Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-0469 criminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. ISAAC M. COLE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 00-0469 CRIMINAL IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ORDER AND NOW, this 2 ! ~' day of August, 2000, the omnibus pretrial motion of the defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Jonathan Birbeck, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Karl Rominger, Esquire.' For the Defendant 'rlm COMMONWEALTH VS. ISAAC M. COLE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 00-0469 CRIMINAL IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FINDINGS AND ORDER Based upon the testimony adduced at pretrial hearings in this case, the court finds the following to be the facts. At approximately 11 '30 p.m. on January 30, 2000, Trooper Jason Carbaugh of the Pennsylvania State Police received a complaint of a hit and run of a pedestrian. Mr. Richard Nickle had been operating his snow blower in front of his house when he was struck from behind by a white passenger car. At the scene, the police determined that the passenger car would now have extensive damage. Eventually, the police located a white Ford Tempo in the parking lot of the Plaza Drive Apartments, an apartment complex located approximately one-half mile from the scene of the accident. The vehicle had damage to the driver's side headlight area and a large hole in the driver's side of the windshield. The hole in the windshield had been covered with a piece of snow in an apparent attempt to hide the damage. Closer examination revealed the presence of hair, blood and clothing on the vehicle. The license plate had been removed and the VIN plate was covered. The state troopers proceeded to knock on doors of apartments close to the car in an attempt to discover the owner. The defendant's apartment was located approximately 300 feet behind the white Ford. At approximately 1 '00 a.m. the state police confronted the defendant 00-0469 CRIMINAL who denied ownership of the vehicle and claimed that he had not driven the car because he had a suspended license. The defendant was then asked to put clothes on and come outsi-cte to::the car:'. In the parking lot, the police noticed that the defendant was swaying back and forth, that he. smelled of an alcoholic beverage, had red and glassy eyes and otherwise aPPear,ed to be drunk'. .. While in the parking lot the defendant became very loud and belligerent and began yelling obscenities. The defendant was then taken into custody and arrested for disorderly conduct. In the course of subduing the defendant, the trooper discovered car keys on the ground. They turned out to be keys to the Ford Tempo. We are satisfied that the arrest of the defendant took place at approximately 1'15 a.m. A request by the police that the defendant consent to a blood alcohol test proved fruitless. Trooper Carbaugh then contacted Chief Deputy District Attorney Jonathan B irbeck in connection with obtaining several search warrants, one of which was for the purpose of obtaining a sample of the defendant's blood. The defendant was eventually transported to the Carlisle Hospital where blood was. drawn at 5:20 a.m. The blood test results were. 101. The defendant was read his Miranda rights at 5:40 a.m. He was retUrned to the police barracks and taken to an interview room. The defendant continued to deny involvement in the accident. The defendant was later confronted with inconsistencies in his own version. He was reread his Miranda rights and signed a waiver and a confession at 7'11 a.m. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. We are satisfied that the defendant was sufficiently aware of the crime being investigated for the purpose of assuring that his waiver of the Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. 00-0469 CRIMINAL 2. The defendant's statement was made, albeit barely, within six hours of his arrest for disorderly conduct and the commencement of what was, arguably, a period of custodial:: detention. In other words, assuming arguendo that a six-hour period had been triggered, because the statement was obtained within said six-hour period, it may be admitted.~' See Com. v. Duncan, 514 Pa. 395,525 A.2d 1177 (1987). 3. The defendant's statement was not obtained by the use of impermissible promises, impermissible threats, coercion, or other improper tactics. ORDER AND NOW, this day of August, 2000, the omnibus pretrial motion of the defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Jonathan B irbeck, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Ke ss, J. Karl Rominger, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm