Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-3121 equity (2)COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff TROY BEAM, Defendant · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : · CIVIL ACTION-LAW : · NO. 99-3121 · IN EQUITY : : : IN RE' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND GUIDO, JJ.. AND NOW, this ORDER day of December, 1999, the motion of the defendant for summary judgment is GRANTED and the complaint of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,. Department of Transportation is DISMISSED. The motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Steven I. Roth, Esquire For the Plaintiff /~A. Hess, J. Lee Alan Stivale, Esquire For the Defendant 'rim COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Plaintiff TROY BEAM, Defendant · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · · CIVIL ACTION-LAW : · NO. 99-3121 · IN EQUITY : · IN RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS AND GUIDO, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER Before the court are the cross-motions of the parties for summary judgment. This is an equity matter in which the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation seeks an injunction against the defendant to require him to cease flight operations at the property located at 401 Shippensburg Road, Hopewell Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. The defendant flies a small airplane in and out of that location. The Department of Transportation contends that the defendant is operating an "airport" and that he is operating it without a license. Section 5301(a) of the Aviation Code gives PennDOT authority to "promulgate and enforce regulations" in order to "execute...laws relating to aviation, airports and air safety within this Commonwealth." 74 Pa.C.S.A. 5301 (a). Further, Section 5301 (b)(1) expressly grants authority to PennDOT to "provide for the examination, rating and licensing of airports." 74 Pa.C.S.A. 5301(b)(1). Pursuant to the authority granted it by the General Assembly, PennDOT enacted a regulation for the licensing of airports that provides, in pertinent part: "No person may establish, maintain or operate an airport, nor conduct flight operations at an airport, unless 99-3121 EQUITY authorized to do so by the Bureau." 67 Pa. Code Section 431.3(a). The Aviation Code defines "airport" as' Any area of land or water which is used, or intended to be used, for the landing and take-off of aircraft and any appurtenant areas which are used, or intended to be used, for airport buildings or air navigation facilities or rights- of-way, together with all airport buildings and facilities thereon. Unless indicated otherwise, airports shall include heliports and public airports. 74 Pa.C.S.A. 5102. Neither the Aviation Code nor the Regulations provide for a penalty for operating an airport without a license. Prior to the filing of the present motions for summary judgment, a hearing was held in connection with the plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. During that hearing it was . apparent that the facts in this case are not in dispute. In an opinion and order of August 17, 1999, the request for preliminary injunction was denied. We ruled in favor of the plaintiff on every issue save one. The court determined that Mr. Beam was, in fact, operating an airport without a license and that other criteria for the entry of a preliminary injunction had been met. We did not, however, grant the motion for preliminary injunction because we concluded that PennDOT could not establish a clear right to relief. The court observed that neither the Aviation Code nor the regulations promulgated pursuant to it contained any enforcement mechanism against the operation of an airport without a license. We questioned whether equity jurisdiction would lie in the absence of any statutory authority which authorized it. The cross-motions for summary judgment seek a resolution of this issue without further hearing. 99-3121 EQUITY As noted in our earlier opinion, we have been unable to locate any other body of law wherein regulatory power was delegated without an enforcement mechanism. Because no enforcement mechanism exists in this statute, we are satisfied that many of the appellate cases cited by the litigants, and particularly the plaintiff, are inapposite. In the en~l, we are satisfied that this case turns on principles having less to do xvith the law of equity and much more to do with the Constitution. We have concluded that the intervention of a court of equity to fill a void in a specific piece of legislation is contrary to the separation of powers.1 PennDOT, in its brief, analyzes several principles of equity. They note, inter alia, that if the legislature "provides a specific, exclusive, and constitutionally adequate method for the disposition of a particular kind of dispute, no action may be brought for an injunction unless the statute provides for it or unless there is some irreparable harm that will follow if the exclusive statutory procedure is followed." 15 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2, Section 83'233 (citing Homestead Borough School District v. Allegheny County Board of School Directors, 440 Pa. 113,269 A.2d 904 (1970). Thus, where an adequate legal remedy exists, the Commonwealth would be precluded from seeking injunctive relief under a statute unless the statute itself specifically provides for injunctive relief. See Commonwealth ex rel. Costa v. Boley, 441 Pa. 495,272 A.2d 905 (1971). In our opinion of August 17, 1999, we cited to numerous statutes wherein the legislature, in addition to specific punitive remedies, authoriZed resort to the courts of equity. The Aviation Code is not such a statute. ~ Const. Art. 2, § 1 states: "The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." 99-3121 EQUITY The plaintiff notes the well-established principle that equity will assume jurisdiction where there is no adequate remedy at law. The Department then goes on to conclude: "[A] statute is only required to contain an injunction provision where legal remedies are · provided .... The Aviation Code does not require an injunction provision because it does not provide an adequate legal remedy..." (Emphasis added) The argument is that whenever the legislature omits a statutory enforcement mechanism, it is the prerogative of the courts of equity to intervene in fashioning one. We know of no authority whatsoever for this proposition. Instead, we are satisfied that the opposite is true; namely, when the legislature provides no remedy at all, the courts are not empowered to fashion one. Said another way, if the legislature chooses to proscribe an activity, then it is the legislature which must at the same time provide consequences for a violation. As noted by the authors of the Pennsylvania Law Encyclopedia: It is a well-established role that the courts have a duty to interpret, not make, laws; they have no function of legislation ... A court cannot under the guise of judicial decision enact legislation, nor may construction be substituted for legislation. The court must consider, construe and apply the legislation as it exists. Thus, a court cannot rewrite an act; add new requirements to a statute; write in omitted words or provisions, or add, delete, or disregard words; improve a statute by judicial amendments; enlarge the scope of an act; extend the meanings of words used or otherwise alter the statute under the guise of construing it. Also, a court cannot, on its own initiative, without statutory authority, create a new ... remedy. (Emphasis added) P.L.E. Constitutional Law, Section 95. 99-3121 EQUITY The parties cite no case precedent dealing with a situation similar to the one sub judice. Nonetheless, PennDOT construes existing case law to mean that where a licensing statute contains no enforcement mechanism, it is assumed that resort to the courts of equity was intended. The plaintiff goes on to observe that "PennDOT could not administer the Aviation Code without the power to enjoin noncompliance." This is, of course, obvious and makes it all the more mystifying that the legislature chose not to define the enforcement powers which it delegated to the Department of Transportation. On at least one other occasion that we know of, certain conduct was made unlawful in Pennsylvania but there was no penalty. This was the situation faced by the Supreme Court in Com. v. Cunningham, 365 Pa. 68, 73 A.2d 705 (1950). There the defendant had been charged with two violations of the Motor Vehicle Code; one for the operation of a tractor-trailer with a gross weight in excess of 45,000 pounds, and another for operating such a vehicle when the weight on any given axle exceeded 20,000 pounds. Four informations were lodged with an alderman alleging violations of the Vehicle Code as to gross weight and as to the weight on each of three axles. The defendant pled guilty to all four informations and was sentenced to a prison term of forty days --- ten days for each offense. He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that his sentence was unlawful. In reviewing the Vehicle Code, the Supreme Court observed that the statute provided for a penalty for the gross weight violation but not for the provision making it unlawful for the axle weight to exceed 20,000 pounds. The Supreme Court sustained the lower court's discharge of the defendant on the axle weight counts with a single sentence: 99-3121 EQUITY Whether the failure to provide penalties for the violation ... was intentional on the part of the legislature or merely an oversight is here immaterial; the court must construe the statute according to its terms as enacted. We reach the same conclusion in this case. We have been unable to find any other cases like Cunningham but "as so often happens in the law, the simpler the proposition, the more difficult it is to find a statement of it." Com. v. Caffrey, 352 Pa. Super. 406, 508 A.2d 322. AND NOW, this ORDER day of December, 1999, the motion of the defendant for summary judgment is GRANTED and the complaint of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation is DISMISSED. The motion of the plaintiff for summary judgment is DENIED. B Y THE COURT, Steven I. Roth, Esquire For the Plaintiff ess, J. Lee Alan Stivale, Esquire For the Defendant 'rlm