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HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-1367 criminalCOMMONWEALTH go BRANDON WRIGHT ' IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ·NO. 2000-1367 CRIMINAL IN RE' DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE GUIDO, J. AND NOW, this ORDER OF COURT /t~ ~ day of JANUARY, 2001 for the reasons stated in the ~ attached opinion, defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. By the Court, Edward E. Guido, J. Jaime Keating, Esquire For the Commonwealth Jerry J. Russo, Esquire For the Defendant William Braught, Esquire For the Co-defendant :sld COMMONWEALTH go BRANDON WRIGHT · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · · 'NO. 2000-1367 CRIMINAL · IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE GUIDO, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Currently before us is the defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. He questions the la~vfulness of the warrantless search of his residence by his parole officer. He also attacks the validity of the search warrant subsequently obtained by the police as being tainted by the warrantless search of his home. An evidentiary heating was held, the parties have filed briefs and this matter is now ready for disposition. FINDINGS OF FACTS On November 4, 1999, the defendant was paroled for the balance of a sentence imposed for dealing drugs. He was placed under the supervision of the Cumberland County Probation and Parole Office. As a condition of parole, he gave permission to his parole officer'to search his home.1 During a visit to defendant's home on December 7, 1999, his parole officer, Mike Mason, observed a large pile of cash along with small plastic bags and scales on a table in the living room. Defendant explained that the cash was from a recent paycheck. However, the parole officer knew that defendant was not working and suspected that he See Commonwealth Hearing Exhibit 1. 2000-13 67 CRIMINAL was again inv°lved with drugs. To confirm his suspicions, Officer Mason had the defendant submit to a urine test on December 8, 1999. On December 15, 1999, he received the results which were positive for drug use. Refusing to give up on the defendant at that time, Officer Mason advised him that he would have to participate in a drug and alcohol counseling program. Numerous unsuccessful attempts were made to get the defendant involved in such a program between December of 1999, and his re-arrest in March of 2000. The defendant had three more drug tests over the next two months. Two of those tests were positive for drug use. The last urine specimen was taken on February 8, 2000 and the results came back hot on February 15, 2000. It was obvious to the parole officer that the defendant was living beyond his means. Despite a work history that was practically non-existent,2 the defendant was able to maintain a residence in a nice neighborhood and still have sufficient funds to use drugs.3 On March 7, 2000, his parole officer discovered that defendant had been fired from his most'recent job. At a staff meeting on March 8, 2000, Mr. Mason and his supervisor determined that defendant should be taken into custody for violating the terms and conditions of his parole.4 Officer Mason was also authorized to search the defendant's residence for evidence of drug usage,s On that same date, Mr. Mason called the defendant and directed him to appear at his office for a meeting on the morning of March 13, 2000.6 2 He had worked only a few days the entire time he was on parole. 3 He lived with his girlfriend who was also on parole for a prior drug delivery. 4 Using drugs, failing to maintain employment, and failing to enter into a drug and alcohol program as directed by his parole officer were all violations of his parole conditions. 5 Mr. Mason explained that the press of his caseload prevented him from taking quicker action after receiving the hot urine results on February 15, 2000. 6 He was not informed that he would be taken into custody at that time. 2000-1367 CRIMINAL The defendant appeared as directed and was taken into custody. His parole officer, accompanied by several other parole officers, then went to his residence to conduct a search.7 After spending only a minute or two searching, the officers observed contraband and evidence of drug usage and drug dealing.8 They left the residence and reported their findings to the local police.9 The police then obtained a search warrant based upon the information provided by the parole officers. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1 .) The parole officers had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a Parole violation and the search of his residence was reasonably related to their duties. Commonwealth'v.' Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 692 A.2d 1031 (1997); 61 P.S. § 331.27b. 2.) The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied. DISCUSSION Defendant attacks the lawfulness of the warrantless search of his home. In addition, since the subsequent search warrant was based upon information discovered during the warrantless search, he claims that the warrant is fatally defective. For the · reasons hereinafter stated, we hold that the initial warrantless search of his home by the parole officers and the subseqUent search by the police pursuant to a warrant were both valid. 7 This residence was listed on the parole agreement as the defendant's approved residence. 8 They observed a large sum of money stacked high with a $100 bill on the top. They also observed numerous small plastic baggies (commonly used to purchase drugs for resale), "philly blunts" (cigars used for making drugs) and hollowed out "philly blunts" (a common practice to prepare them to be filled with marijuana). The officers did not seize any evidence. 9 There had been no interaction between the parole office and the police regarding the suspected drug trafficking of the defendant before this time. We are satisfied that the parole officers were acting in furtherance of their own duties and not, as suggested by the defendant, to uncover evidence of criminal activity for the police. 2000-1367 CRIMINAL A parolee has limited Fourth Amendment fights because of a diminished expectation of privacy. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct. 3164 97 L.Ed. 2d 709 (1987). Pennsylvania recognizes that "a parolee must expect to have a diminished right to privacy as a condition of being released from prison early". Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, 692 A.2d at 1039. Therefore, a parolee is offered no greater protection under Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution than he is under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. In the Williams case, the Court was faced with the identical question before this Court, i.e. what is the effect of a parolee signing a parole agreement giving his parole officer authority to search his residence? The Williams Court held as follows' ... the parolee's signing of a parole agreement giving his parole officer permission to conduct a warrantless search does not mean either that the parole officer can conduct a search at any time and for any reason or that the parolee relinquishes his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. Rather, the parolee's signature acts as acknowledgment that the parole officer has a right to conduct reasonable searches of his residence listed on the parole agreement without a warrant. A search will be deemed reasonable if the totality of the evidence demonstrates' (1) that the parole officer had a reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a parole violation, and (2) that the search was reasonably related to the parole officer's duty. (emphasis added) 692 A.2d 1036.~° ~0 In November of 1995 the Pennsylvania Legislative enacted legislation which provides as follows' Searches by county probation and parole officers (2) A property search may be conducted by any officer if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the possession of or under the control of the offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision. 61 P.S. § 331.27b (d)(2). This was passed after the Williams case arose but before it was decided. The legislation specifically provides that it shall not be construed "to permit searches and seizures in violation of the constitution of the United States or Section 8 Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania." 61 P.S. § 331.27b(b). Therefore, the Williams decision is still controlling. 2000-1367 CRIMINAL In the case before us, the parole officer had a "reasonable suspicion" that defendant had violated his parole. He had failed three drug tests, failed to maintain regular employment, and had not followed through with drug and alcohol counseling as directed. Further, the search was reasonably related to the parole officer's duties. The defendant's home was being searched for evidence of drug use, including drugs or drug paraphernalia. The search was not conducted to obtain independent evidence of a crime or to aid the police. In fact, as soon as the parole officers realized that the home might contain evidence that could lead to consequences more serious than a parole violation, the search was stopped and the matter was mined over to the local police. We are satisfied' that the parole officer's conduct met the dictates of Williams. Therefore, the warrantless_search of defendant's residence did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the .United States Constitution or Section 8 Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution.~ Since the only basis for his challenge to the search warrant is that it was tainted by the alleged illegality of the warrantless search, the challenge is without merit. ~1 Defendant argues that his parole officer's information was stale, since he received the results of the last drug test almost a month prior to the search. We disagree. In the first instance, part of a parole officer's function is "to assist the offenders in their rehabilitation and reassimilation into the community". 61 P.S. § 331.27 b(a). Defendant's officer was doing that from the time defendant was paroled until his re-arrest on March 13, 2000. He was under no obligation to take him into custody on the date he failed the drug tests. On the contrary, he was well within his authority to try to get him into drug counseling and to see that he obtained regular employment. However, once he determined to take him into custody, the defendant's failing three out of four drug tests in the first three months after his release gave his parole officer the requisite reasonable suspicion to conclude that evidence of drug use would be in his home. This is especially tree since the defendant had not had any intervening drug counseling. 2000-1367 CRIMINAL For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, we will deny defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 18TM day of JANUARY, 2001, for the reasons stated in the attached opinion, defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. By the Court, Is~ Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. Jaime Keating, Esquire For the Commonwealth Jerry J. Russo, Esquire For the Defendant William Braught, Esquire For the Co-defendant :sld