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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-0900 criminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. DARRYL SCOTT CAMERON 1N THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 98-0900 CRIMINAL CHARGE: (1) DUI (2) TRAFFIC CONTROL SIGNALS AFFIANT: PTL. THOMAS GAIDOS IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 In this case, the defendant was convicted following a jury trial of a count of driving under the influence of alcohol, 75 Pa.C.S.A. 373 l(a)(1). His post-trial motion, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, has been denied. He now appeals to the Superior Court. It is axiomatic that we now view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Commonwealth v. Gease, 548 Pa. 165,696 A.2d 130 (1997). The facts, thus viewed, are accurately recited in the brief filed by the Commonwealth in connection with the defendant's post-sentence motion. They are as follows. On the night of March 21, 1998, at approximately 10:15 p.m., Jeffrey and Christine Miller and their two children were driving home from a soccer game in Harrisburg when they were involved in a collision with a pickup truck operated by Darryl Cameron, the defendant herein. (N.T. 5, 16-17). As the Millers' van approached the traffic light at U.S. Route 11 & 15 southbound and Valley Street in East Pennsboro Township, several hUndred feet before they reached the intersection, the traffic light turned from red to green. (N.T. 5, 17). At the time that the Millers' van began to proceed through the intersection, the defendant, who was stopped in the northbound left-hand turning lane, turned directly into the path of the Millers' van and the two vehicles collided. (N.T. 5, 17). The defendant got out of his truck and approached the Millers' van, yelling that the collision was their (the Millers') fault. (N.T. 6-7). At that time, Jeffrey 98-0900 CRIMINAL Miller was unconscious and one of the two Miller children was bleeding from cuts to his face. (N.T. 6). Moments after the collision, east Pennsboro Township Police Officer Thomas Gaidos arrived on the scene. (N.T. 29). Officer Gaidos has been a police officer for twenty-four years, is trained in the administration of Standard Field Sobriety Tests and has encountered many intoxicated people in the course of his employment. (N.T. 28). Officer Gaidos secured the scene and encountered the defendant. (N.T. 31-33). When speaking with the defendant, Officer Gaidos noted a heavy odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath and that the defendant's speech was slurred. (N.T. 33). The defendant indicated to Officer Gaidos that he had been driving and that he was the operator and the sole occupant of the truck. (N.T. 33). The defendant admitted to Officer Gaidos that he had been drinking. (N.T. 33). The defendant's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. (N.T. 34). Officer Gaidos observed that the defendant was bleeding from a cut to his head and suggested that he receive some medical treatment at the hospital, and the defendant agreed. (N.T. 34). In order to facilitate the treatment, Officer Gaidos took the defendant to the medical personnel on scene. (N.T. 34). The defendant then left the medical personnel and began to walk around the scene. (N.T. 35). The defendant told Officer Gaidos that he did not require medical treatment. (N.T. 35). Officer Gaidos and another officer took the defendant to the medical personnel at least two more times and the defendant walked away each time. (N.T. 35-36). Because the police officers believed that the defendant required medical treatment, he was placed in a patrol car. (N.T. 36). 98-0900 CKIM~AL At that time, the defendant began to complain of neck pain, and a third ambulance was called in which the defendant was eventually transported to Holy Spirit Hospital. (N.T. 37). At the hospital, the defendant refused all medical treatment. (N.T. 38, 73). Officer Gaidos requested that the defendant submit to a blood test in order to determine his blood alcohol content. (N.T. 38). Officer Gaidos read the defendant the implied consent warnings as mandated by Pennsylvania law. (N.T. 40-42). The defendant signed the DL-26 form acknowledging his understanding of the implied consent warnings. (N.T. 41, 43, Commonwealth's Exhibit 2). The defendant refused to submit to a blood test, stating that he was a Jehovah's Witness and therefore forbidden to submit to such a test. (N.T. 39). Based on this twenty-four years' experience as a police officer, his education, his training and his observations of the defendant on March 21, 1998, Officer Gaidos opined that the defendant was at that time under the influence of alcohol to a decree that rendered him incapable of safe driving. (N.T. 43). East Pennsboro Township Police Officer Todd Bashore assisted Officer Gaidos at the scene that night. (N.T. 61). Officer Bashore has been a police officer with East Pennsboro for ten years, is trained in the administration of Standard Field Sobriety Tests and is a certified Intoxylizer operator. (N.T. 60). He is experienced in dealing with people who are under the influence of alcohol. (N.T. 60). Officer Bashore encountered the defendant at the scene, spoke with him and noted a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. (N.T. 62). The defendant was very uncooperative with Officer Bashore. (N.T. 62). The defendant's speech was slurred and his eyes were bloodshot. 98-0900 CRIMINAL (N.T. 62). Officer Bashore made several attempts to get the defendant to accept medical treatment and eventually put him into a patrol car. (N.T. 62-64). Officer Bashore opined, based on his training and experience as a police officer and his contact with the defendant that night, that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safe driving. (N.T. 64). Sally Krieger, a registered nurse, dealt with the defendant at the hospital on the night of March 21, 1998. (N.T. 68). She has been a nurse for six years, has dealt with people who are under the influence of alcohol and recognizes signs of intoxication. (N.T. 68-69). The defendant refused a legal blood alcohol test in nurse Krieger's presence. (N.T. 70, Commonwealth exhibit 4). Nurse Krieger observed signs of intoxication in the defendant including very slurred speech, inappropriate actions, unruly behavior, unsteady gait and an odor of alcohol. (N.T. 70-71). As Judge Oler, of this court, recently noted in Commonwealth v. James Oliver Lott, III, 97-1642 Criminal: Under Section 3731 (a)(1) of the Vehicle code, it is provided that "[a] person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle ... [w]hile under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving." Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, § 1, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 (a)(1) (1998 Supp.). The Pennsylvania Superior Court has discussed the elements of this offense as follows: In order to secure a conviction under section 3 731 (a)(1), the Commonwealth must prove that (1) the defendant was the operator of a ... 98-0900 CRIMINAL vehicle and (2) during operation of the vehicle he was under the influence of alcohol to such a degree that rendered him incapable of safe driving. In order to establish that a driver is unable to safely operate a vehicle, the prosecution must prove that alcohol has substantially impaired the normal mental and physical faculties required to operate the vehicle safely. Substantial impairment, in this context, means a diminution or enfeeblement in the ability to exercise judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to changing circumstances and conditions. Commonwealth v. Montini, 712 A.2d 761,768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Lott, III, 97-1642, Opinion dated 4/29/99, at pp. 4-5. As Judge Oler also went on to note, our courts have recognized various common indicia of driving under the influence which include an accident suggestive of serious driver error, glassy bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the breath. In addition, the Vehicle Code specifically provides that the defendant's refusal to submit to chemical testing may be considered by the jury. Finally, a police officer may generally express an opinion based on personal observation that a person was intoxicated. Id. at 5 (citations omitted). Without repeating the facts already extensively set forth, it is clear that all of the foregoing factors are present in this case. It is, of course, not proper for the court, in any event, to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. It would have been appropriate to award a new trial in this case only had the verdict been so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock one's sense ofjustice. Commonwealth v. Cruz-Senteno, 447 Pa. Super. 98, 668 A.2d 536, 540 (1995); 98-0900 CRIMINAL allocatur denied 544 Pa. 653,676 A.2d 1195 (1996). As noted by the Commonwealth, conviction in a DUI refusal case where the defendant had turned his vehicle directly in front of oncoming traffic and where, in the opinion of two police officers and a registered nurse, the defendant was under the influence to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving cannot be considered shocking. May ~* ,1999 David J. Freed, Esquire Assistant District Attorney KeyjrirA. Hess, J. Austin F. Grogan, Esquire Assistant Public Defender :rim