Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-7651 civilWILLIAM SCOTT EVANS V, BRIAN ROWLES and, EXEL LOGISTICS · 1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · · NO. 99-7651 CIVIL TERM IN RE' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OF DEFENDANT ROWLES BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS, GUIDO, J J, AND NOW, this ORDER OF COURT t~& day of FEBRUARY, 2001, for the reasons set forth in the attached opinion the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by defendant Rowles is DENIED. By the Edward E. Guido, J. Michael B. Scheib, Esquire 110 South Northern Way York, Pa. 17402 Stephen E. Geduldig, Esquire 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 999 Harrisburg, Pa. 17108 James J. Kayer, Esquire 4 East Liberty Avenue Carlisle, Pa. 17103 :sld WILLIAM SCOTT EVANS V. BRIAN ROWLES and, EXEL LOGISTICS · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ·NO. 99-7651 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OF. DEFENDANT ROWLES BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS, GUIDO, JJ.. OP1NION AND ORDER OF COURT CUrrently before us is the motion of Defendant Brian Rowles for judgment on the pleadings. The motion is opposed by both plaintiff and defendant Exel Logistics. The parties have briefed and argued their respective positions. This matter is now ready for disposition. FACT[ IAL BACKGROUND A review of the pleadings reveals the following undisputed facts. Plaintiff and defendant Rowles were both employed by defendant Exel Logistics. They were working the third shift on January 18 into January 19, 1998. Shortly before the end of their shift, both plaintiff and defendant Rowles received permission from their supervisor to go outside to warm up their vehicles. The vehicles were parked in a private lot.~ On the way back to work, plaintiff was struck and seriously injured by a vehicle operated by defendant Rowles. Both plaintiff and defendant Rowles allege that the lot was maintained by defendant Exel. Defendant Exel denies that 'it maintained the lot. See paragraph 11 of the complaint and answers. 99-7651 CIVIL TERM DISCUSSION Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 1034(a) provides that "(a)f~er the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." A motion for judgment on the pleadings should only be granted where the pleadings demonstrate that no genuine issue of fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hammerstein v. Lindsay, 440 Pa. Super. 350, 655 A.2d 597, 600-601 (1995). Judgment on the pleadings should be granted only in cases which are clear and free from doubt such that a trial would be fruitless (Id). Defendant Rowles argues that plaintiff's suit is barred by the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act.2 "If an injury is compensable under the Act, the compensation provided by the Act is the employee's exclusive remedy." Wasserman v. Fifth & Reed Hospital, 442 Pa. Super. 563,569, 660 A.2d 600, 604 (1995). Where an employee's injury is sustained in the course of employment, both the employer and co- employees are immunized from suit.3 There are two distinct situations where an injury is considered to qualify an employee for Worker's compensation benefits. They are as follows: (1) where the employee, whether on or off the employer's premises, is injured while actually engaged in the furtherance of the employer's business or affairs, or (2) where the employee, although not actually engaged in the furtherance of the employer's business or affairs (a) is on the premises occupied or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer's business or affairs are being carried on; (b) is required by the nature of his employment to be present on his employer's premises; and (c) sustains injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by operation of the employer's business or affairs thereon. 2 77 P.S. § 1 et seq. 3 77 P.S. §§ 72 and 481. 99-7651 CIVIL TERM Motion COntrol Industrie~ v. W0rkmen'$ Compensation Appeal Board, 145 Pa. Cmwlth, 399, 403,603 A.2d 675,677 (1992). (emphasis added). Based upon the record before us, we cannot state as a matter of law that plaintiff's injuries are compensable under the' Act. There are still material issues of fact in dispute. It is not clear whether the injury occurred on premises occupied or under the control of defendant Exel or whether the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the condition of the premises or by operation of the employer's affairs thereon. We agree with defendant Exel that discovery is needed to shed more light on these matters. Therefore, defendant Rowe's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings must be denied. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 15TM day of FEBRUARY, 2001, for the reasons set forth in the attached opinion the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by defendant Rowles is DENIED. By the Court, Michael B. Scheib, Esquire Stephen E. Geduldig, Esquire James J. Kayer, Esquire 'sld /S/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J.