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HomeMy WebLinkAbout004505 civilLAURI A. B ECKER Ve DAVID J. BECKER · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · : · NO. 2000-4505 CIVIL : · · CIVIL ACTION- LAW IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 Guido, J., May 24, 2001 On February 28, 2001, we entered an order denying the defendant's petition to ~ Defendant filed this timely appeal. He alleges that we enforce a postnuptial agreement. erred in failing to enforce the agreement. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The parties were married on March 28, 1989. They have two children, ages eleven and six. Their marital relationship could be described as rocky, at best. They argued constantly and separated often. The relevant separation for purposes of this action occurred in September of 1998. At that time, plaintiff and the two children moved into an apartment. The separation resulted in the institution of a divorce action, as well as support and custody proceedings. As part of the custody proceedings, the parties were ordered to undergo an evaluation by Dr. Stanley Schneider. Because of defendant's refusal to pay the necessary fees, the evaluation process did not begin until the spring of 1999. The parties and the children had several meetings with Dr. Schneider. In June of 1999, the process was put The order was filed on March 2, 2001. 2000-4505 CIVIL TERM on hold so that the parties could begin counseling to work out their anger toward each other. However, despite agreeing to do so, defendant never attended the counseling. On July 5, 1999, plaintiff advised Dr. Schneider to continue with the evaluation process. Dr. Schneider advised that no further meetings were necessary. He needed only to write the evaluation and forward it to the attorneys. On September 10 or 11, 1999, plaintiff received a letter which purported to be from Dr. Schneider.2 It was addressed to her and contained Dr. Schneider's recommendation for shared custody of the children, with each party having primary physical custody on an alternating weekly basis. The letter was on Dr. Schneider's stationary and contained what appears to be his signature. However, the letter was not from Dr. Schneider and his signature was forged.3 We note that defendant is very controlling. During the course of the marriage, plaintiff and the children were often subjected to emotional abuse. Defendant was adamantly opposed to the separation and wanted his wife and children to return home. During the separation, he used the children as a tool to get plaintiff to reconcile. Although he visited them infrequently, he threatened to continue to fight for custody until the youngest child turned eighteen (18). He lied to plaintiff, telling her that Dr. Schneider was good friends with his attorney and that he would decide in his favor. When plaintiff got the forged letter, she was devastated. She became physically ill and cried continuously. She was convinced that the shared custody arrangement would not be in the best interest of her children. She viewed herself as the nurturing 2 See plaintiff's Exhibit 4. 3 Based upon all of the evidence and circumstances present in this case, we are satisfied that the letter was sent to plaintiff by the 'defendant. 2000-4505 CIVIL TERM parent. She truly believed that the defendant could not properly care for the children's needs. She was also convinced that they needed to be protected from his fits of rage and emotional abuse. Shortly after she received the letter, defendant called plaintiff. He asked whether she was ready to give up the fight and to reconcile. He called her continuously for the next several days. Despite her pleas that the children were better off with her, defendant threatened to continue the custody fight if she and the children did not move back home. He pointed out that she would lose her child support, as well as the children. Plaintiff was emotionally distraught. She felt that she had no alternative but to move back in with her husband, for the sake of her children. On September 15 or 16, 1999, she finally agreed to return to the marital home at the expiration of her apartment lease on September 30. On September 27, 1999, the plaintiffhad made arrangements for the defendant to spend time with their son, while she took their daughter to a recital. The parties agreed to meet in the parking lot of a local mall at 6:30 p.m. Since her daughter's recital was to start at 7'00 p.m., plaintiff was on a tight schedule. When she arrived, defendant approached her vehicle and told her that she had to sign the postnuptial agreement which underlies this action. She said that she needed time to read it.4 Defendant told her that she would have plenty of time to read it, after it was signed. Plaintiff protested, saying that she could not sign something she did not read. Defendant then played his trump cards. He told plaintiff that if she did not sign the agreement on the spot, she could not move back into the home. He further threatened to implement the custody arrangement 4 The agreement contained 14 pages and numerous exhibits. We find as a fact that the agreement was never mentioned to her, let alone seen by her, prior to that point. 2000-4505 CIVIL TERM recommended by Dr. Schneider. Since plaintiff had already given up her apartment, and since she feared for her children's welfare, she signed the agreement without reading it.5 Although plaintiff moved back into the marital home, she and defendant slept in separate bedrooms. Nothing had changed. Defendant still refused counseling and still abused plaintiff emotionally. Plaintiff and the children again moved out in February, 2000. The instant divorce action was commenced in June, 2000. On October 2, 2000, defendant filed the petition to enforce the postnuptial agreement of September 27, 1999. Plaintiff raised the forged letter of Dr. Schneider as grounds to void the agreement.6 DISCUSSION The definitive authority on the validity of marital agreements is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case ofSimeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990). As the Simeone Court noted: Prenuptial agreements are contracts, and, as such, should be evaluated under the same criteria as are applicable to other types of contracts. ... Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their agreements. Id. at 400, 581 A.2d at 165.7 Simone went on to hold If an agreement provides that full disclosure has been made, a presumption of full disclosure arises. If a spouse attempts to rebut this presumption through an assertion of fraud or misrepresentation then this presumption can be rebutted if it is proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 403, 581 A.2d at 167. Defendant did not even give her a copy until two months after she had moved back home. The agreement is incredibly one sided. Plaintiff gives up everything and gets little, or nothing, in return. Plaintiff did not discover the forgery until August of 2000. Simeone dealt with a prenuptial agreement. However, the same principles of law apply when analyzing posmuptial agreements. Adams v. Adams, 414 Pa. Super. 634, 607 A.2d 1116, (1992). 2000-4505 CIVIL TERM Having recited the facts as we found them to be, the rationale for our decision is clear.8 The defendant secured plaintiff's signature on the agreement through both fraud and duress. His actions were at least unconscionable and possibly criminal. Those actions wore down plaintiff's ability to resist his demands. To enforce an agreement obtained under these circumstances would amount to a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, 9 we declined to do so. DATE Edward E. Guido, J. Samuel Andes, Esquire Laurie Saltzgiver, Esquire 8 We resolved most issues of credibility in favor of plaintiff. She was honest and forthright in her testimony. Seeing her testify, we are satisfied that her concern for the welfare of her children, and her fear of the prospect of having them live twenty six weeks per year with their father, was genuine. Furthermore, we are convinced that the only reason she reconciled with her husband was because of that fear. We are also convinced that her version of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the postnuptial agreement was truthful. 9 Defendant also alleges that we erred in refusing to admit an affidavit of plaintiff's landlord. We disallowed this evidence because the landlord was not subject to cross-examination. "The right of a litigant to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is essential to due process." City of Philadelphia v. Tasker, 119 Pa. Commonwealth 519, 523 547 A.2d 1261, 1267-1268 (1988).