HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-3184 civilEARL L. KNISELY and
MARGARET D. KNISELY,
Plaintiffs
Vo
CONSOLIDATED RAIL
CORPORATION,
Defendant
' IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
· CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
· NO. 99-3184 CIVIL TERM
·
' CIVIL ACTION- LAW
:
IN RE' PLAINTIFFS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
TO DEFENDANT'S ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER TO
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED COMPI~AINT
.,B, EFORE BAYLEY~ GUIDO~ JJ.
AND NOW, this
ORDER OF COURT
day of JUNE, 2001, for the reasons set forth in the
accompanying opinion, Plaintiffs' Preliminary Objections to Defendant's Answer with
New Matter to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint are DISMISSED.
By
Edward E. Guido, J.
G. Sander Davis, Esquire
For the Plaintiffs
Craig J. Staudemaier, Esquire
For the Defendants
'sld
EARL L. KNISELY and
MARGARET D. KNISELY,
Plaintiffs
ge
CONSOLIDATED RAIL
CORPORATION,
Defendant
· IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
· CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
o
· NO. 99-3184 CIVIL TERM
· CIVIL ACTION- LAW
IN RE' PLAINTIFFS' PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
TO DEFENDANT'S ANSWER WITH NEW MATTER TO
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED COMPI.AINT
BEFORE BAYLEY, GUIDO, JJ.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Before us are plaintiffs' preliminary objections requesting that we strike
defendant's answer to their second amended complaint. For the reasons hereinafter set
forth, the preliminary objections will be denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 26, 1999, plaintiff Earl Knisely commenced this action by filing a two-
count complaint. The first count contained a claim under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act.~ The second count sounded in common law negligence. Defendant filed
timely preliminary objections to both counts. Prior to the disposition of those objections,
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On July 16, 1999, defendant filed a second set of
preliminary objections which were addressed only to the FELA claim contained in count
one.
~45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
99-3184 CIVIL TERM
Defendant's preliminary objections to the amended complaint were briefed and
argued by the parties. On November 16, 1999, the Honorable Edgar B. Bayley filed an
opinion and order dismissing those preliminary objections. Defendant never filed an
answer to the amended complaint.
Over the next five months there was extensive docket activity involving discovery
motions. The docket reflects no activity from April 14, 2000, until plaintiffs' current
counsel entered his appearance on December 4, 2000. Thereafter, the docket activity
increased significantly.
On December 28, 2000, defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment in
connection with the FELA count. On January 17, 2001, counsel for both parties filed a
stipulation allowing plaintiff to file a second amended complaint.2 The stipulation
provided as follows'
o
,
o
(emphasis added).
The Second Amended Complaint attached to this. stipulated (sic) shall
be filed of record.
The Defendant's answer filed to the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
filed in this matter shall be deemed to apply to and be responsive to
this Second Amended Complaint without the necessity of the
Defendant filing any additional pleading. Insofar as the Second
Amended Complaint makes any new allegations or claims, or contains
any different wording, the Defendant shall be presumed to deny all of
same as if a specific answer were filed to such changes.
The filing of this Second Amended Complaint shall not affect in any
way Defendant's pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
2 The second amended complaint added a claim for past and furore medical bills (paragraph 28). It also
added plaintiff's wife, Margaret D. Knisely, as a party plaintiff and included a loss of consortium claim on
her behalf. It was filed two days before the statute of limitations expired.
99-3184 CIVIL TERM
On February 9, 2001, plaintiffs' counsel filed a brief in opposition to defendant's
motion for partial summary judgrnent.3 Defendant's failure to file an answer was raised
for the first time in that brief.4 Defendant's counsel received a copy of the brief on
February 12, 2001 .s He immediately filed an answer to plaintiffs' second amended
complaint.6 The plaintiffs ask us to strike that answer as untimely.
DISCUSSION
pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1028(d) defendant's answer to plaintiffs' amended
complaint should have been filed on December 6, 1999, twenty (20) days after Judge
Bayley denied its preliminary objections. Plaintiffs argue that the delay of fourteen (14)
months is inexcusable. Therefore, they contend that defendant's answer with new matter
to their second amended complaint should be stricken. This argument is not supported
by law, reason, or common sense.
Even if we were being asked to strike an untimely answer to the amended
complaint, we would still be inclined to deny the request. "It is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court 'to permit a late filing of a pleading where the opposing party
will not be prejudiced and justice so requires.'" Gavle v. Mercy Catholic Medical
Center, 698 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. 1997) quoting from Ambrose v. Cross Creek
Condominiums, 412 Pa. Super. 1, 10, 602 A.2d 864, 868 (1992). Pa. Rule of Civil
Procedure 126 requires that:
The roles shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to which they are
3 Plaintiff's Preliminary Objections to Defendant's Answer with New Matter to Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint, paragraph 6. (The brief was filed with the Court Administrator pursuant to local role
and is, therefore, not part of the record.)
4Id.
5 Id. paragraph 7.
6 According to the docket, the answer with new matter was filed that very same day.
99-3184 CIVIL TERM
applicable. The court at every stage of any such action or proceeding may
disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the
substantial fights of the parties.
In accord with Rule 126, the Supreme Court has often held that the timing requirements
of the pleading roles are "not mandatory but permissive." Peters Creek Sanitary
Authority v. Welch, 545 Pa. 309, 313 681 A.2d 167, 170 (1996).
In Peters_, supra, the Supreme Court held that "the trial court does not abuse its
discretion in striking a pleading as untimely where it finds that a party's blatant disregard
for the time limits established by the Rules of Civil Procedure, without just cause for the
delay, constitutes an abject indifference to the Rules.", 681 A.2d at 170. In the instant
case we are satisfied that defendant's failure to file an answer to plaintiffs' amended
complaint was not the result of an "abject indifference" to the Rules. We find as a fact
that the parties were laboring under the mistaken assumption that an answer had been
filed. This is clear from the stipulation executed by counsel on January 17, 2001, which
provided that "(D)efendant's answer filed to the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint...
shall be deemed to apply to and be responsive to this Second Amended Complaint..."
(emphasis added). The assumption, albeit mistaken, by both parties that an answer had
been filed amounts to "just cause" for the delay. Since we are not persuaded that
plaintiffs have suffered any prejudice, we would not be inclined to strike as untimely an
answer to plaintiffs' amended complaint.
However, plaintiffs ask us to strike the answer to their second amended
complaint. That answer was filed only twenty-six (26) days after the second amended
complaint.7 Plaintiffs argue that it is also untimely since, pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1026(a),
7 It was also filed Within hours after defense counsel was made aware that he had inadvertently neglected to
file an answer to the previous complaint.
99-3184 CIVIL TERM
it should have been filed within twenty (20) days. Actually, under the Rule, it should
have been filed twenty (20) days after service of the second amended complaint. Since
there is nothing in the record to indicate when service was made, we cannot conclude that
defendant's answer is untimely.
We also note that plaintiffs' second amended complaint failed to contain a notice
to plead or notice to defend as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1026(a). Perhaps this is because
both parties assumed that no responsive pleading would be necessary in light of the
stipulation referred to above.
In any event, both parties have committed errors of procedure. We are satisfied
that none of those errors have in any way affected the substantial fights of either party. In
light of all the circumstances, we are convinced that justice will best be served by
denying plaintiffs' preliminary objections.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 20TM day of JUNE, 2001, for the reasons set forth in the
accompanying opinion, Plaintiffs' Preliminary Objections to Defendant's Answer with
New Matter to Plaintiffs' Second Amended-Complaint are DISMISSED.
By the Court,
G. Sander Davis, Esquire
Craig J. Staudemaier, Esquire
:sld
/s/Edward E. Guido
Edward E. Guido, J.