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HomeMy WebLinkAbout96-1645 CivilSCOTT A. RUNK, Plaintiff VS. PARKER E. RAFFENSBERGER, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 96-1645 CIVIL IN RE' DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. ORDER AND NO W, this day of February, 2001, the motion of the defendant for partial summary judgment is DENIED. B Y THE COURT, Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire For the Plaintiff John M. Popilock, Esquire For the Defendant :rim SCOTT A. RUNK, Plaintiff VS. PARKER E. RAFFENSBERGER, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION- LAW 96-1645 CIVIL IN RE' DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER Before the court is the motion of the defendant for partial summary judgment. This matter arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 29, 1994, at the intersection of Route 11 and Locust Point Road in Silver Spring Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle that was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant. According to the complaint, as a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained injuries to his head, neck and back. The plaintiff in this matter had a limited tort coverage insurance policy. Under that policy, the plaintiff is precluded from recovering noneconomic damages unless there is "a personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of bodily function or permanent serious disfigurement." 75 P.S. 1702. The instant motion asserts that the court should determine that the plaintiff's injuries do not reach the threshold of serious injury as a matter of law and, therefore, he should not be entitled to recover noneconomic damages. The standard for summary judgment was clearly stated in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Baxter' In examining this matter, as with all summary judgment cases, we must view the record in the 96-1645 CIVIL light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Pennsylvania State University v. County of Centre, 532 Pa. 142, 143-145,615 A.2d 303,304 (1992). In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party "must adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor. Failure to adduce this evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Ertrel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93, 101-102, 674 A.2d 1038, 1042 (1996). Finally, we stress that summary judgment will be granted only in those cases which are free and clear from doubt. Marks v. Tasman, 527 Pa. 132, 589 A.2d 205(1991). Washington v. Baxter, 553 Pa. 434, 441,719 A.2d 733,737 (1998). In limited tort cases such as this one, the question is whether the plaintiff's injuries are of a nature that under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (hereafter "MVFRL") the plaintiff can recover non-economic damages. In the past this has been referred to as the "serious injury threshold." Dodson v. Elvey, 445 Pa. Super. 479, 665,665 A.2d 1223 (1995). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Washington v. Baxter, rejected much of the Dodson reasoning. See Baxter, 553 Pa. at 446-47, 719 A.2d at 740. The Washington decision analyzed the history of the MVFRL and its intent. Id. at 443- 44, 719 A.2d at 738. The court examined whether the legislature intended to leave the "serious injury" determination to the trial judge as a matter of law or to a jury as a question of fact..I.d, at 444, 719 A.2d at 738. The court decided, given that the legislature flatly rejected making the determination a matter of law, that the decision should be "left to a jury unless reasonable minds 96-1645 CIVIL could not differ on the issue of whether serious injury had been sustained." Id.__:. at 446-47, 719 A.2d at 740. The court then defined what constituted a serious bodily injury: The "serious impairment of body function" threshold contains two inquiries' a) What bodily function, if' any, was impaired because of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident? b) Was the impairment of the body function serious? The focus of these inquiries is not on the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected a particular body function. Generally, medical testimony will be needed to establish the existence, extent, and permanency of the impairment... In determining whether the impairment was serious, several factors should be considered: the extent of the impairment, the length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant factors. An impairment need not be permanent to be serious. Id.__:. at 447, 719 A.2d at 740. Viewing the facts in light of the Washington standard, and viewing those same facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment lacks merit. Using the definition of serious injury stated in Washington, this case is not clear enough to determine the question as a matter of law. While the record indicates that treatment for pain has been sporadic over the years, there has been consistent treatment since the accident, dating from April 1994 through 1999. There is no indication that these injuries are even now resolved. In addition to the injuries to his neck and lower back, the record reflects that the plaintiff has a limitation with regard to the use of his hand due to carpal tunnel injuries. The injuries to his hand have affected his enjoyment of certain activities. He is, for example, no 96-1645 CIVIL longer able to play a stringed instrument. In conclusion, we are satisfied that there remain issues of material fact that should be resolved by a jury. ORDER AND NOW, this Q:"" day of February, 2001, the motion of the defendant for partial summary judgment is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Marcus A. McKnight, III, Esquire For the Plaintiff Hess, J. John M. Popilock, Esquire For the Defendant :rim