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HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-0366 civilDARRY SINGLETON, Appellam VS. COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 00-0366 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: APPEAL FROM SUSPENSION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE BEFORE HESS, J.. ORDER AND NOW, this day of June, 2000, the within appeal from suspension of driver's license is DENIED. BY THE COURT, David E. Hershey, Esquire For the Appellant nA. Hess, J. George Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rlm DARRY SINGLETON, Appellant VS. COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 00-0366 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: APPEAL FROM SUSPENSION. OF DRIVER'S LICENSE BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER This is a driver's license suspension appeal. The petitionef received notice that his license would be suspended as a result of a notification from New York of a conviction for an offense which is equivalent to a violation of Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, Driving Under the Influence. According to the notice, PennDOT had received notification from New York of a conviction on November 1, 1999, for an offense which occurred on October 16, 1999. Specifically, the defendant had been convicted of Driving While Impaired, a violation of the Vehicle Code in New York. The petitioner has raised numerous issues in his appeal. The first contention is that the record of the New York conviction is inadmissible. In support of his contention he cites Hoover v. Com., Dept. of Trans., 725 A.2d 1254 (Pa. Cmmwlth. 1999). In Hoover, the department attempted to suspend the appellant's operating privileges for a violation of the Drug, Devise and Cosmetic Act. The court held that a certified record of the conviction was necessary in light of 42 Pa.C.S. Section 6103 which governs the proof of official records "kept within this Commonwealth." The matter sub judice, of course, involves an out-of-state record and, as Hoover itself notes, such records are governed by 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1550(d). That section, in .. 00-0366 CIVIL turn, provides that documents received from out of state become the records of DOT and are admissible. We agree with the appellant that Section 1532(b)(3) appears to suggest that reports made pursuant to the Drivers License Compact are required to be certified. Such an interpretation, however, is clearly at odds with Section 1550(d). As noted in the law of statutory construction: (a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions. 1 Pa.C.S.A. Section 1921. We are satisfied that it was the intention of the legislature to relax reporting requirements with respect to out-of-state convictions. This is evident from no less than the adoption of the compact itself which requires the department to act upon receipt of "reports" of convictions in other jurisdictions. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1581. Next, the petitioner alleges that the report from New York does not contain the required information by which the department can act pursuant to the Drivers License Compact. This issue we recently resolved adversely to the motorist in Fox. v. Com. of PA. Dept. of Transp., Cumberland County, 2000-0145. In that case we found that this situation was governed by Section 1584 of the Vehicle Code as recently amended. Succinctly stated, that provision provides that the department may suspend a license based upon the report of a conviction even though the report does not comply strictly with Article III. The third issue raised by the appellant is whether or not the offense of Driving While Impaired in New York is an offense "substantially similar" to the Pennsylvania DUI statute so as to warrant suspension. Our courts have earlier held that these two offenses are not substantially __ 00-03.6.6 CIVIL similar. See Olmstead v. Dept. of Transp., 677 A.2d 1285 (Pa. Cmmwlth. 1996) and Petrovick v. Dept. of Transp.., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 741 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 1999). In an apparent reaction to these two cases, the legislature amended Section 1586 of the Motor Vehicle Code to include the following language' The fact that the offense reported to the department by a party state may require a different degree of impairment of a person's ability to operate, drive or control a vehicle than that required to support a conviction for a violation of section 3731 shall not be a basis for determining that the party state's offense is not substantially similar to section 3731 for purposes of Article IV of the compact. 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1586. We are satisfied that this new language defeats the petitioner's present argument. The remaining issues raised by the instant appellant involve, inter alia, challenges to Sections 1584 and 1586 of the Vehicle Code which prescribe procedures for the implementation of the compact. With regard to these statutory provisions, the petitioner contends that they violate the contractural provisions of the compact and the petitioner's due process rights under the Pennsylvania and federal constitutions. He then goes on to contend that the suspension of his driver's license in this case subjects him to double jeopardy and/or the denial of equal protection or due process. We have disposed of these various issues, in one form or another, in the cases of Karen A. Gnazzo v. Com. of Pa., Dept. of Transp., Cumberland County, 97-5408, and Fox v. Com. of Pa., Dept. of Transp., supra. Rather than reiterate our holdings here, we will attach copies of these opinions and incorporate same herein by reference. As can be seen from these earlier opinions, none of the grounds asserted operate as a basis for vacating the petitioner's license suspension. 00-0.3.66 CIVIL AND NOW, this driver's license is DENIED. 270" ORDER day of June, 2000, the within appeal from suspension of BY THE COURT, David E. Hershey, Esquire For the Appellant George Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rlm ess, J. JUSTIN C. FOX, Plaintiff VS. COM. OF PA, DEPT. OF TRANS., ' Defendant ' · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 00-0145 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION- LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL IN RE: APPEAL OF LICENSE SUSPENSION BEFORE HESS. J. ORDER AND NO W, this day of May, 2000, the a. ppeal, of Justin C. Fox from the suspension of his operating privileges is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Samuel L. Andes, Esquire For the Appellant George H. Kabusk, Esquire 'For PennDOT K/A. Hess, J. 'rlm JUSTIN C. FOX, · Plaintiff · VSo ° COM. OF PA, DEPT. OF TRANS., · Defendant ' IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 00-0145 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION- LAW LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL IN RE' APPEAL OF LICENSE SUSPENSION BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER By a notice dated December 14, 1999, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation notified Justin C. Fox that his driver's licer/s~ would be suspended for a period of one year. The notice was based on Section 1581 of the Motor Vehicle Code which requires the department to treat certain out-of-state convictions as though they had occurred in Pennsylvania. PennDOT had purportedly received a notification from the state of New Jersey that Mr. Fox had been convicted on November 1, 1999, of an offense which occurred on August 17, 1999, which offense was equivalent to a violation of Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, Driving under the Influence. In his appeal, Mr. Fox raises two issues. His first contention is that PennDOT failed to satisfy the requirements of the Driver's License Compact (in Pennsylvania at 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1581 et seq.). Article III of the Compact requires that the "licensing authority of a party state shall report each conviction of a person from another party state occurring within its jurisdiction to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee." 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1581. The Compact further requires that such reports shall: (1) clearly identify the person convicted; (2) describe the violation specifying the section of the statute, code or ordinance violated; (3) identify the court in 00-0145 CIVIL which action was taken; and (4) certify how the conviction was obtained (by trial, guilty plea or as a result of some kind of forfeiture). In 1998, the Commonwealth Court held that the reporting requirements of Article III were mandatory and that a failure to fully comply with the reporting requirements made the suspension of the motorist's operating privileges improper. See Mazurek v. Com., Dept. of Transp,., 717 A.2d 23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). In an apparent response, the legislature amended the Vehicle Code to provide, at 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1584, that: The omission from any report received by the department from a party state of any information required by Article III of the Compact shall not excuse or prevent the department from complying with its duties under Article IV and V ~t~ the Compact. Article IV of the Compact requires the licensing authority of the home state to give the same effect to out-of-state conduct as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state. In this case, the Department of Transportation submitted a New Jersey driving record which contained Mr. Fox's name and Pennsylvania driver's license number, his date of birth, · gender and eye color, a violation date, conviction date and a description of the offense which merely read "operate under influence liq./drugs." The report from New Jersey clearly failed to comport with the requirements of Article III of the Compact. Under Mazurek, supra, Mr. Fox would be entitled to relief. The department counters, however, that the strict application of Article III is no longer necessary because of the 1998 amendment to the Vehicle Code. Mr. Fox argues, in turn, that the language of Section 1584 relaxing the reporting requirements of Article III is unconstitutional. There are not yet any appellate decisions on this issue. The lower courts are split. .00-0145 CIVIL In Com., Department of Transp. v. Anderson, 48 Ches. Co. Rep. 3 (1999) Chester County Judge James P. MacElree considered the notice requirements of Article III of the Compact to be of constitutional dimension. Concerning the 1998 amendments to the Vehicle Code relaxing those requirements, Judge MacElree observed: The Amendment violates the specific requirements of Article III of the Compact and it violates due process requirements under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. the purpose of due process notice is founded on the concept of fundamental fairness. Due process requires that the defendant have enough information to respond to the charge. An examination of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1584 reveals a broad and sweeping pr(3v'ision, which permits Pennsylvania to suspend a driver's license where "any information" is omitted from the report required by Article III of the Company. Applying § 1584 literally could result in Pennsylvania suspending the license of a driver where the report only contained the licensee's name or operator's license number. Such notice would be really no notice at all because it would lack fundamental facts sufficient to advise the licensee of who, what, where or when an alleged violation occurred. While we certainly share Judge MacElree's concerns, nonetheless, we will follow the approach taken by Bucks County President Judge R. Barry McAndrews. In Com. of Pa., Dept. of Transp. v. Wenger, 73 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 54 (2000), he wrote: This Court agrees with Judge MacElree in part, but disagrees with [his]conclusion that the amendment is per se unconstitutional. First, it is a well- established principle of statutory construction that vests all enactments of the legislature with a strong presumption of constitutionality. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922, Plowman v. Department of Transportation, 535 Pa. 314, 635 A.2d 124 (1993). Second, a court reviewing a statute should interpret the enactment _ 0'0-0 ?,-45' CIVIL of the legislature in a constitutional manner, if possible. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3), Commonwealth v. Hud.e., 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313 (1980); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 464 Pa. 435,347 A.2d 290 (1975). Article IX of the Compact clearly sets forth that the proviSions of the Compact should be broadly construed so as to effectuate the Compact's remedial purpose. 75 Pa.C.S. {} 1581, Article IX; See also, 1 Pa.C.S. {} 1928(c) (regarding liberal construction of statutes). Procedural due process simply requires that the Department of Transportation provide the licensee with sufficient notice of the conduct that forms the basis of the Department's action so that the licensee can prepare a defense. The use of an out- of-state conviction report that does not fully comply with all the technical requirements of Article III does not necessarily impinge on Petitioner's due process rights. The Department still has the burden of proof; hence the report must still be suitably informative so as to allow the Department to identify the driver and the offense for which the driver has been convicted. In other words, the report must still contain the fundamental facts. We reach the same conclusion as Judge McAndrews and for the same reasons. The appellant's second issue arises out of the circumstances of his plea in New Jersey. The guilty plea ~vas accompanied by a so-called "civil reservation" preventing the use of the guilty plea as evidence in a civil proceeding. Since the. suspension of his license involves a civil proceeding, the petitioner argues that evidence of the guilty plea is inadmissible. We agree with the department that the plea entered is akin to a plea of nolo contendere and that the plea cannot .serve as an admission of guilt in a civil action related to the defendant's driving on the date in question. The civil reservation, however, does not alter the fact that the defendant was convicted and it is the conviction which has triggered the Pennsylvania driver's license suspension. O0-01.45'CIVIL The motorist in Hunt v. Com. of PA, Dept. of Transp.., Cmwlth Ct. No. 2244 C.D. 1999, filed March 29, 2000, argued that his plea of"nolo contendere" to a charge of driving under the influence in West Virginia could not be used to suspend his Pennsylvania operating privilege. The Commonwealth Court noted that it had repeatedly upheld suspensions based upon pleas of no contest, citing pepperling v. Dept. of Transp.., 737 A.2d 310 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999); Smega v~. Dept. of Transp,, 727 A.2d 154 (Pa. Cwmlth. 1999); Mackall v. Dept. of Transp..,680 A.2d 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). For the foregoing reasons we enter the following order. ORDER AND NOW, this 2.2 ~ day of May, 2000, the appeal of Justin C. Fox from the suspension of his operating privileges is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Samuel L. Andes, Esquire For the Appellant K~A. Hess, J. George H. Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rim · KAREN A. GNAZZO, Plaintiff VS. COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant~ IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-5408 CIVIL APPEAL FROM LICENSE SUSPENSION IN RE' APPEAL FROM DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION BEFORE HESS. J, ORDER AND NOW, this day of February, 1998, for the reasons stated in our opinion filed of even date herewith, the appeal of Karen A. Gnazzo from the suspension of her driver's license is DENIED. . o. BY THE COURT, David E. Hershey, Esquire For the Appellant George Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rim KAREN A. GNAZZO, Plaintiff · VS. COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-5408 CIVIL APPEAL FROM LICENSE SUSPENSION IN RE: APPEAL FROM DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION BEFORE HESS. J, 0P~ION AND ORDER Before us is the appeal by Karen A. Gnazzo from the one-year suspension of her Pennsylvania driver's license by the Pennsylvan/a Department of Transportation (PennDOT). By official notice, dated and mailed September 4, 1997, PennDOT notified Gnaz.zo that her license was being suspended pursuant to Section 1581 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. Section 1581 states in relevant part: (a) The licensing authority in the home state, for purposes of a suspension, revocation, or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article 3 of this compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state in the case of convictions for' (2) driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle. PennDOT had received notice on August 11, 19_.97, that Gnazzo was convicted of driving. 97-5408 CIVIL while intoxicated in New Jersey on June 18, 1997, in violation of Title 39 New Jersey Statute Section 4-50. Accordingly, it determined that the New Jersey conviction was equivalent to a violation of Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, relating to driving under the influence, and, therefore, enforced the one-year driving suspension mandated by Section 1532(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code. Petitioner is a Pennsylvania resident who, other than the offense stated above, has no prior record. Additionally, in the incident which gave rise to Petitioner's conviction in New Jersey, there was no accident involved and there ,,vas no act in conjunction with the offense in New Jersey which would have constituted a violation of any of the specific-offenses enumerated under Section 1542 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code had the conduct occurred in Pennsylvania. Petitioner's driving privileges were suspended in New Jersey for six months, she received a fine, and ,.','as directed to comply with a program deemed satisfactory by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center in New Jersey. Petitioner now raises several arguments concerning the impropriety of having her license suspended for a year. First, she claims a violation of her right to equal protection under the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions. Second, she claims that her fight against double jeop.ardy has been violated under the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions. Third, she claims that PennDOT incorrectly determined, pursuant to Section 1581 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, that her violation in Ne,,',' Jersey was equivalent to Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code. Finally, she contends that her fights to due process and equal protection, and against double 97-5408 CIVIL jeopardy have been violated under the New Jersey Constitution. Plainly read, the above cited part of Section 1581, requires the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation to look at the conduct reported (i.e. that an individual was driving under the influence), and to give the same effect (i.e. license suspension) to the conduct as if the conduct had occurred in Pennsylvania. The petitioner argues, however, that her conduct which resulted in a driving while intoxicated conviction in New Jersey would have very likely placed her in an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program in Pennsylvania. And although ARD programs are handled ~ , differently in many counties in Pennsylvania, generally, the license suspensions which DOT must effectuate in ARD programs are six months or less. As such, the petitioner argues that her right to equal protection is violated, since she has received a one-year suspension whereas the same conduct in Pennsylvania would have almost surely resulted in a suspension of six months or less. We agree that ARD is generally offered to a first time violator of Pennsylvania's driving under the influence statute, and therefore there existed a good possibility that, had the petitioner been arrested in Penm;ylvania for the same conduct, she would have been allowed to enter an ARI? program. We do not think' howevm-, that Pen.nDOT, pursuant to Section 1581, violated the petitioner's right to equal protection. The wording of Section 1581 creates a problem of interpretation. If PennDOT is supposed to "give the same effect to the conduct reported," then should not the Department 97-5408 CIVIL consider that such conduct, had it occurred in Pennsylvania, might have resulted in an ARD disposition? o In resolving this question, we resort to the well-established laws of statutory interpretation. In attempting to ascertain the meaning of a statute, the court is required to consider the intent of the legislature, and is permitted to examine the practical consequences ora particular interpretation. The court is to presume that the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. ' Commonwealth v. Long, 395 Pa. Super. 495,577 A.2d 899 (1990). We are satisfied that it would be virtually impossible for PennDOT to give the same effect to the conduct involved in an out-of-state conviction, as would probably be given for the same conduct (without a conviction) in Pennsylvania. It is possible, of course, that the Department of Transportation could determine an average suspension period for first-time DUI · offenders in this Commonwealth, and apply that suspension to out-of-state offenders. This potential resolution, however, is plagued with other problems. Suffice it to say, in any case. that such an interpretation of the statute could not have been intended by the legislature. Rather. we believe it is apparent that the statute requires PennDOT to treat out-of-state conduct resulting in a · conviction, just as it would treat a conviction in Pennsylvania based on the same conduct. Since PennDOT is treating the petitioner as it treats eveu' person who is convicted of violating Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, there is clearly no violation of the 97-5408 CIVIL equal protection clause under either the Pennsylvania or the Federal Constitutions.t The petitioner next argues that the suspension is a second punishment in violation of her fight against double jeopardy, relying primarily upon United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides no greater protection than the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, we have only one analysis of the alleged violation. Commonwealth v. Tabb, 491 Pa. 372, 421 A.2d 183(1980). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution . , states that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple prosecutions for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction and precludes the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Sweeny v. State Board of Funeral Directors, 666 A.2d 1137 (Pa. Commw. 1995). See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,399 (1938). In Halper, supra, the Supreme Court concluded that a civil penalty of a large fine for violations of the False Claims Act constituted punishment for purposes of double jeopardy because the amount of the fine was unrelated to the damages suffered by the government and was designed to punish violators. The Court said that a civil sanction may constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes if the sanction "may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as ~We note, once again, that the Department of Transportation, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532C0)(3), is required to suspend the license of any driver convicted of 75 Pa.C.S. {}3731 for 12 months. 97-5408 CIVIL a deterrent or retribution." Ha_.H. dp~, 490 U.S. at 449. The Supreme Court, however, has recently disavowed the test applied in Ha__H. glp~, and reaffirmed the test applied in cases pre-dating Halper such as Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 373 U.S. 144 (1963). Hudson v. United States, No. 96- 976', 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7497 (Dec. 10, 1997)/ The disav0wment of the test applied in Halper, however, makes little difference in our analysis here. The Commonwealth Court has already determined, even under the Halper test, that a license suspension does not constitute a criminal sanction. Krall v. Com., Dept. of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 682 A.2d 63 (Pa.. Commw. 1996). It is well established that "driver revocation proceedings are remedial sanctions and are civil in nature, designed to protect the public from unsafe drivers." Id__~. at 66, citing Drogowski v. Corn, 94 Pa. Commw. Ct. 205,209, 503 A.2d 104, 107 (1986). .. Next, the petitioner contends that violation of New Jersey's driving while intoxicated statute, Title 39 New Jersey Statutes Section 4-50, is not an equivalent offense to Permsylvania's driving under the .influence statute, 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3731. The petitioner points to the fact that in New Jersey driving under the influence is not classified as a felony or a misdemeanor, but more as a summary offense in that there is no right to a jury trial and the maximum term of imp.risonment, even for a repeat offender is six months. In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, driving under the influence is a misdemeanor of the second degree, the accused has a right to trial by jury, and imprisonment of not less than one year must be ordered for third time offenders. See 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3731 (e)(1)(iv). 97-5408 CIVIL We .are satisfied, however, that the relevant question under the Driver's License Compact is whether the conduct prohibited in the new Jersey statute is of the same type as the conduct prohibited by the Pennsylvania statue -- not whether the offenses are punished equally. In this regard, the Superior Court has already decided that a conviction under the New Jersey statute and a conviction under the Pennsylvania statute are "equivalent offenses" for purpose of sentencing a defendant as a multiple offender. Commonwealth v. \Vhisnant, 390 Pa. Super. 192, 568 A.2d 259. The Superior Court noted that both statutes define the offense as operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or with a blood alcohol concentration of. 10% or-more, and the court also noted that the'underlying policy of the two statutes is the same. Id. at 195,568 A.2d at 260. Despite slightly different wording in the two statutes, we believe that the statutes address the same conduct. Therefore, PennDOT appropriately equated the conviction in · New Jersey to a violation of Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. The petitioner also argues that PennDOT improperly applied the Driver's License Compact because there is no evidence that the petitioner ,,vas convicted of driving under the influence to a degree which rendered her incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle as she believes is required under the Compact. The petitioner, however, has misinterpreted the lang.uage of the statute which applies to convictions for "driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor," and does not further require that the driver have been found incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle. Finally, the petitioner argues that her rights to due process, equal protection, and against 97-5408 CIVIL double jeopardy under the New Jersey Constitution have been violated by this license suspension. We disagree. The petitioner argues that her fights to equal protection and due process were violated because she was not informed t~,at she would lose her license in Pennsylvania when she entered a guilty plea in New Jersey. She claims that because of this lack of information her'guil.ty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. See State v. Samuels, 253 N.J. Super. 335,601 A.2d 784 (1991). It is axiomatic, however, that a licensee may not collaterally attack an underlying criminal conviction in the context of a civil license suspension proceeding. Com. v. Duffv, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174 (1994). We need not address the petitioner's other arguments concerning a'violation of the New Jersey Constitution as v,'e know of no authority whereby a resident of Pennsylvania may challenge the actions of a Commonwealth agency based on the constitution of another state. .. - ORDER AND NOW, this 12..'n day of Feb,mary, 1998, for the reasons stated in our opinion filed of even date herewith, the appeal of Karen A. Gnazzo from the suspension of her driver's license is DENIED. BY THE COURT, SS, J. 97-5408 CIVIL David E. Hershey, Esquire For the Appellant George Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rim