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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-2049 criminalCOMMONWEALTH vs SANTOS TORRES IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 98-2049 CRIMINAL IN RE: POST-SENTENCE MOTIONS FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT OR NEW TRIAL BEFORE HESS AND OLER, JJ_. ORDER AND NOW, this !/* day of July, 2000, the post-sentence motions of the defendant for arrest of judgment or new trial are DENIED. BY THE COURT, The Honorable J. Wesley Oler Mary-Jo Mullen, Esquire Assistant District Attorney William Tully, Esquire For the Defendant K~/A. Hess, J. 'rlm COMMONWEALTH ¥s SANTOS TORRES IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 98-2049 CRIMINAL IN RE' POST-SENTENCE MOTIONS FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT OR NEW TRIAL BEFORE HESS AND OLER, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER.. In this case the defendant has filed post-sentence motions. One of his motions challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction for "Altered, Forged or Counterfeit Documents," 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 7122(3). In addition, he contends that the Honorable J. Wesley Oler, Jr. erred in failing to suppress evidence in this case. Judge Oler has prepared and filed an opinion in support of his earlier ruling. We join in his opinion for the purpose of the disposition of these post-trial motions. Thus, there remains the matter of the sufficiency of the evidence. In disposing of this issue, it is, of course, necessary to review the facts of the case. The charges arise out of an investigation conducted in July of 1998 by Pennsylvania State Trooper Gerry L. Oberdorf. On Thursday, July 23, 1998, Trooper Oberdorf went to the defendant's residence to investigate his possible involvement with a stolen 1992 Nissan Pathfinder. While at the defendant's property in Walnut Bottom, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, Trooper Oberdorf noticed approximately ten motor vehicles on the premises. In the course of his investigation, Trooper Oberdorf had learned that the defendant, himself a state trooper, bought and sold older cars as something of a hobby. While at the defendant' s property, Trooper Oberdorf made the observations which led to the filing of the charges for which the defendant was ultimately convicted. Among other things, he noticed a counterfeit inspection 98-2049 CRIMINAL sticker displayed on a Mercury Tracer. Soon thereafter, he noticed a similar counterfeit sticker displayed on a 1978 Ford box truck. The inspection dates on these stickers were June 15, 1998 and June 28, 1998, respectively. Because he suspected that the stickers were not genuine, Trooper Oberdorf asked the defendant where these vehicles had been inspected. Initially, the defendant said that he had had the vehicles inspected at Zeigler's Gulf and D & J Truck Stop. Later, he admitted that he had purchased the stickers from someone on the streets of Philadelphia for $35.00 each and that he knew that they were either counterfeit or stolen. At trial, the defendant claimed that his purpose for placing the stickers on the vehicle was "just bad judgment," that it could have been to "create some sort of appearance," and that he "wasn't really thinking properly." N.T. 45. The defendant's argument is that the evidence is insufficient, in this case, to prove that his display of the counterfeit inspection stickers was with the "fraudulent intent" required under 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 7122. The law with regard to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well established. The court must determine whether, when reviewing all the evidence admitted at trial, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trier of fact could have found the requisite elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Tullius, 399 Pa. Super. 172, 175,582 A.2d 1, 2 (1990). As noted by the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Standard Criminal Jury Instructions for 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 7122 define fraudulent intent as "the intent to conceal or misrepresent a matter or matters of substantial, not incidental, importance required by law to be set forth on the (documents) in question." Pa. SSJI(Crim) 17.7122A. In the realm of record keeping, the 98-2049 CRIMINAL Commonwealth Court has noted that in determining fraud, the questions are whether the record keeping entry was false, entered intentionally and with the purpose of deceiving. See Commonwealth, Dept. of Trans. v. Midas Muffler Shop, 108 Pa. Cmmwlth. 199, 529 A.2d 91 (1987). In this case, the two stickers falsely indicated recent inspection dates. As noted by the Commonwealth in its brief, this information would be important not only to law enforcement officers but also to potential vehicle buyers. Indeed, the defendant testified that his purpose "could have been to create some sort of appearance." N.T. 45. It is clear that the defendant knew that these stickers were counterfeit and/or stolen and that he knew that it was illegal to display them. He is, after all, a thirteen-year veteran of the Pennsylvania State Police. He admitted that he traveled to Philadelphia where he purchased each sticker for $35.00 (more than a car inspection would have cost). It strains credulity to suggest that the defendant would have gone to these lengths unless some benefit was to accrue to him at someone else's expense. It should be remembered that, when first asked about these inspection stickers, the defendant indicated that they were from local inspection stations. Only when Trooper Oberdorf confronted him with facts making it impossible for that to have been the case, did the defendant admit their fraudulent origin. In something of a last ditch effort to distance himself from an allegation of fraudulent intent, the defendant claimed, at trial, that the stickers had been placed on the vehicles while he was away at the shore. While declining to name a person who might have done this, he was content, simply, to blame some "cheap" laborer. 98-2049 CRIMINAL From all of the facts of this case, there arises a strong inference that the defendant possessed counterfeit inspection stickers with a fraudulent intent. The inference is so strong, in fact, that it permits a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ORDER AND NO W, this day of July, 2000, the post-sentence motions of the defendant for arrest of judgment or new trial are DENIED. BY THE COURT, The Honorable J. Wesley Oler Kev~. Hess, J. Mary-Jo Mullen, Esquire Assistant District Attorney William Tully, Esquire For the Defendant :rim