella, supra., 745 A.2d at 120. Pursuant to that broad grant of authority, the Cumberland Valley School Board adopted Policy No. 122 which provides in part: e Code of Conduct. The following conduct shall constitute grounds for expulsion from practices, participation in interscholastic competition or other participation in extra-curricular activities during that particular season, when such conduct occurs on or off school grounds: ao The use of violence, force, coercion, threat, intimidation, or similar conduct in a manner that constitutes a substantial interference with school purposes. NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY g. Continual abusive language, or obscene gestures, or willful indecent exposure. he Engaging in any other activity forbidden by the laws of the State of Pennsylvania which actively constitutes a danger to other students or interferes with school purposes. Certainly, the petitioner's conduct could be deemed to have been a violation of any one of the above cited subsections.? Petitioner does not deny that his conduct was in violation of the Policy. His main attacks on the propriety of his expulsion are based upon an overly technical reading of the Policy. First, he argues that the wrestling camp cannot be deemed to have been an extra- curricular activity within the meaning of the policy because it was never approved by the school board.8 Therefore, he contends that his conduct at the camp cannot be grounds for expulsion from the wrestling program. There are several problems with this argument. In the first instance, the Policy specifically provides that it must be adhered to whether the student is "on or off school grounds." Furthermore, nothing in the code of conduct would indicate that it applies only while the student is engaged in a school, or school sponsored extra-curricular, activity. To accept such an interpretation would lead to untenable results. For instance, the 7 Dr. Colistra relied solely on subparagraph g in upholding the expulsion. However, both parties agree that, since there has been no school board adjudication, we are not being asked to assume appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S.A. 751, et seq. Rather, we are being asked to exercise original jurisdiction as a Court of equity. See F!ynn-Scarcella v. Pocono Mountain School District, supra. As such, we are not limited in our scope of review. 8 Section 2 of the Policy provides in relevant part: For purposes of this policy, "extra-curricular activities" shall be those activities, which are sponsored or approved by the Board but are not offered for credit toward graduation. Section 3 goes on to provide that: Any extra-curricular activity shall be considered to be under the sponsorship of this Board when it has been approved by the Superintendent and reported to the Board for their information and review. The evidence indicates that the wrestling camp was never submitted to the school board for their information and review. NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY District would not be able to sanction an athlete with steroids in his system9 unless it could prove that he used them at school or during a board approved extra-curricular activity. In any event, we are satisfied that the wrestling camp was properly determined by Dr. Colistra to be an extension of the District's wrestling program. We are not persuaded that the camp had to be approved by the school board any more than each individual practice session or exhibition meet would need to be approved by the board. The extra- ; curricular activity for purposes of Policy No. 122 is not the wrestling camp but the wrestling program itself. As set forth in our findings of fact, there was more than sufficient nexus between the camp and the program to support the finding that the former was part and parcel of the latter. Petitioner's next argument is that the literal language of the Policy does not allow for his suspenSion during the 2000-2001 season. He points to the language of Section 5 which provides. The following conduct shall constitute grounds for expulsion from practices, participation in interscholastic competition or other participation in extra-curricular activities during that particular season, when such conduct occurs on or off school grounds' (emphasis added). Since the offensive conduct occurred in July, during the off season, he contends that he cannot be expelled for the current season. We disagree.~° Clearly, the camp was in preparation for the 2000-2001 wrestling season and his suspension for "that particular season" is apPropriate. 9 Section 5(0 prohibits use of anabo'lic steroids. l0 The comma separating the phrases "during the particular season" and "when such conduct occurs" makes it clear that the latter phrase does not refer to the time of the conduct. Rather it refers to the location of the conduct, i.e. "on or off school property." NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY Petitioner finally argues that his expulsion is "fundamentally unfair and individually discriminatory.''~ Fairness is not the standard to be applied in cases such as this. We are not to substitute our judgment for that of the School District. As the Commonwealth Court recently stated in reversing a trial court's decision to overturn a school suspension' Clearly, the trial court did not conclude that the School District's actions were arbitrary, capricious, or prejudicial to the public interest but rather, that when Tyler was held accountable for his actions, the results were unfair. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the School District. Flynn-Scarcella v. Pocono Mountain School District, supra, 745 A.2d at 121. In the instant case, we cannot say that Doctor Colistra acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or against the public interest. Furthermore, the petitioner has not presented any evidence that he has been individually discriminated against. While the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that like persons in like circumstances will be treated equally, it does not require that they be treated identically. Curtis v. Kline, 542 Pa. 249, 666 A.2d 265 (1995). Although petitioner has shown that another wrestler who participated in the hazing received a lesser punishment, Dr. Colistra explained that there were sufficient differences in the conduct engaged in by the two students to justify the difference in treatment. Therefore, we are satisfied that nothing presented by petitioner rises to the level of a cognizable 14th Amendment claim. See J.S.v. Bethlehem School District, 757 A.2d 412 (Pa. Comm. 2000). Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petition for Preliminary Injunction, p. 5. NO. 2000-8799 EQUITY For the reasons set forth above, we will deny petitioner's request for a preliminary injunction. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 10TH day of JANUARY, 2001, for the reasons stated in the attached opinion, Petitioner's request for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. By the Court, John M. Glace, Esquire 132-134 Walnut Street Harrisburg, Pa 17101-1612 C. Roy Weidner, Jr., Esquire P.O. Box 109 301 Market Street Lemoyne, Pa. 17043 :sld /s/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. 9