HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-1476-2000
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
V.:
:
CHRISTOPHER J. WILLIAMS : NO. CP-21-CRIMINAL 1476 – 2000
:
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925
Guido, J., December , 2007
Petitioner has filed this appeal from our order of October 1, 2007 which denied
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his request for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act. In his concise Statement of
Matters Complained of on Appeal he alleges that his sentence was illegal because 1) this
Court did not give him credit for time served from November 6, 2000 to June 5, 2001 and
2) the sentence exceeded the maximum length of his original intermediate punishment
sentence.
On October 24, 2000 petitioner entered a guilty plea to a count of robbery at 365
Criminal 2000, a separate count of robbery at 368 Criminal 2000 and a count of access
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device fraud at 1476 Criminal 2000. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of
imprisonment for 11 ½ to 23 months in connection with the robbery charges. Those
sentences commenced on November 6, 2000. He was placed in the intermediate
punishment program for 36 months in connection with the access device fraud charge.
The IP sentence was to run concurrent to the robbery sentences.
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42 Pa. C.S.A. 901 et seq.
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Each count of robbery was graded a felony of the 3rd degree. The access device fraud was also graded a
felony of the third degree.
NO. CP-21-CRIMINAL 1476 - 2000
Among the conditions of his intermediate punishment sentence was that he “be and
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remain on good behavior.” While he was incarcerated on the robbery charges he
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committed other offenses which included the charge of escape. Because he had not
remained on good behavior we revoked the defendant’s intermediate punishment
sentence on June 5, 2001. On that same date we entered a sentencing order which
provided in relevant part as follows:
The sentence of the Court is that the Defendant pay the costs of
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prosecution, make restitution to Members 1 Federal Credit Union in the amount
of $2,653.50, to Weis Market in the amount $238.45, and to Rug Doctor in the
amount of $800.00, and that he undergo imprisonment in a state correctional
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institution for not less than one and a half nor more than seven years.
sentence imposed shall commence today
and run concurrent with any sentence
he is currently serving.
This is an aggravated range sentence. We have considered the sentencing
guidelines. The Defendant is an incorrigible career criminal who preys upon the
innocent citizens of this community. Until such time as he has his drug problem
under control, he will continue to be a predator.
. . .
The Defendant is paroled immediately on the sentences imposed at 00-
0365 and 00-0368 so he can begin serving the instant sentence in a state
correctional institution.
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(emphasis added).
In 2006 Petitioner filed two separate pro se requests for credit on this docket for
time served between November 6, 2000 and June 5, 2001. On June 20, 2007 he filed this
untimely petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act requesting the same relief. In
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each instance we denied his request. We were satisfied that he was not in custody on the
access device fraud charge prior to June 5, 2001. His entire time in custody prior to that
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The IP sentence imposed several other conditions upon the defendant, including a requirement that he
undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with any treatment recommendations.
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The escape charge was filed at 966 Criminal 2001. Petitioner entered a guilty plea to that charge on
September 19, 2001.
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See Sentencing Order dated June 5, 2001.
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See our Orders dated July 5, 2006, December 11, 2006, and October 1, 2007.
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NO. CP-21-CRIMINAL 1476 - 2000
date was spent in connection with (and credited to) the charges docketed at 365 and 368
Criminal 2000.
On appeal petitioner has also raised the issue, for the first time, that our sentence
of 1 ½ to 7 years was illegal because it exceeded the three year IP sentence originally
imposed. Petitioner does not cite, nor could we find, any authority to support his
position. To the contrary, case law clearly establishes that we are limited only by the
statutory maximum when resentencing an offender who has violated the terms of his
probation. See Commonwealth v. Bowser, 783 A.2d 348 (Pa.Super 2001). The same
rationale would apply to an intermediate punishment sentence.
_____________________ ________________________
DATE Edward E. Guido, J.
Michelle H. Sibert, Esquire
For the Commonwealth
Stephen O. Fugett, Esquire
For the Defendant
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