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Home My WebLink About2006-3101 Civil SAFE AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : KAREN BRUNNER, : CHRISTINA TEMES AND CHRISTINA : TEMES, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE : ESTATE OF HUNTER TEMES, : DECEASED, : DEFENDANTS : 06-3101 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION OF PLAINTIFF FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., December 10, 2007:-- Defendant, Karen Brunner, was the owner of a Saturn that was insured by plaintiff, Safe Auto Insurance Company. On July 7, 2004, while Brunner was operating a Chevrolet owned by George Shoemaker, she was involved in an accident in a parking lot in Camp Hill, Cumberland County. The accident occurred when her daughter, Christina Temes, was about to put Brunner’s grandson, Hunter Temes, into her vehicle. Temes and Hunter were standing by the backdoor when the Chevrolet driven by Brunner struck the Temes’ vehicle. The impact moved the Temes vehicle into Temes and Hunter. Temes was injured and Hunter was killed. Christina Temes, individually and as administratirix of the estate of Hunter Temes, submitted a liability to claim to Safe Auto under the policy it issued to Karen Brunner for her Saturn. Safe Auto has denied coverage and instituted this action for a declaratory judgment to resolve the coverage dispute. The Safe Auto policy provides coveredautoyou that “Liability coverage applies to you while driving your and to while 06-3101 CIVIL TERM non-owned auto driving a , if you have permission from the owner to drive the auto.” That provision is subject to the following exclusion: “Liability coverage will not apply to you while driving an auto that is not listed on the Declarations Page and that is: 1. Owned or leased by you; or 2. Available for your regular use; or 3. Owned or leased by a resident of your household.” The policy defines a “resident” as “any person who physically lives in your household for longer than fourteen (14) consecutive days.” It does not define “household.” Safe Auto seeks summary judgment, maintaining that there are no factual disputes, and on this record, as a matter of law, at the time of the accident on July 7, 2004: (1) Brunner and Shoemaker were residents in the same household at One Colliery Road, Williamstown, Pennsylvania, (2) they had resided together in that household for more than fourteen consecutive days, (3) Brunner was operating a Chevrolet owned by Shoemaker, and (4) the Chevrolet was not an auto that was listed on the declaration page of Brunner’s Safe Auto policy. Therefore, plaintiff seeks summary judgment in form of a declaration that the insurance policy it issued to Brunner for her Saturn does not provide liability coverage for the accident on July 7, 2004. Washington v. Baxter, supra In , the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set forth the standard for deciding a motion for summary judgment. A court: . . . must view the record in the light most favorable to the non- moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Pennsylvania State University v. County of Centre, 532 Pa. 142, 143-145, 615 A.2d 303, 304 (1992). In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party “must adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor. Failure to adduce this evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to -2- 06-3101 CIVIL TERM judgment as a matter of law.” Ertrel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93, 101-102, 674 A.2d 1038, 1042 (1996). Karen Brunner has admitted the following facts. She was operating a Chevrolet owned by George Shoemaker at the time of the accident on July 7, 2004. On that date she lived at and was a resident of One Colliery Road, Williamstown, Pennsylvania, and had lived there for longer than fourteen consecutive days. The house at One Colliery Road, Williamstown, Pennsylvania, was owned by George Shoemaker. She possessed a key to the house and received her mail there. On July 7, 2004, she did not own or rent any other premises and/or did not live any where else other than One Colliery Road, Williamstown. She was involved in a romantic relationship with George Shoemaker. Shoemaker permitted her to operate his Chevrolet when her vehicle could not have been used or when she needed to transport any child in a child safety seat. George Shoemaker testified in a deposition that he purchased the house at One Colliery Road, Williamstown approximately a year and a half before July 7, 2004. He did some remolding and Karen Brunner moved in approximately a year later. She brought her personal things to the house. He did most of the grocery shopping but she did some. She slept at the house and ate there everyday. They shared cleaning the house. He described their relationship during the period as “friendly.” When asked, “Was there any romance involved,” he answered “Well, it happens.” While they each had a bedroom they sometimes would sleep in the same room. They stayed at the house until September or October 2005, when they moved together into a home in Camp Hill. Brunner owned and operated a Saturn, but on July 7, 2004, he let her use his Chevrolet because she was transporting a child and the safety seat fit better in his car than in hers. -3- 06-3101 CIVIL TERM Karen Brunner maintains that the household exclusion in the insurance policy is ambiguous and must be construed against the insurer. Noting that the exclusion is for an auto “owned or leased by a resident of your household,” i.e., Brunner’s household, she argues in her brief that “the most straightforward reading of the disputed policy language requires a finding that George Shoemaker was a resident of Karen Brunner’s household. However, George Shoemaker owned his own home and Karen Brunner moved in with him. . . . George Shoemaker never resided in Karen Brunner’s home nor was he a resident of her household.” The policy exclusion is not ambiguous. In a case involving an automobile insurance policy where the term “household” was not defined, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated: The term “household” is defined as “[a] family living together.” th Black’s Law Dictionary 666 (5 ed. 1979). See: Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 886 Utah 284, 289-91, 43 P.2d 696, 699 (1935). “The term ‘household’ is generally synonymous with ‘family’ for insurance purposes, and includes those who dwell together as a family under the same roof.” th Black’s Law Dictionary 666 (5 ed. 1979). See: Van Overbeke v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 303 Minn. 387, 391-93, 227 N.W.2d 807, 810 (1975). See also: Bartholet v. Berkness, 291 Minn. 123, 125-27, 189 N.W.2d 410, 412 (1971). The term does not apply to a relative, however close, who lives elsewhere; nor does it apply to a resident of the same residence who is not a member of the family, i.e., one who enjoys all the prerogatives of family life. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 122 Ga.App. 584, 585-86, 178 S.E.2d 215, 216 (1970). See also: 6C Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (Buckley ed.), § 4411. Whether Shoemaker is a resident in Brunner’s household does not turn on who owns the house at One Colliery Road, Williamstown, or on the fact that Brunner and Shoemaker are not married. By their own admission they are living as a family unit enjoying all of the prerogatives of family life. Brunner’s household consists of herself and Shoemaker as his household consists of himself and Brunner. For a year and a -4- 06-3101 CIVIL TERM half before the accident on July 7, 2004, Brunner had no other place of residence or any other household than One Colliery Road, Williamstown. On that date she was operating his Chevrolet that was owned by Shoemaker and was not an auto listed on the declaration page of her Safe Auto policy. The exclusion applies. Brunner further argues in her brief: To find that the household exclusion applied to non-relatives living separate existences under the same roof would be to unfairly limit the portability of liability coverage, when such coverage has been obtained by the claimant on her own vehicle. . . . It is clear that such an extension of this exclusion works against the welfare of many Pennsylvanians by necessity living in shared housing arrangements for financial reasons and therefore violates public policy. Brunner cites no authority for this proposition. We are not willing to vitiate the exclusion by declaring that it violates public policy. There are not genuine issues of material fact that need to be resolved and Safe Auto is entitled to summary judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the following order is entered. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of December, 2007: IS (1) The motion of Safe Auto Insurance Company for summary judgment, GRANTED. IT IS ADJUDGED (2) that Safe Auto Insurance Company does not provide liability coverage to Karen Brunner for any damages arising out of Brunner’s accident on July 7, 2004. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. -5- 06-3101 CIVIL TERM Jeffrey C. Catanzarite, Esquire For Plaintiff Dusan Bratic, Esquire For Defendant Karen Brunner :sal -6- SAFE AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : KAREN BRUNNER, : CHRISTINA TEMES AND CHRISTINA : TEMES, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE : ESTATE OF HUNTER TEMES, : DECEASED, : DEFENDANTS : 06-3101 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION OF PLAINTIFF FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND HESS, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of December, 2007: IS (1) The motion of Safe Auto Insurance Company for summary judgment, GRANTED. IT IS ADJUDGED (2) that Safe Auto Insurance Company does not provide liability coverage to Karen Brunner for any damages arising out of Brunner’s accident on July 7, 2004. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Jeffrey C. Catanzarite, Esquire For Plaintiff Dusan Bratic, Esquire For Defendant Karen Brunner :sal