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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-926 civilJAY F. DAVIDSON, Plaintiff Vo FLORENCE K. DAVIDSON, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, :PENNSYLVANIA : : CIVIL ACTION-LAW : NO. 97-926 CIVIL ACTION : IN DIVORCE IN RE' PETITION TO ENFORCE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT BEFORE HESS, J. ORDER AND NOW, this ~r/-'day of July, 1999, upon consideration of plaintiff's petition for enforcement of Agreement of September 27, 1995, and any responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the petition is GRANTED. BY THE COURT: Hess, J. · Theresa Barrett Male, Esquire Attorney for plaintiff Samuel L. Andes, Esquire Attomey for defendant o JAY F. DAVIDSON, Plaintiff V,, FLORENCE K. DAVIDSON, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, :PENNSYLVANIA : CIVIL ACTION-LAW : : NO. 97-926 CIVIL ACTION : IN DIVORCE IN RE' PETITION TO ENFORCE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER I. CASE HISTORY We are called upon, in this case, to determine the enforceability of an agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant on September 27, 1995. Plaintiff Jay F. Davidson ("Husband") and defendant Florence K. Davidson ("Wife") were married on September 29, 1995. The parties executed an agreement on September 27, 1995, in which Husband'and Wife agreed to dispose of their marital real estate in a specified manner in the event of divorce, death or disability. They also agreed to reserve certain assets which each acquired prior to the marriage for the benefit of their children and grandchildren. The agreement did not purport to relinquish any statutory rights of the respective parties. The agreement acknowledged that the full extent of the assets of both parties had not yet been disclosed as of the date the Agreement was executed. 97-O926 CIVIL II. DISCUSSION The defendant, Florence K. Davidson, relying upon the case of Simeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990)asserts that the prenuptial agreement between the plaintiff and defendant is invalid because there was no "full and fair disclosure" of the parties' finances. In abandoning the inquiry under pre-1990 cases that permitted examination of the reasonableness of prenuptial agreements and allowed inquiries into whether parties had attained informed understandings of the rights they were surrendering, the Simeone Court did not depart from the long standing principle that a full and fair disclosure of the financial positions of the parties is required. Absent this disclosure, a material misrepresentation in the inducement for entering a prenuptial agreement may be asserted... Parties to these agreements do not quite deal at arm's length, but rather at the time the contract is entered into stand in a relation of mutual confidence and trust that calls for disclosure of their financial resources... It is well settled that this disclosure need not be exact, so long as it is "full and fair."...In essence, therefore, the duty of disclosure under these circumstances is consistent with traditional principles of contract law. 525 Pa. at 402, 581 A.2d at167 (citations omitted). The Simeone Court stands for the proposition that "full and fair disclosure" is necessary in an agreement where there are certain rights that are surrendered. In the instant case, there were no such rights relinquished. In Mormello, the postnuptial agreement waived wife's fights of dower, curtesy, widow's rights, support, alimony, APL and counsel fees. "For a Postnuptial Property Settlement Agreement to be valid, there must be evidence that the parties are aware of the statutory rights they are relinquishing." Mormello v. Mormel!o., 452 Pa. Super. 590, 599, 97-0926 CIVIL 682 A.2d 824, 828 (1996). The Superior Court held that the mention of these various rights in the agreement was sufficient and the wife was not entitled to relief on that basis. Unlike the agreement at issue in Mormell0., the instant agreement does not waive defendant's statutory right to spousal support, alimony pendente lite, alimony, or counsel fees. Rather, the Agreement simply describes certain assets exempted from the marital estate (which were, in any event, owned by the parties prior to the marriage), and specifically provides for the respective contributions each party was to make toward the purchase and maintenance of the marital residence.~ Construing the September 27, 1995 agreement as a whole, it is clear that the parties entered into the agreement to limit each one's claim to pre-marital assets, and to define each party's contributions toward and share in the acquisition of the marital residence. The parties expressly and unambiguously agreed that disclosure of other financial matters would occur at a later date. Plaintiff's testimony, which was unrebutted by defendant, supports this conclusion. Thus, the agreement of the parties should be acknowledged and enforced in the context of this divorce action. III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Wife knowingly and voluntarily signed the September 27, 1995 Agreement. 2. Wife did not establish a material misrepresentation in the formation of the Agreement. ~ While the parties' agreement concerning the residence affects the mechanics of equitable property distribution, the right to equitable distribution (by appropriate adjustments for any inequities) remains unimpaired. 9%O926 CIVIL 3. Wife was not induced fraudulently to enter into the Agreement. 4. Wife was not under duress or coercion when she signed the Agreement. 5. The parties intended to be bound by the terms of the Agreement. 6. The September 27, 1995 Agreement is an enforceable contract. ORDER AND NOW, this ~7"day of July, 1999, upon consideration of plaintiff s petition for enforcement of Agreement of September 27, 1995, and any responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that the petition is GRANTED. BY THE COURT: Theresa Barrett Male, Esquire For the Plaintiff · Hess, J. Samuel L. Andes, Esquire For the Defendant :rim