Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-0145 civilJUSTIN C. FOX, Plaintiff VS. COM. OF PA, DEPT. OF TRANS., : Defendant : : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 00-0145 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL IN RE: APPEAL OF LICENSE SUSPENSION BEFORE HESS, J.. ORDER AND NO W, this day of May, 2000, the appeal of Justin C. Fox from the suspension of his operating privileges is DENIED. BY THE COURT, K/A. Hess, J. Samuel L. Andes, Esquire For the Appellant George H. Kabusk, Esquire 'For PennDOT :rim r JUSTIN C. FOX, · Plaintiff · VS. ° COM. OF PA, DEPT. OF TRANS., · Defendant · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 00-0145 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION- LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL IN RE' APPEAL OF LICENSE SUSPENSION BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER By a notice dated December 14, 1999, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation notified Justin C. Fox that his driver's license would be suspended for a period of one year. The notice was based on Section 1581 of the Motor Vehicle Code which requires the department to treat certain out-of-state convictions as though they had occurred in Pennsylvania. PennDOT had purportedly received a notification from the state of New Jersey that Mr. Fox had been convicted on November 1, 1999, of an offense which occurred on August 17, 1999, which offense was equivalent to a violation of Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, Driving under the Influence. In his appeal, Mr. Fox raises two issues. His first contention is that PennDOT failed to satisfy the requirements of the Driver's License Compact (in Pennsylvania at 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1581 et seq.). Article III of the Compact requires that the "licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee." 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1581. The Compact further requires that such reports shall: (1) clearly identify the person convicted; (2) describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated; (3) identify the court in 00-0145 CIVIL which action was taken; and (4) certify how the conviction was obtained (by trial, guilty plea or as a result of some kind of forfeiture). In 1998, the Commonwealth Court held that the reporting requirements of Article III were mandatory and that a failure to fully comply with the reporting requirements made the suspension of the motorist's operating privileges improper. See Mazurek v. Com., Dept. of Transp., 717 A.2d 23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). In an apparent response, the legislature amended the Vehicle Code to provide, at 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1584, that: The omission from any report received by the department from a party state of any information required by Article III of the Compact shall not excuse or prevent the department from complying with its duties under Article IV and V of the Compact. Article IV of the Compact requires the licensing authority of the home state to give the same effect to out-of-state conduct as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state. In this case, the Department of Transportation submitted a New Jersey driving record which contained Mr. Fox's name and Pennsylvania driver's license number, his date of birth, · gender and eye color, a violation date, conviction date and a description of the offense which merely read "operate under influence liq./drugs." The report from New Jersey clearly failed to comport with the requirements of Article III of the Compact. Under Mazurek, supra, Mr. Fox would be entitled to relief. The department counters, however, that the strict application of Article III is no longer necessary because of the 1998 amendment to the Vehicle Code. Mr. Fox argues, in turn, that the language of Section 1584 relaxing the reporting requirements of Article III is unconstitutional. There are not yet any appellate decisions on this issue. The lower courts are split. 00-0145 CIVIL In Com., Department of Transp. v. Anderson, 48 Ches. Co. Rep. 3 (1999) Chester County Judge James P. MacElree considered the notice requirements of Article III of the Compact to be of constitutional dimension. Concerning the 1998 amendments to the Vehicle Code relaxing those requirements, Judge MacElree observed: The Amendment violates the specific requirements of Article III of the Compact and it violates due process requirements under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. the purpose of due process notice is founded on the concept of fundamental fairness. Due process requires that the defendant have enough information to respond to the charge. An examination of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1584 reveals a broad and sweeping provision, which permits Pennsylvania to suspend a driver's license where "any information" is omitted from the report required by Article III of the Company. Applying § 1584 literally could result in Pennsylvania suspending the license of a driver where the report only contained the licensee's name or operator's license number. Such notice would be really no notice at all because it would lack fundamental facts sufficient to advise the licensee of who, what, where or when an alleged violation occurred. While we certainly share Judge MacElree's concerns, nonetheless, we will follow the approach taken by Bucks County President Judge R. Barry McAndrews. In Com. of Pa., Dept. of Transp? v. Wenger, 73 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 54 (2000), he wrote' This Court agrees with Judge MacElree in part, but disagrees with [his]conclusion that the amendment is per se unconstitutional. First, it is a well- established principle of statutory construction that vests all enactments of the legislature with a strong presumption of constitutionality. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922, Plowman v. Department of Transportation, 535 Pa. 314, 635 A.2d 124 (1993). Second, a court reviewing a statute should interpret the enactment 00-0145 CIVIL of the legislature in a constitutional manner, if possible. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3), Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313 (1980); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 464 Pa. 435,347 A.2d 290 (1975). Article IX of the Compact clearly sets forth that the provisions of the Compact should be broadly construed so as to effectuate the Compact's remedial purpose. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581, Article IX; See also, 1 Pa.C.S. {} 1928(c) (regarding liberal construction of statutes). Procedural due process simply requires that the Department of Transportation provide the licensee with sufficient notice of the conduct that forms the basis of the Department's action so that the licensee can prepare a defense. The use of an out- of-state conviction report that does not fully comply with all the technical requirements of Article III does not necessarily impinge on Petitioner's due process rights. The Department still has the burden of proof; hence the report must still be suitably informative so as to allow the Department to identify the driver and the offense for which the driver has been convicted. In other words, the report must still contain the fundamental facts. We reach the same conclusion as Judge McAndrews and for the same reasons. The appellant's second issue arises out of the circumstances of his plea in New Jersey. The guilty plea was accompanied by a so-called "civil reservation" preventing the use of the guilty plea as evidence in a civil proceeding. Since the. suspension of his license involves a civil proceeding, the petitioner argues that evidence of the guilty plea is inadmissible. We agree with the department that the plea entered is akin to a plea of nolo contendere and that the plea cannot .serve as an admission of guilt in a civil action related to the defendant's driving on the date in question. The civil reservation, however, does not alter the fact that the defendant was convicted and it is the conviction which has triggered the Pennsylvania driver'S license suspension. 00-0145 CIVIL The motorist in Hunt v. Com. of PA, Dept. of Transp., Cmwlth Ct. No. 2244 C.D. 1999, filed March 29, 2000, argued that his plea of"nolo contendere" to a charge of driving under the influence in West Virginia could not be used to suspend his Pennsylvania operating privilege. The Commonwealth Court noted that it had repeatedly upheld suspensions based upon pleas of no contest, citing pepperling v. Dept. of Transp., 737 A.2d 310 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999); Smega v. Dept. of Transp, 727 A.2d 154 (Pa. Cwmlth. 1999); Mackall v. Dept. of Transp,,680 A.2d 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). For the foregoing reasons we enter the following order. ORDER AND NOW, this day of May, 2000, the appeal of Justin C. Fox from the suspension of his operating privileges is DENIED. Samuel L. Andes, Esquire For the Appellant BY THE COURT, K~A.H , . George H. Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT 'rim