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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-4683 civil1951 ASSOCIATES, a Pennsylvania' IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Partnership and MARSHALL K. DAVIS, Partner and individually, Plaintiffs Vo BRUCE SZCZYPTA and KIM EBERTS SZCZYPTA, Defendants ·CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · NO. 98-4683 CIVIL TERM · CIVIL ACTION- LAW IN RE: DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER, GUIDO, JJ. AND NOW, this ii,t ORDER OF COURT day of APRIL, 2001, defendant Bruce Szczypta's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are GRANTED. Plaintiffs are granted leave .to file an amended pleading within twenty (20) days. By the~,lm~ Edward E. Guido, J. James .L. Walsh, Esquire For the Plaintiffs Mark C. Duffle, Esquire For the Defendants 'sld 1951 ASSOCIATES, a Pennsylvania' IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Partnership and MARSHALL K. · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA DAVIS, Partner and individually, · Plaintiffs · BRUCE SZCZYPTA and KIM EBERTS SZCZYPTA, Defendants · 'NO. 98-4683 CIVIL TERM · · IN RE' DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER, GUIDO, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT This action seeks to impose liability upon defendants for damages allegedly caused to rental property owned by plaintiffs. Currently before us are defendant Bruce Szczypta's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, those preliminary objections will be granted. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On May 1, 1996, defendant Kim Eberts (now Kim Eberts-Szczypta), along with a Randall Eberts, entered into a lease agreement with plaintiffs for the residence located at 1951 Lenox Street, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.~ On May 1, 1997, the lease was renewed by defendant Kim Eberts alone.2 The lease agreement dated May 1, 1996, did not allow pets.3 The lease agreement dated May 1, 1997, allowed one dog to be on the premises.4 Complaint paragraph 5. Complaint paragraph 6. Complaint exhibit A. Complaint exhibit B. NO. 98-4683 CIVIL TERM Sometime after May 1, 1997, defendant Bruce Szczypta moved into the premises with defendant Kim Eberts.5 The defendants vacated the property on April 1, 1998.6 Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs determined that damage exceeding $6000 had been done to the unit.7 The majority of the damage resulted from pet urine on the carpeting.8 Notice of the damage was sent by letter to defendant Kim Eberts-Szczypta on April 23, 1998.9 DISCUSSION The standard to be applied to preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer was succinctly stated by our Supreme Court as follows: A demurrer can only be sustained where the complaint is clearly insufficient to establish the pleader's right to relief. For the purpose of testing the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits as true all well-pleaded, material, relevant facts, and every inference fairly deducible from those facts. Since the sustaining of a demurrer results in a denial of the pleader's claim or a dismissal of his suit, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Allegheny County v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360, 372 490 A.2d 402, 408 (1985) (citations omitted). Furthermore, when ruling upon a demurrer, we are limited to a review of the allegations set forth in the complaint. Mellon Bank, N.A.v. Fabinyi, 437 Pa. Super. 559, 650 A.2d 895 (1994). Applying the above standard to the case at bar, we are satisfied that the demurrer must be granted. The only substantive allegation made in the complaint regarding 5 Complaint paragraph 7. The complaint contains no indication as to why or when defendant Kim Eberts became Kim Eberts Szczypta. 6 Complaint paragraph 9. 7 Complaint paragraph 10. 8 Complaint paragraph 11. 9 Complaint paragraph 10. NO. 98-4683 CIVIL TERM defendant Bruce Szczypta is that he moved into the premises sometime after May 1, 1997. There is no allegation that he owned, or was in any way responsible for, the dog that allegedly caused the damage to the property. Neither is there any allegation that he independently caused damage to the property. Plaintiffs argue that the marriage relationship between defendants, coupled with his moving into the premises, makes Bruce Szczypta a party to the lease. However, there is no allegation in the complaint that the parties were married during the period of their 10 tenancy. For the reasons set forth above, we will enter the order that follows. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 11TI-I day of APRIL, 2001, defendant Bruce Szczypta's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are GRANTED. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file an amended pleading within twenty (20) days. By the Court, /s/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. James L. Walsh, Esquire For the Plaintiffs Mark C. Duffle, Esquire For the Defendants :sld l0 Plaintiffs rely on $chweitzer v. Evans., 360 Pa. 552, 63 A.2d 39 (1949). This case has been interpreted to stand for the proposition that one spouse can bind the other spouse to a contract that benefits them both, so long as the other spouse expressly or tacitly acquiesces in the contract. Roman Mosaic and Tile Company v. Vollrath, 226 Pa. Super. 215,313 A.2d 305 (1973). However, virtually every case we could find involved a contract involving property owned by the parties as tenants by the entireties. In other words, the marriage relationship existed at the time the contract was executed. Plaintiffs have not cited, nor did we find, any case which binds one spouse to a lease executed by the other prior to marriage, absent an express agreement to be bound thereby.