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HomeMy WebLinkAbout89-1754 criminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. DONALD EUGENE WILES IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS-OF.:.-.-. CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 1754 CRIMINAL 1989 IN RE' OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 The petitioner in this case, Donald Eugene Wiles, was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy following a jury trial. On January 5, 1993, he was sentenced by then President Judge Harold E. Sheely to a term of life imprisonment. Over the years he has filed numerous petitions seeking some form of post-trial relief. Recently, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. His petition was dismissed, without prejudice, on May 15, 2000, by United States District Judge Richard P. Conaboy. A copy of Judge Conaboy's opinion is attached hereto. An understanding of the disposition of this matter in federal court assists in putting Mr. Wiles' current petition in procedural perspective. Judge Conaboy recounted the history of the case as follows. By order dated October 5, 1992, the petitioner's motions for a new trial and an initial post-conviction collateral relief petition were denied by Judge Sheely. On December 3, 1993, the Superior Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. A subsequent petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied. Wiles next filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on a claim that his trial counsel was deficient for not seeking a cautionary instruction with respect to prior bad act testimony. The Supreme Court denied this petition on 1754 CRIMINAL 1989 April 17, 1995. The petition also sought habeas corpus relief in the Middle District. By order dated August 25, 1995, Wiles' petition was dismissed without prejudice for failuf~ to-e'xhaust'. state court remedies. He then initiated a second petition under Pennsylvania' s Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9541 et seq., alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as well as other purported constitutional violations and included a claim that exculpatory evidence was unavailable at trial. This petition was denied by the trial court on March 1, 1996. He contends that, thereafter, his PCRA counsel declined a request to pursue an appeal. A pro se habeas corpus action was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on April 7, 1998. As can be seen from Judge Conaboy's opinion, the United States District Court has concluded that it should not consider Mr. Wiles' habeas corpus petition because he had not exhausted his state remedies or obtained a determination as to whether his unexhausted claims were procedurally defaulted. Based on review of the present record, it is apparent that the following claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in the instant petition were not previously asserted in state court' (1) failure to seek a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case; (2) neglecting to object to rebuttal testimony; (3) not seeking a mistrial after introduction of testimony after introduction of testimony regarding the petitioner's past sexual conduct; and (4) failing to obtain copies of relevant police reports. Wiles v. Gillis, M.D. Pa., Civil No. 3 :CV-98-0705, p.9. Not surprisingly, the foregoing claims with regard to ineffective assistance of counsel are precisely those asserted in the instant petition. In addition, the defendant complains that (5) the trial court erred by improperly eliciting testimony and (6) prosecutorial misconduct occurred 1754 CRIMINAL 1989 because the Commonwealth misled the jury regarding the petitioner's past sexual activity. We denied what we understand to be the third PCRA petition filed by Mr. Wiles by or:der-dated June 6, 2000. The current appeal is from our most recent order. We are satisfied that the disposition of the instant PCRA petition is controlled by the filing provisions of the Judicial Code and specifically 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b) which provides: (1) any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that: (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution of laws of the United States; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively. (3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review. Our appellate courts have made it clear that all second and, presumably, subsequent petitions seeking collateral relief fall within the purview of Section 9545(b). Commonwealth v. 1754 CRIMINAL 1989 Johnson, 732 A.2d 639, 642 (Pa. Super. 1999) citing Commonwealth v. Alcom, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 555 PA.711,724 A.2d 348 (1998). In Corfi?nonwealth v. Johnson, supra, the defendant was convicted and sentenced for second degree murder and robbery. His judgment of sentence was affirmed on direct appeal in 1994. He filed an initial PCRA petition in 1996. His petition was eventually dismissed pursuant to the submission of a "no merit" letter and the withdrawal of counsel. Johnson filed a second PCRA petition on January 17, 1998. This petition was dismissed without a hearing. The issue faced by the Superior Court was whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing Johnson's petition without holding a hearing. The Superior Court held that there was no error. Appellant's PCRA petition, a second petition for collateral relief, had to be filed within one year of the date on which his judgment of sentence became final. The Superior Court affirmed appellant's judgment of sentence on January 28, 1994, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on July 11, 1994. Appellant did not file a PCRA petition underlying this appeal until January 17, 1998, over three years after his judgment of sentence became final. Appellant's PCRA petition thus is facially untimely. Section 9545(b) provides exceptions to the timing requirements of the PCRA. However, appellant's PCRA petition alleges nothing that triggers any exception. Johnson, 732 A.2d at 642. The case sub judice presents the same situation as in Johnson. Here, the judgment of sentence became final in 1994 when the Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal or, at the latest, in 1995 when the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. 1754 CRIMINAL 1989 In addition, none of the allegations in the defendant's current petition trigger any exception to the one-year filing limitation. Accordingly, we continue to believe that our order disrfiissing this "' PCRA petition, without hearing, was proper. August Z'/' , 2000 Jaime Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Donald Eugene Wiles BZ-7294 1 Kelley Drive Coal Township, PA 17866-1021 :rim Kevin/~~ Hess, J.