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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-4558 civilCARL E. SHIPE, Plaintiff Vo DETECTIVE RONALD EGOLF, Defendant COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY CIVIL ACTION-LAW NO. 98-4558 IN RE' DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ._ ORDER AND NOW, this tO e day of November, 1999, defendant's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are GRANTED and plaintiff' s complaint DISMISSED with prejudice. BY THE COURT, Carl E. Shipe Pro Se Plaintiff Hess, J. Hugh J. Hutchinson, Esquire Attorney for Defendant :rim CARL E. SHIPE, Plaimiff Vo DETECTIVE RONALD EGOLF, Defendant COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY CIVIL ACTION-LAW NO. 98-4558 IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER This action was instituted, pro se, on August 6, 1998 upon the filing of a Writ of summor~s. In September 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint in which he asserted one or more causes of action against Detective Ronald Egolf for violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant has filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the complaint fails to set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. According to plaintiff' s complaint, he is currently a prisoner confined to the State Correctional Institute in Houtzdale, Pennsylvania serving a sentence of five to ten years as the result of a criminal conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. The core allegation against Detective Egolf is that the Detective allegedly "gave false testimony while on the witness stand." The complaint recites a series of statements given by Detective Egolf during the course of Mr. Shipe's criminal trial that are allegedly false. Plaintiff now seeks both compensatory and punitive damages to compensate him for the injuries he has sustained as a result of the allegedly false testimony. 98-4558 CRIMINAL The issue raised by plaintiff's complaint has been the subject of specific discussion by the United States Supreme Court which has long since concluded that a police officer is entitled to immunity from civil suit for testimony offered in a criminal prosecution. Briscoe, et al v. Lahue., et al, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Pansy v. Preat_e, 870 F.Supp. 612 (M.D.Pa. 1994). In Briscoe, the United States Supreme Court considered a question of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorized a convicted person to assert a claim for damages against a police officer for giving perjured testimony at his criminal trial. After considering common law precedent and balancing the equit,ies, the Court concluded that it was better to "leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject thoSe who try to do their duty to a constant dread of retaliation." Briscoe., at 345, quoting, Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). With that fundamental concern, the Supreme Court held that a police officer had complete immunity for testimony presented as a witness in a criminal trial. Thus, even if' a police officer testifies falsely during the course of a criminal trial resulting in the conviction of the accused, he is cloaked with immunity from civil damages arising out of testimony given during a judicial proceeding. Here, the plaintiff also asserts that his conviction was the product of the denial of his constitutional right to counsel or that the conviction was based on a statement made while he was unaware of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The United States Supreme Court has specifically addressed the issue of using civil process to collaterally attack a criminal conviction in the matter of Hecht v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). In that case, the Court reviewed a matter 98-4558 CRIMINAL in which, in order to establish a claim, plaintiff would have to implicate the validity of the underlying conviction. In that case, the Court held that: In order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a {} 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983... Hecht, 512 U.S. at 486, 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2367, 129 L.Ed. 2d at 394. See also, Zolicoffer v. FBI, F.Supp. 173 (M.D.Pa. 1995). If the allegations contained in litigation asserted by a state prisoner under {} 1983 would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction has already been invalidated. The defendant, here, is clearly raising issues that implicate the validity of his conviction. However, he remains in custody as a result of the criminal prosecution that underlies his civil complaint. The criminal conviction has not been reversed, expunged or declared invalid. Rather, the damages sought by plaintiff are the damages arising out of his current incarceration. To the extent that the allegations contained in the complaint purport to assert a cause of action based on actions whose unlawfulness would render the underlying conviction invalid, such a collateral attack on the criminal conviction is insufficient, as a matter of law, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, even if the allegations of the complaint are accepted as tree, the plaintiff' s complaint fails to set forth a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. It is further clear that no amendment to the pleading could satisfy the legal deficiencies 98-4558 CRIMINAL inherent in the alleged causes of action. Therefore, the defendant's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are granted and that the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. ORDER AND NOW, this day of November, 1999, defendant's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are GRANTED and plaintiff' s complaint DISMISSED with prejudice. BY THE COURT, Carl E. Shipe, Pro Se Plaintiff Keyi~ A. Hess, J. Hugh J. Hutchinson, Esquire Attorney for Defendant :rlm