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HomeMy WebLinkAbout96-5680 civilSALVATORE and SHARON ' PURPURA, husband and wife, · t/a LACAMPANA RISTORANTE, · Plaintiffs ' · VS. ARTHUR G. BRUAW, JR. and : individual, CHICKEN GOODE, · LTD., a corporation, JOHN B. · NIESLEY t/a JOHN B. NIESLEY : REAL ESTATE, and HOWARD G. : AMMONS, JR., Defendants VS. GINGERBREADMAN, INC., Additional Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION- LAW 96-568O CIVIL JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ORDER AND NOW, this day of December, 2000, our order of December 12, 2000, is amended to reflect that the same is the Defendants' Motion for Post-Trial Relief. BY THE COURT, K/A. Hess, J. Charles W. Rubendall, Esquire For Defendants Bruaw and Chicken Goode, Ltd. William P. Douglas, Esquire For Additional Defendant :rim SALVATORE and SHARON · PURPURA, husband and wife, · t/a LACAMPANA RISTORANTE, · Plaintiffs ' · VS. ' ARTHUR G. BRUAW, JR. and : individual, CHICKEN GOODE, · LTD., a corporation, JOHN B. · NIESLEY t/a JOHN B. NIESLEY : REAL ESTATE, and HOWARD G. : AMMONS, JR., Defendants VS. GINGERBREADMAN, INC., Additional Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION- LAW 96-5680 CIVIL JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL RELIEF BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND OLER, J.J. ORDER AND NOW, this day of December, 2000, following argument thereon, the motion of the defendants for post-trial relief is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Charles W. Rubendall, Esquire For Defendants Bruaw and Chicken Goode, Ltd. K/~A. Hess, J. William P. Douglas, Esquire For Additional Defendant SALVATORE and SHARON · PURPURA, husband and wife, · t/a LACAMPANA RISTORANTE, · Plaintiffs · VS. ARTHUR G. B RUAW, JR. and individual, CHICKEN GOODE, LTD., a corporation, JOHN B. NIESLEY t/a JOHN B. NIESLEY REAL ESTATE, and HOWARD G. : AMMONS, JR., Defendants VS. GINGERBREADMAN, INC., Additional Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION- LAW 96-5680 CIVIL JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE' PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR POST-TRIAL RELIEF BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND OLER, J.J. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This is a case in which the claims of the plaintiffs were settled and discontinued prior to trial. The claims eventually considered by a jury were those of defendants, Arthur G. Bruaw, Jr. and Chicken Goode, Ltd., on their cross-complaint against the additional defendant, Gingerbread Man, Inc. The jury rendered a verdict finding that the Gingerbread Man "did not intentionally prevent Chicken Goode, Ltd. from performing a contract with Purpura." The defendants have filed the within motion for post-trial relief seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. This lawsuit arose out of a written option agreement, executed December 19, 1983, between Mr. Bmaw and the Gingerbread Man giving Mr. Bmaw, his successors and assigns, the 96-568O CIVIL exclusive right to purchase beer license no. E-3384 for the sum of $10,000. According to the option agreement, Gingerbread Man agreed that it would, upon receipt of written notice and the payment of $1.00, execute whatever documents were necessary to make application to the LCB to transfer the license to Mr. Bmaw. On June 13, 1985, Mr. Bruaw assigned his rights under the option agreement to Chicken Goode Ltd. For many years, because of zoning constraints and other reasons, Mr. Bruaw and Chicken Goode were unable to place the license that ~vas the subject of the option agreement. On April 27, 1995, Bruaw and Chicken Goode entered into an agreement to sell the license to Salvatore Purpura and Sharon Purpura t/a LaCampana Ristorante for the sum of $55,000. Thereafter, Chicken Goode attempted to exercise its option under the December 19, 1983 agreement. Gingerbread Man's principal, Richard E. Phelan, refused to sign the transfer documents or otherwise cooperate. At the trial of this case, Mr. Phelan articulated his reasons for refusing the transfer of the license. These included certain improprieties surrounding the proposed transaction which would subject him to liability. Because of his refusal to abide by the option agreement, the Gingerbread Man was joined in the original action in this case on an allegation that Mr. Phelan intentionally interfered in the contract between the Purpuras and the defendants. In the end, it became clear that the Purpuras were not so much interested in a beer license as they were in a beer and wine license. The beer license offered by Mr. Bruaw would not have, in any event, served their purposes. Rule 227.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the trial court to grant post-trial relief. Post-trial relief may include either the grant of a new trial as to all or any of the issues or the entry of judgment in favor of any party. Entry may be entered in favor of a verdict 96-5680 CIVIL loser where (1) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and/or (2) the evidence at trial was sUch that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movement. See Simmons v. Pacor, 543 Pa. 664, 674 A.2d 232 (1996); Davis v. Berwind Corp., 547 Pa. 260, 266, 690 A.2d 186, 189 (1997). We are satisfied both as a legal and factual matter that the jury was well within its province in determining that Mr. Phelan had not interfered with the contract between Purpura and Bruaw. As noted in Frankel v. Northeast Land Co., 391 Pa. Super. 226, 570 A.2d 1065 at 1069' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has adopted the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 766 and has made them a part of the law of this Commonwealth. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 207, 412 A.2d 466, 470 (1980), citing Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoffv. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 429-433,393 A.2d 1175, 1181-1182 (1978). Section 766 ofthe Restatement is as follows: One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) be- tween another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract. Appellants aver generally in Count V of their amended complaint that because the Millers and Jefferson Bank knew or should have known of the lis pendens notice, they are liable additionally for tortious interference with appellants' contractual 96-5680 CIVIL rights. This averment is inadequate to state a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract for the sale of real estate. "One does not induce another to commit a breach of' contract with a third person under the rule stated in [Section 766 o£ the Restatement (Second) of Torts] when he merely enters into an agreement with knowledge that the other cannot perform both it and his contract with the third person." Similarly, we are satisfied that a person does not tortiously interfere with a contract between the plaintiff and a third party simply by failing to perform his contract with the plaintiff. This was, in fact, the specific holding in Glazer v. Chandler, 414 Pa. 304, 200 A.2d 416 (1964). As noted therein' The tort of inducing breach of contract or refusal to deal is defined as inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to perform a contract with another, or not to enter into or continue a business relation with another, without a privilege to do so. Restatement, Torts § 766 (1939). Numerous cases in this Commonwealth are in accord with this definition. See Restatement, Torts, Pa. Annot. § 766 (Supp. 1953). Every case in Pennsylvania granting recovery for this tort has involved a defendant's interference with known contracts or business relations existing between third parties and a plaintiff. See, e.g., Dora v. Dora~ 392 Pa. 433, 141 A.2d 587 (1958) and Padden v. Local No. 90 United Association of Journeymen Plumbers, 168 Pa. Super. 611, 83 A.2d 327 (1951). Our courts have also indicated that there may be recovery under this tort theory where a defendant has interfered with prospective contracts or business relationships of third parties with a plaintiff. See Neel v. Allegheny County Memorial Park, 391 Pa. 354, 358, 137 A.2d 785, 787 (1958) and Locker v. Hudson Coal Company, 87 Pa. D.& C. 264, 267 (1953). 96-5680 CIVIL However, where, as in this case, the allegations and evidence only disclose that defendant breached his contracts with plaintiff and that as an incidental consequence thereof plaintiff' s business relationships with third parties have been affected, an action lies only in contract for defendant's breaches, and the consequential damages recoverable, if any, may be adjudicated only in that action. Id._:. at 418. In the case sub judice, the jury made a finding that Mr. Phelan did not interfere in the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. While we are, of course, not privy to the deliberations of the jury, their finding could easily be based on a conclusion that Mr. Phelan's reasons for not transferring the license were credible. The determination of credibility is the exclusive province of the fact finder. See Foflygen v. Allegheny General Hosp., 723 A.2d 705 (Pa. Super. 1999). In addition, the evidence allows a conclusion that Mr. Phelan did nothing more than breach a contract with Bruaw and Chicken Goode which would not, in any event, support an action for tortious interference, as a matter of law. ORDER AND NOW, this ! 2. *' day of December, 2000, following argument thereon, the motion of the defendants for post-trial relief is DENIED. B Y THE COURT, Charles W. Rubendall, Esquire For Defendants Bruaw and Chicken Goode, Ltd. William P. Douglas, Esquire For Additional Defendant K/A. Hess, J.