Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-1366 criminalCOMMONWEALTH Vo GIANNINA BARNES · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : · NO. 2000-1366 CRIMINAL TERM : : IN RE- MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE GUIDO, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ! ~ day of JANUARY, 2001, for the reasons set forth in the attached opinion, Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. By Edward E. Guido, J. District Attorney Public Defender Jerry Russo, Esquire For the Co-defendant 'sld COMMONWEALTH go GIANNINA BARNES · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · 'NO. 2000-1366 CRIMINAL TERM · · IN RE' MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE GUIDO, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Currently before us is the defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. She questions the lawfulness of the warrantless search of her residence by her probation officer. She also attacks the validity of the search warrant subsequently obtained by the police as being tainted by the warrantless search of her home. In addition, she argues that the search warrant was fatally flawed because it did not contain sufficient probable cause to justify its issuance. Finally, she contends that the search warrant is invalid for lack of particularity. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence was consolidated with that of her codefendant for hearing purposes. The joint evidentiary hearing was held on December 19, 2000. The parties have filed briefs, and this matter is now ready for disposition. F1ND1NGS OF FACTS On February 22, 2000, the defendant received a probationary sentence in connection with a drug charge. She was placed under the supervision of the Cumberland County Probation and Parole Office. On February 23, 2000, she signed conditions of 2000-1366 CRIMINAL probation in which she agreed to the search of her home by members of the probation office.~ At the end of February or beginning of March, 2000, shortly after her probation began, she failed a drug test administered by her probation officer. This was a direct violation of the terms of her probation.2 On March 12, 2000, her probation officer participated in a search of her residence along with several other members of the Cumberland County Probation Office. The residence also belonged to her codefendant who had been taken into custody that same day as a result of Violating conditions of his parole, including the use of drugs. The facts set forth in a Separate opinion filed in connection with the codefendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence are adopted as part of this opinion and incorporated herein by reference. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1 .) The probation officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a Probation violation and the search of her residence was reasonably related to their duties. Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 697 A.2d 1031 (1997); 61 P.S. {} 331.27b. 2.) The facts contained within the four comers of the search warrant provide sufficient probable cause for its issuance. 3.) The search warrant is not invalid for lack of particularity. 4.) Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied. ~ She shared a residence with her boyfriend, the codefendant in connection with these charges, from the time of his parole on drug delivery charges in November of 1999, until their arrest on these charges. 2 Conditions of her probation included compliance with the laws of this Commonwealth and a prohibition from possessing or using drugs or drug paraphernalia. 2000-1366 CRIMINAL DISCUSSION The legality of the warrantless search by the parole officers was also raised by the codefendant. For the reasons set forth in that case, we hold that the search of defendant's residence by the Cumberland County Probation and Parole officers was 3 proper. Since we have held that the search by the parole officers was valid, the challenge to the warrant based upon the illegality of the warrantless search by the parole offices is without merit. However, we must still address defendant's other attacks upon the validity of the warrant, i.e., the sufficiency of the probable cause and the lack of particularity in connection with the items to be seized. Sufficiency of Probable Cause. Only the information within the four comers of the search warrant may be examined in determining whether there was probable cause for its issuance. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 382, 586 A.2d 887, 891 (1991); Pa. R. Crim. P. 2003. "The standard for evaluating whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant is the 'totality of the circumstances' test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)." Commonwealth v. Baker, 513 Pa. 23, 518 A.2d 802, 803 (1986). That test was adopted as the law of this Commonwealth by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921, (1985). As the Gray Court said' 3 The codefendant was on parole rather than on probation. However, the analysis of the issue is the same, since "the constitutional rights of a parolee are indistinguishable from that of a probationer." Commonwealth v, Williams, supra, 697 A.2d at 1035, n.7. 2000-1366 CRIMINAL The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,.., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for.., conclud(ing) that probable cause existed." 503 A.2d at 925. The probable cause affidavit in the instant case set forth the following facts: The codef,::ndant and co-occupant of the house to be searched xvas on parole for prior drug violations. · He had been arrested for violations of that parole. His parole' officers discovered a large sum of cash stacked on a coffee table in the home. The top bill on the stack was a $100 bill. · Numerous small square zip lock baggies were discovered in one of many empty cigar boxes located in the house. The baggies were of both the 1" x 1" and 2" x 2" variety. The affiant had been involved in over 500 drug investigations. · The small square zip lock baggies are commonly used to package cocaine. The above facts were sufficient to allow the magistrate to make a practical common sense decision that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the residence and we are satisfied that she had a substantial basis upon which to base her conclusion that probable cause existed.4 4 This case is much closer than it had to be. There were many facts not contained in the probable cause affidavit which could, and should, have been. For instance, there was no logical explanation for the large amount of cash since the defendant had not been meaningfully employed during the four months he was on parole. Hollowed out "philly blunts" were observed in the residence. These are commonly used for smoking marijuana. The "parole violations" for which the co-defendant had been arrested included drug use and failure to enroll in a drug and alcohol treatment program. 2000-1366 CRIMINAL Sufficient Particularity. Defendant objects to the inclusion of the phrase "proceeds from drug transactions" in the "items to be searched for and seized" portion of the warrant. She argues that this makes the warrant unconstitutionally vague and overbroad since it provides no means by which the police could determine what would constitute "proceeds form drug transactions." She envisions unfettered discretion to "seize jewelry, furniture, checkbooks, credit cards, and cash". A warrant lacking in particularity is invalid under both the Fourth Amendment to the United states Constitution and Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.5 Pennsylvania's "requirement is more stringent than that of the Fourth Amendment, which merely requires particularity in the description. The Pennsylvania Constitution further requires the description to be as particular as is reasonably possible." Commonwealth v. Grossman, 521 Pa. 290, 296, 555 A.2d 896, 899 (1989). Defendant has not cited, nor were we able to find, any case which holds that the phrase "proceeds from drug transactions" is overly broad. While not specifically addressing the issue of overbroadness, the Superior Court indicated that a search warrant authorizing th:e seizure of"proceeds from drug sales" was valid. Commonwealth v. Speaks, 351 Pa. Super. 149, 156, 505 A.2d 310, 314 (1986). In Commonwealth v. Bleigh, 402 Pa. Super. 169, 586 A.2d 450, (1991) the search warrant authorized the seizure of 5 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause.., and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "no warrant to search a place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be..." Pa. Const., Art. 1 § 8. 2000-1366 CRIMINAL "any and all sexually oriented materials, including magazines, movies, sexual devices, records of ownership/occupancy/employment, any cash monies or proceeds derived form the sale of said material, and/or sexual activity." (emphasis added) 586 A.2d at 451. The defendant in Bleigh attacked the warrant's validity on several grounds, including lack of particularity. The Superior Court specifically held that "our review of the search warrant leads us to conclude that it adequately described the... things to be seized." 586 A.2d at 454. After reviewing this warrant in its entirety we are satisfied that the phrase "proceeds from drug transactions" is sufficiently specific to meet the dictates of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. To hold otherwise would require an unduly technical interpretation of the particularity requirements of those constitutions. Furthermore, we see no meaningful distinction between the language of the warrant in this case and that in Bleigh, supra. For the reasons set forth above, defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence will be denied. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 18TM day of JANUARY, 2001, for the reasons set forth in the attached opinion, Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. By the Court, District Attorney /s/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. Public Defender Jerry Russo, Esquire