HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-2079 criminalCOMMONWEALTH
VS.
DAVID STRANGE
· IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
· CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
·98-2079 CRIMINAL
IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE HESS, J...
ORDER
AND N OW, this
day of June 1999, the omnibus pretrial motion in the nature
of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED.
BY THE COURT,
Mary-Jo Mullen, Esquire
Assistant District Attorney
ess, J.
Timothy Clawges, Esquire
Assistant Public Defender
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COMMONWEALTH
VS.
DAVID STRANGE
· IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
· CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
· 98-2079 CRIMINAL
·
IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE HESS, J.
OPINION AND ORDER
In this case, the defendant has filed a motion to suppress evidence questioning the
legality of an encounter between the defendant and a police officer that ultimately led to the
defendant being arrested for disorderly conduct and driving under the influence. On September
25, 1998 at roughly 3:00 a.m., Cpl. Mark Williams of the Lower Allen Township Police
Department was standing outside of his marked police cruiser, in front of the Lower Allen
Township Emergency Medical Services Building (EMS). Off-duty Lower Allen Township
Officer Thomas Gelnett and EMS employee Jeanne Weber accompanied Cpl. Williams.
Williams, Gelnett, and Weber witnessed a car driven by the defendant pull into the parking lot of
Stephenson's Tire and Service Center; the three were roughly sixty feet away from the
defendant' s car.
Williams testified that he watched the defendant get out of his car, and while facing
Williams's direction, place his hands at his groin area and assume a position that led Williams to
believe that the defendant was urinating. The area where the defendant stood was relatively
unlit, and Cpl. Williams testified that he did not see the defendant's genitalia, nor did he hear any
sounds which contributed to his belief that the defendant was urinating. Williams did testify that
in his opinion, given the sixty-foot distance between the parties, the defendant should have seen
Gelnett, Weber, and himself, and should also have recognized that Weber, given her long red
hair, was a female.
Cpl. Williams entered his cruiser and approached the defendant without turning
on his emergency lights, and as Williams pulled up, the defendant entered his vehicle. Williams
then proceeded to pull his cruiser behind the defendant's vehicle, effectively blocking the
defendant's vehicle. Cpl. Williams exited his cruiser, and as he was approaching the defendant's
car, Williams notice a large wet spot on the asphalt by the defendant's vehicle. Cpl. Williams
asked the defendant to exit his car, and the defendant removed his keys from the ignition and did
so. Williams testified that the defendant was apologetic about what he did, and that the
defendant said he badly had to relieve himself. Williams noticed that the defendant had an odor
of alcohol and glassy eyes, and Williams testified that the defendant admitted he had been
drinking. The defendant failed two field sobriety tests and was placed under arrest for disorderly
conduct for his having urinated in public, and for driving under'the influence.
The defendant's motion to suppress states that Cpl. Williams pulling his car in behind the
defendant represented an investigative detention that required reasonable suspicion on the part of
Cpl. Williams that the defendant was in fact urinating in public and therefore engaging in
disorderly conduct in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 5503(a)(4). The defendant argues that
Williams had no reasonable suspicion that the defendant was in fact in violation of Section
5503(a)(4), that the investigative detention therefore violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment
fights, and that all evidence obtained after Cpl. Williams blocked the defendant's car, including
evidence as to the defendant's intoxicated state, should be suppressed.
It is true that, in order to engage in a non-custodial detention, an officer must be able to
point to specific and articuable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from the
facts, show that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaging in
criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Di~, 442 Pa. Super. 228,252, 659 A.2d 563, 570 (1995).
The section of the Crimes Code dealing with disorderly conduct, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section
5503(a)(4), provides:
(a) that a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he'
(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which
serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
In Commonwealth v. Williams.., 390 Pa. Super. 493,506, 568 A.2d 1281, 1288 (1990),
the court stated that the defendant's urinating in public, as witnessed by the arresting officer,
"incontrovertibly constitutes disorderly conduct." However, in Commonwealth v. Mcquire,
Judge Bayley of this court found that the defendant's urinating in a public at 1:54 a.m. was not
disorderly conduct, as only the defendant's companions and the arresting officer had witnessed
the defendant's act and that the officer had acted surreptitiously. Commonwealth v. Mca_uire,
98-1078, slip. op. at 4. (Cumberland County April 22, 1999). The court thus found that the
defendant had not recklessly risked public inconvenience or harm. Id__:. However, the facts of
Mcquire are distinguishable from the situation at bar, because not only did the arresting officer,
Cpl. Williams, witness the defendant, but off-duty Officer Gelnett and Ms. Weber also witnessed
the defendant's acts. Moreover, they felt that the defendant should have seen them.
Therefore, as Pennsylvania courts have in some instances found public urination to
represent disorderly conduct, see Williams., 390 Pa. Super. at 506, 568 A.2d at 1288, Cpl.
Williams did have reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was recklessly engaged in
an activity that would cause public annoyance or alarm. Given that there was only a sixty-foot
distance between the parties, that the defendant was facing Williams and his companions, that
Williams was in uniform and standing near his marked police cruise.r, and that Williams saw the
defendant assume a position consistent with the act of urination, it seems clear that an officer of
Williams's experience could have reasonably suspected that Strange was urinating in public and
therefore in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 5503(a)(4).
ORDER
AND NOW, this /8'~ day of June, 1999, the omnibus pretrial motion in the nature
of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED.
BY THE COURT,
Mary-Jo Mullen, Esquire
Assistant District Attorney
Timothy Clawges, Esquire
Assistant Public Defender
· Hess, J.
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