HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-3141-2005 (2)
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
: CHARGES: (1) FIREARMS NOT TO BE
v. : CARRIED W/O LICENSE
: (2) PERSON NOT TO POSSESS
: FIREARM
KEVIN LEROY :
JACKSON :
OTN: L270336-3 : No. CP-21-CR-3141-2005
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925
OLER, J., August 20, 2007.
In this criminal case, Defendant was found guilty in a bench trial of Person
Not To Possess, Use, Manufacture, Control, Sell or Transfer Firearms, a felony of
1
the second degree, and Firearms Not To Be Carried without a License, a felony of
2
the third degree. Notwithstanding an extensive and serious criminal record,
3
including weapons offenses, he received a sentence on the former charge at the
4
bottom of the mitigated range of the guidelines of not less than 36 months nor
more than 72 months in a state correctional institution; on the latter charge, he
received a concurrent sentence in the standard range of the guidelines of not less
5
than 24 months nor more than 48 months in a state correctional institution.
6
From the judgment of sentence, Defendant has filed a direct appeal to the
7
Pennsylvania Superior Court. The issues being pursued on appeal have been
expressed in a statement of matters complained of on appeal as follows:
1
Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, §1, as amended, 18 Pa. C.S. §6105.
2
Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, §1, as amended, 18 Pa. C.S. §6106.
3
Presentence Investigation Report, at 3.
4
Presentence Investigation Report, at 2; Order of Court, April 3, 2007.
5
Presentence Investigation Report, at 1; Order of Court, April 3, 2007.
6
Although Defendant’s notice of appeal indicates that the appeal is from an order denying a post-
sentence motion, the appeal is more properly viewed as being from the judgment of sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 2006 PA Super 314, ¶1 n.1, 911 A.2d 558, 561 n.1.
7
Defendant’s Notice of Appeal, filed August 8, 2007.
1. Whether this Honorable Court erred in denying Kevin Leroy
Jackson’s Omnibus Pre-trial Motion (Motion to Suppress Physical
Evidence) where law enforcement performed an unlawful and pre-textual
traffic stop of the vehicle being operated by Mr. Jackson where law
enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion or probably cause to believe that
a motor vehicle violation was committed pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
2. Whether this Honorable Court erred in denying Mr. Jackson’s
Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion (Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence) where
law enforcement subjected Mr. Jackson to a prolonged and continued
unlawful detention following the initial traffic stop where the alleged,
initial basis for the stop had concluded with a warning, and where the law
enforcement officer withheld Mr. Jackson’s vehicle information without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify the further detention, and
ordering of Mr. Jackson out of the vehicle, in violation of Article I, Section
8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
3. Whether this Honorable Court erred in denying Mr. Jackson’s
Omnibus Pre-trial Motion (Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence) where
Mr. Jackson was coerced into providing invalid consent to search said
vehicle during a custodial detention, and where the warrantless search of
the vehicle was unreasonable thereby pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
4. Whether this Honorable Court erred in denying Mr. Jackson’s
Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion (Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence) where
law enforcement’s search of said vehicle exceeded the scope of the alleged
consent and, therefore, was unlawful pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
5. Whether this Honorable Court erred in denying Mr. Jackson’s Post-
Sentence Motion where this Court’s guilty verdict, based upon the
evidence presented at the non-jury trial, by the Commonwealth, was
against the weight of the evidence such that the verdicts would shock one’s
sense of justice, and render the award of a new trial imperative.
6. Whether this Honorable court abused its discretion in sentencing
Mr. Jackson to serve an aggregate sentence of 3 years to 6 years in a state
correctional facility, where the sentence was excessive and unreasonable in
that it failed to consider the rehabilitative needs of Mr. Jackson, failed to
consider the sentence necessary to protect the public, failed to account for
the character of Defendant, and failed to consider the cooperation of Mr.
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Jackson in this matter.
8
Defendant’s Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, Pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), filed August 10, 2007.
2
This opinion in support of the judgment of sentence is written pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1925(a).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As a result of a vehicle stop on Saturday, December 17, 2005, Defendant
was charged with Person Not To Possess, Use, Manufacture, Control, Sell or
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Transfer Firearms and Firearms Not To Be Carried without a License. He was
10
formally arraigned on March 10, 2006.
Defendant filed an omnibus pretrial motion for relief in the form of a
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motion to suppress on April 7, 2006. The grounds pursued in the motion were
(1) a lack of a lawful basis for a stop of Defendant’s vehicle, (2) an unlawful
prolongation of a detention of Defendant beyond the period of any lawful
detention, (3) the invalidity of consent given by Defendant for a search of his
vehicle, due to the occurrence of the consent during a period of unlawful detention
and/or its involuntary nature resulting from coercion, and (4) an extension of the
search beyond the physical scope of the consent. A hearing was held on the
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motion on May 17, 2007.
The motion was denied by an order of court, accompanied by an opinion,
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dated August 28, 2007. The rationale for the court’s ruling as it related to the
issues pursued by Defendant at the hearing, and reiterated at this time on appeal by
way of paragraphs 1-4 of Defendant’s statement of matters complained of on
appeal, was contained in the court’s opinion dated August 28, 2007. Accordingly,
that opinion is incorporated herein by reference, and the suppression issues will
not be further discussed herein.
9
Criminal Complaint, filed December 17, 2005.
10
Acknowledgment of Arraignment Form, filed March 10, 2006.
11
Defendant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, filed April 7, 2006.
12
See Opinion of Court, dated August 28, 2006, at 1.
13
Order and Opinion of Court, dated August 28, 2006.
3
A non-jury trial was held in this matter before the undersigned judge on
January 10, 2007, and March 1, 2007. At the commencement of trial, the
Commonwealth secured a bench warrant for the arrest of one James Callahan, a
passenger in Defendant’s vehicle at the time of Defendant’s arrest, as a material
witness, due to his failure to appear for trial in response to a Commonwealth
14
subpoena; Mr. Callahan was not, however, apprehended pursuant to the warrant,
15
and the trial proceeded without him.
The evidence at trial consisted of a set of stipulated facts, testimony of three
Commonwealth witnesses, three Commonwealth exhibits, and one defense
exhibit. The set of stipulated facts read as follows:
1. The defendant is Kevin Leroy Jackson; DOB January 8, 1959; on
the date of the offense Defendant reported his address as 2098 Broad Street,
Statham, Georgia 30666.
2. On December 17, 2005 at approximately 7:30 p.m. Pennsylvania
State Police Trooper Bryan Henneman was on duty and working in his
capacity as a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper with Troop H in Carlisle,
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Trooper Henneman has been a
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper for more than 5 years.
3. On the above referenced date and time, Trooper Henneman was on
routine patrol on Interstate 81 southbound in the vicinity of mile marker 27 in
Southampton Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
4. At the above referenced date and time, Trooper Henneman
conducted a registration check of a vehicle that bore Georgia license plates
and that was traveling in front of Trooper Henneman on the highway.
5. Trooper Henneman utilized an in-car computer to access a
computerized database that contained vehicle registration information.
6. The information Trooper Henneman received from the
computerized database indicated that the registration for the above
reference[d] vehicle with George license plates had expired.
7. Trooper Henneman conducted a stop of the above referenced
vehicle.
8. Trooper Henneman approached the passenger side of the vehicle
and instructed the occupants to lower the window and requested proof of
insurance, registration and the driver’s license of the operator. Trooper
Henneman identified the defendant as the operator of the vehicle.
14
N.T. 3-4, Trial, January 10, 2007.
15
See Order of Court, March 1, 2007.
4
9. Trooper Henneman also observed and identified one passenger in
the vehicle, James Callahan of Stone Mountain, Georgia.
10. Upon reviewing the documentation provided by the defendant,
Trooper Henneman determined that the documentation appeared to be
authentic and that defendant possessed a valid registration for the vehicle.
11. The documentation supplied by the defendant indicated that
defendant is the sole registered owner of the vehicle.
12. During defendant’s encounter with police, defendant executed a
written consent for Trooper Henneman to search the vehicle, a 1999 Hyundai
Sonata.
13. During the course of Trooper Henneman’s search of defendant’s
vehicle Trooper Henneman located a 9 mm handgun and next to the handgun,
Trooper Henneman located a 15 round magazine for the handgun loaded with
ammunition.
14. Both the handgun and the magazine with ammunition were found
inside a brown bag in the locked trunk of defendant’s vehicle.
15. When asked by Trooper Henneman defendant admitted that he did
not have a permit to carry the handgun.
16. Trooper Henneman subsequently conducted a criminal history
check of the defendant. Defendant has been convicted of the following
offense(s) that exclude the defendant from lawfully possession a handgun:
a. On April 20, 1993, defendant pleaded nolo
contendere to Possession of Cocaine with the intent to
Deliver in the State of Florida, a felony offense.
Defendant’s Florida conviction is analogous to 35 P.S.
Section 780-113(3). Florida transferred supervision of the
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case to Georgia on July 26, 1996.
Trooper Henneman supplemented these facts with testimony to the effect
17
that the barrel length of the handgun in question was 3 7/8 inches, that he would
have established the compatibility of the magazine with the gun on the evening of
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the stop, that the bag in which the gun and magazine were found also contained
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six medications prescribed to Defendant and a plaque inscribed with the words
20
“In memory of Leroy Jackson, shortstop,” and that no key to the vehicle was
16
Commonwealth’s Ex. 3, Trial, January 10, 2007.
17
N.T. 15, Trial, January 10, 2007.
18
N.T. 15, Trial, January 10, 2007.
19
N.T. 6, Trial, March 1, 2007.
20
N.T. 6, Trial, March 1, 2007.
5
21
found upon the passenger. Trooper Henneman conceded that a search of
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Defendant’s person had not yielded anything illegal, and that he had not
23
attempted to take fingerprints from the evidence seized.
Pennsylvania State Trooper Douglas Rost corroborated Trooper
Henneman’s testimony as to the gun, loaded magazine, medications prescribed to
Defendant, and baseball plaque, which were found in the bag in the trunk of
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Defendant’s car. He also testified that the bag had contained several business
cards for “Against All Odds Clothing” products, with the name “Keith” and a
25
telephone number printed on them.
Pennsylvania State Police Corporal William Palmero testified as an expert
2627
in firearms. He stated that he had examined the gun in question, that its barrel
2829
length was approximately four inches, that it was operable, and that it was a
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“firearm.”
At the conclusion of the non-jury trial, the court found Defendant guilty of
31
the aforementioned charges. A presentence investigation report, upon which the
3233
expressly court relied at sentencing and which was made part of the record,
21
N.T. 9, Trial, January 10, 2007.
22
N.T. 14, Trial, January 10, 2007.
23
N.T. 13, Trial, January 10, 2007.
24
N.T. 14, Trial, March 1, 2007.
25
N.T. 15, Trial, March 1, 2007; Defendant’s Ex. 1, Trial, March 1, 2007.
26
N.T. 18, Trial, January 10, 2007.
27
N.T. 18-20, Trial, January 10, 2007.
28
N.T. 23, Trial, January 10, 2007.
29
N.T. 28, Trial, January 10, 2007.
30
N.T. 20-21, Trial, January 10, 2007.
31
Verdict, March 1, 2007.
32
Order of Court, April 3, 2007.
33
Order of Court, April 3, 2007.
6
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revealed that Defendant had a Prior Record Score of 5. His prior record
consisted of the following:
10/25/1982
82-115, Oneida County, New York, Criminal Possession
Weapons – 4th degree, M, 3 years probation
12/20/1982
FCR-135, Fayette Town Court, New York, Criminal
Possess Weapon – 4th: Fir[e]arm, M2 $500 fine paid
5/7/1986
Aurelius Town Court, New York, Petit Larceny, M2,
$100.00 fine paid
7/26/1989
8901172CFA, 20th Circuit Court-Naples, FL843.01,
Resisting Arrest with Violence, Felony of 3rd Degree, 2
years community control
8/3/1989
8902650MMA, Collier County, Florida, FL784.03,
Battery, M, 1 month 10 days in jail, 1 year probation
4/20/1993
93000146CFMA, Hernando County, Florida, 893131a1,
Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Sell or Deliver,
Felony, 2 months jail, 3 years probation
6/21/1996
NBR – 96CR2520, Dekalb County, Georgia, Possession
of Fir[e]arm by Convicted Felon, Felony of the 3rd
degree, 30 days confinement, 1 year 11 months probation
8/5/2003
NBR - 01 – CR1480, Dekalb County, Georgia, Battery,
35
M2, 12 months probation
The Offense Gravity Score for the crime of Person Not To Possess, Use,
Manufacture, Control, Sell or Transfer Firearms was 9, and the Offense Gravity
36
Score for the crime of Firearms Not To Be Carried without a License was 7.
These scores, in conjunction with Defendant’s Prior Record Score of 5, yielded
guideline minimum sentences of 36 months (mitigated range), 48-60 months
(standard range), and 60 months (aggravated range) for the first crime and 18
34
Presentence Investigation Report, at 1.
35
Presentence Investigation Report, at 3.
36
Presentence Investigation Report, at 1.
7
months (mitigated range), 24-30 months (standard range), and 36 months
37
(aggravated range) for the second.
At sentencing, Defendant’s counsel advised that at one time Defendant had
38
cooperated with law enforcement authorities in Syracuse, New York, and that
Defendant had carried the gun involved in the present case for his own
39
protection. On behalf of Defendant, his wife, son and daughter spoke of his
40
positive character. Several letters were also presented attesting to Defendant’s
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good character. The Commonwealth, however, requested a minimum sentence
in the standard range of the guidelines, noting the following:
Your Honor, the Commonwealth certainly has no intention to
diminish the good reputation that the Defendant has earned with all of the
people that wrote on his behalf or to his family or to downplay any of the
positive steps he’s taken in his life. However, what we’ve heard today
from the Defendant’s family and what we’ve heard from all of the letters
written on his behalf do not match the prior record that is listed for Your
Honor in the presentence report. This record started way back in 1982 and
continues through the ‘90s, and with a conviction in 2003, and based on
[defense counsel’s] representation to the Court, that actually occurred in
the ‘90s, but it was prosecuted in 2003.
The Defendant’s justification for carrying the gun he was found with
in this case, Your Honor, is for protection from an incident that occurred
prior to 1987. I don’t know exactly when, but based on one of the letters
we can tell it was at least prior to 1987, and that was 20 years ago.
He was also convicted . . . in 1996 of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. He is—he knows he’s not to be carrying a gun and he
continues to do that. He’s not taking responsibility for this crime. If you
look at the statements he made to the Probation Officer that prepared the
presentence investigation report, on page 1 of that report, he’s not taking
42
responsibility for this, and we would ask for a standard range sentence.
37
Presentence Investigation Report, at 1-2.
38
N.T. 3-4, Sentencing Proceeding, April 3, 2007; see Defendant’s Ex. 1, Sentencing Proceeding,
April 3, 2007.
39
N.T. 3, Sentencing Proceeding, April 3, 2007.
40
N.T. 13-14, Sentencing Proceeding, April 3, 2007.
41
Defendant’s Ex. 1, Sentencing Proceeding, April 3, 2007.
42
N.T. 15-16, Sentencing Proceeding, April 3, 2007.
8
In declining to impose a standard range sentence with respect to the more
serious offense, and instead imposing the lowest aggregate minimum sentence
consistent with the mitigated range of the guidelines, the court noted “the support
shown for the Defendant at sentencing by members of his family and his
43
acquaintances.”
On April 12, 2007, Defendant filed a post-sentence motion requesting (a)
an arrest of judgment and dismissal of the charges, on the ground that the verdict
4445
was against the weight of the evidence, and (b) a modification of sentence.
With respect to the weight of the evidence, the motion contended as follows:
14. The Commonwealth attempted to prove constructive possession
of a firearm in the trunk of a vehicle operated by Mr. Jackson.
15. Besides the officer, there was only one other eyewitness, James
Demario Callahan, who failed to appear for the trial.
16. Mr. Callahan’s failure to appear casts serious doubt on whether he
actually was in physical control of the firearm which was located in the
vehicle.
17. The Commonwealth was unable to prove that Mr. Jackson
possessed the firearm in question.
18. Therefore, the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, and
46
such a verdict shocks the conscience.
With respect to the motion to modify sentence, it was contended that
Defendant’s sentence “was excessive and unreasonable” for the following reasons:
a. the failure to consider the rehabilitative needs of the defendant;
b. the failure to consider the sentence necessary to protect the public;
c. the failure to account for the character of the defendant; and
47
d. the failure to consider prior cooperation of the defendant.
43
Order of Court, April 3, 2007.
44
A new trial would be the more appropriate remedy on such a motion. See Commonwealth v.
Davis, 2002 PA Super 167, 799 A.2d 860.
45
Defendant’s Post-Sentence Motion, filed April 12, 2007.
46
Defendant’s Post-Sentence Motion, filed April 12, 2007.
47
Defendant’s Post-Sentence Motion, filed April 12, 2007.
9
At a hearing on Defendant’s post-sentence motion, Defendant introduced a
1987 Syracuse, New York, police report concerning an incident in which
Defendant was allegedly assaulted and robbed by a man who asked why
48
Defendant had once brought a police officer to his residence. Following the
49
hearing, Defendant’s post-sentence motion was denied. Defendant’s direct
50
appeal was filed on July 30, 2007.
DISCUSSION
Weight of the evidence. In a determination of whether a new trial should be
granted based on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the proper test is
whether the verdict is so contrary to the evidence presented at trial as to “shock
[the court’s] sense of justice.” McElrath v. Commonwealth, 405 Pa. Super. 431,
443, 592 A.2d 740, 745 (1991). While this issue requires a review of all evidence
presented at trial, credibility determinations are within the province of the trier of
fact. Id. at 442-43, 592 A.2d at 745.
With respect to possession of an item of tangible personalty, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has stated as follows:
When [the item] is not found on the defendant’s person, the
Commonwealth must establish “constructive possession,” that is, the
power to control the [item] and the intent to exercise that control. The fact
that another person may also have control and access does not eliminate
the defendant’s constructive possession; two actors may have joint control
and equal access and thus both may constructively possess the [item]. As
with any other element of a crime, constructive possession may be proven
by circumstantial evidence. The requisite knowledge and intent may be
inferred from examination of the totality of the circumstances. The fact
that the [item] is located in an area usually accessible only to the defendant
may lead to an inference that he placed it there or knew of its presence.
Commonwealth v. Haskins, 450 Pa. Super. 540, 544, 677 A.2d 328, 330 (1996).
Thus, in appropriate circumstances a trier of fact may properly infer that an
item found in an area of a vehicle usually accessible only to its operator, such as
48
Defendant’s Ex. 1, Hearing, July 2, 2007.
49
Order of Court, July 13, 2007.
50
Defendant’s Notice of Appeal, filed July 30, 2007.
10
its glove compartment or hatch area, was in the constructive possession of the
operator, notwithstanding that the vehicle also contained a passenger.
Commonwealth v. Haskins, 450 Pa. Super. 540, 677 A.2d 328 (1996).
In the present case, circumstances leading to an inference that Defendant
was in constructive possession of the gun seized by police from a bag in the trunk
of a vehicle were (1) his ownership of the vehicle, (2) his operation of the vehicle
at the time, (3) the absence of a means of access to the trunk on the part of the
vehicle’s passenger, and (4) the presence of other items in the bag associated with
Defendant, in the form of medication prescribed to him and a baseball plaque
bearing his family name. In the virtual absence of any evidence to be weighed to
the contrary, the inference of constructive possession derivable from these
circumstances was sufficiently strong, in the court’s view, as to render the verdict
less than shocking.
Discretionary aspect of sentencing. The imposition of a legal sentence is a
51
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and such a sentence will not
be subjected to review on appeal unless “there is a substantial question that the
sentence imposed [was] not appropriate under [the Sentencing Code] of [the
Judicial Code.]” Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1316, §3, 42 Pa. C.S. §9781(b).
In this regard, as a general rule “a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating
factors does not raise a substantial question for [appellate] review.
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 2005 Pa. Super. 16, ¶32, 868 A.2d 516, 529.
In Pennsylvania, “sentencing guidelines were promulgated by the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing to be considered by and to aid courts in
imposing sentences. The guidelines were designed to bring greater rationality and
consistency to sentences and to eliminate unwarranted disparity in sentencing.”
Commonwealth v. Walls, __ Pa. __, __ n.3, 926 A.2d 957, 961 n.3 (2007). The
51
Commonwealth v. Walls, __ Pa. __, __, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (2007).
11
52
guidelines are informative, and in this role they constitute “an important factor”
53
in a determination of sentence. Where a departure from the guidelines is
involved, the reason for the departure must be explicitly stated by the court at the
time of sentencing. Act of December 30, 1974, P.L. 1052, §1, as amended, 42 Pa.
C.S. §9721(b).
54
On the other hand, the guidelines are not binding. Sentencing is an
55
“individualized” process, and considerations bearing upon the reasonableness of
the sentence imposed include “the protection of the public[,] the gravity of the
offense in relation to the impact on the victim and the community[,] and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Walls, __ Pa. __, __,
926 A.2d 957, 964 (2007). The court’s consideration of such factors must be at
least implicit in the sentence. Id. In the latter regard, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court has noted:
Where pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue to presume that
the sentencing judge was aware of the relevant information regarding the
defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with
mitigating factors.
Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 101-02, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988).
Finally, “under the current Sentencing Code there is no requirement that a
sentencing court’s imposition of sentence must be the minimum possible
confinement.” Commonwealth v. Walls, __ Pa. __, __, 926 A.2d 957, 965 (2007).
However, any confinement that is imposed “must be consistent with concern for
public protection, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.” Id. In this regard, the special threat which illegal weapons pose to the
safety of the public is widely recognized. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Green, 405
Pa. Super. 24, 591 A.2d 179 (1991).
52
Commonwealth v. Walls, __ Pa. __, __, 926 A.2d 957, 962 (2007).
53
Commonwealth v. Walls, __ Pa. __, __, 926 A.2d 957, 967 (2007).
54
Commonwealth v. Walls, __ Pa. __, __, 926 A.2d 957, 965 (2007).
55
Commonwealth v. Walls, __ Pa. __, __, 926 A.2d 957, 963 (2007).
12
In the present case, where (a) Defendant illegally possessed a firearm, with
live ammunition, (b) Defendant had a serious criminal record dating to 1982,
which included crimes of violence and three possession-of-weapons crimes, (c)
the explanation proffered for the present offense was neither plausible nor
consistent with a recognition of the impropriety of the conduct involved, (d) a
series of prior lenient sentences had not had the effect of deterring Defendant’s
criminal conduct, and (e) the sentencing guidelines recommended a standard range
minimum sentence of 48-60 months for the more serious of the crimes charged, it
is believed that an aggregate minimum sentence of 36 months at the bottom of the
mitigated range of the guidelines reasonably took into account any mitigating
circumstances advanced by Defendant, along with the other factors appropriate to
sentencing, including the concern for public protection, the gravity of the offense,
and the rehabilitative needs of Defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, it is believed that the judgment of sentence from
which Defendant has appealed was properly entered.
BY THE COURT,
_________________
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Daniel J. Sodus, Esq.
Senior Assistant District Attorney
Royce L. Morris, Esq.
Joseph M. Sembrot, Esq.
320 Market Street
P.O. Box 1268
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1268
Attorneys for Defendant
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