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HomeMy WebLinkAbout96-3640 civilSANDRA IRENE WOLFE, Plaintiff VS. HOUSE OF TSANG, LTD. and HORMEL FOODS CORP., Defendants · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ~o 96-3640 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION- LAW IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. ORDER AND NO W, this day of September, 2000, the motion of the defendants for summary judgment is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Karl Rominger, Esquire For the Plaintiff ess, J. Kristin E. Jaquis, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm SANDRA IRENE WOLFE, Plaintiff VS. HOUSE OF TSANG, LTD. and HORMEL FOODS CORP., Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA .o 96-3640 CIVIL CIVIL ACTION- LAW IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER In the instant matter, the plaintiff, Sandra Irene Wolfe, is seeking damages from the defendants, House of Tsang, Ltd. and Hormel Foods Corporation, under a claim of products liability. She alleges that she suffered injuries while consuming a meal that consisted of rice, chicken and a jarred sauce produced by the defendants. The plaintiff suffered a laceration to the back of her throat causing bleeding, vomiting, and several weeks of pain and discomfort. Plaintiff instituted this action against the defendants claiming that she unknowingly ingested a shard of glass that came from the jar that had held the defendants' product. The plaintiff preserved the glass jar from which the sauce was served but was unable to preserve the shard of glass. The jar in question is, purportedly, missing a sliver of glass from the lip of the container. Some discovery has been completed, however, counsel for the plaintiff has requested additional items of information from the defendants including certain manufacturing information. The matter is now before this court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment wherein they claim that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence of facts that would prove that the defendants' product was the cause of the plaintiff's injury or that the product was defective. NO. 96-3640 CIVIL DISCUSSION The standard of review for summary judgment is firmly established. After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. Pa.R.C.P. 103 5.2(2) (emphasis added). In addition, we are mindful that in considering a motion for summary judgment the court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; that the court's function is not to decide issues of fact but merely to determine whether any such issues exist; and that all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party [citations omitted]. Taylor v. TukanowicT., 290 Pa. Super. 581,586, 435 A.2d 181,183 (1981). In the present case, the defendants seeking summary judgment have argued that the plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of facts that would entitle her to relief. The difficulty in the defendants' assertion is, simply, that discovery in this matter has not been completed. In reviewing appeals from orders granting summary judgment, the Superior Court has held that summary judgment should not be granted when discovery requests, which could produce information germane to the facts of the case, are outstanding. The trial court, facing a summary judgment motion prior to the time when the plaintiff has been furnished responses to discovery requests, cannot be assured that there are no genuine issues of material fact; a requirement of Pa.R.C.P. 103 5.2(1). Such was the holding in Basel v. New Boulevard Baking Company, Inc, NO. 96-3640 CIVIL 410 Pa. Super. 591,600 A.2d 610 (1991). While the Basel case involved a slightly different factual scenario, it is applicable to the instant matter. In that case, the trial court' s "order granting summary judgment preceded any responses to the plaintiff's discovery requests. Here, the defendants have responded to some discovery requests but not others. The Superior Court's decision stands for the principle that a non-moving party may oppose a summary judgment motion on the grounds that it requires additional time to complete relevant discovery matters. The defendants' summary judgment motion asserts the plaintiff's inability to eliminate secondary causes of injury and her inability to prove that the defect occurred while in the control of the defendants. The Superior Court recently dealt with this issue in the case of Dansak v. Cameron Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Inc.~ 703 A.2d 489 (1997). In Dansak, the defendant bottling company filed a motion for summary judgment in a products liability action filed by a convenience store employee who suffered injuries to her hand as she was stocking a store cooler with beverages in bottles manufactured by the defendant. While removing a bottle from a box, she was cut by glass from another broken bottle. The defendant's motion argued that the plaintiff could not eliminate the possibility of abnormal use or secondary causes as being the source of her injury..Id, at 491. The Superior Court's lengthy analysis of the matter can be summarized as follows' Specifically, the court held that the lower court's grant of summary judgment was improper and the plaintiff should have been permitted to present her case to a jury. The court reiterated the proposition that when the plaintiff's case in chief does not reveal mishandling, abnormal use, or a secondary cause of the accident, then the matter may go to the jury based on circumstantial evidence. Id. at 497. · NO. 96-3640 CIVIL Thus, in a products liability case the plaintiff seeks to prove, through whatever means he or she has available under the circumstances of the case, that a product was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer. In some cases, the plaintiff may be able to prove that the product suffered from a specific defect by producing expert testimony to explain to the jury precisely how the product was defective and how the defect must have arisen from the manufacturer or seller. In cases of a manufacturing defect, such expert testimony is certainly desirable from the plaintiff's perspective but it is not essential. The plaintiff, even without expert testimony articulating the specific defect, may be able to convince a jury that the product was defective when it left the seller's hands by producing circumstantial evidence. Such circumstantial evidence includes (1) the malfunction of the product; (2) expert testimony as to a variety ofpossible causes; (3) the timing of the malfunction in relation to when the plaintiff first obtained the product; (4) similar accidents involving the same product; (5) elimination of other possible causes of the accident; and (6) proof tending to establish that the accident does not occur absent a manufacturing defect. ..Id. at 496. [citations omitted, emphasis in the original] Here, the injury to the plaintiff is consistent with the ingestion of a piece of glass. The presence of such glass in a food product is quite clearly a "malfunction." It would appear, under Dansak, that the plaintiff' s case can proceed, at least in part, on circumstantial evidence. ORDER AND NOW, this day of September, 2000, the motion of the defendants for NO. 96-3640 CIVIL summary judgment is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Karl Rominger, Esquire For the Plaintiff Kristin E. Jaquis, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm