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HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-0484 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH Vo STANLEY JAY SHANNON OTN: L050680-0 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CHARGE: DUI NO. 00-0484 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION OF COURT OLER, J., April 4, 2001. This driving-under-the-influence case presents the issue of whether a stop of a motor vehicle by police is violative of either the Pennsylvania Constitution or the United States Constitution where (1) the driver committed a Vehicle Code violation, (2) the police would not have stopped him for that violation alone, (3) the police stopped him on the basis of the Vehicle Code violation because they suspected other criminal activity, and (4) the facts supporting the suspicion of other criminal activity would not have justified the stop of the vehicle. The matter arose initially as the result of an omnibus pretrial motion in the form of a motion to suppress filed by Defendant. A hearing on the motion was held on June 23, 2000. Following the hearing, the issue presented was answered in the negative by a denial of Defendant's suppression motion on July 14, 2000. A nonjury trial on the charge of driving under the influence resulted in a guilty verdict.~ Defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence applicable to a second offense on November 28, 2000.2 Following disposition of a post-sentence motion, Defendant filed an appeal from the judgment of sentence on March 24, 2001. ~ Order of Court, October 13, 2000. The transcribed verdict order was inadvertently submitted to the Honorable Edgar B. Bayley of this court for signature; however, the nonjury trial was presided over, and the verdict was entered in open court, by the writer of this opinion. 2 Order of Court, November 28, 2000. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Pretrial Motion to Suppress Evidence as a result of a pretextual traffic stop in violation of Article 1, {}8 of the to suppress 1925(a). Pennsylvania Constitution which provides Defendant with greater rights from illegal searches and seizures than the 4th Amendment counterpart of the United States Constitution where evidence during the pretrial hearing indicated that there was a single turn signal violation, no interference with any other traffic, and the police officer involved in the stop testified he normally would not stop a motorist for that reason unless he wanted to investigate possible criminal activity.3 This opinion in support of the court's ruling on Defendant's pretrial motion is written pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure STATEMENT OF FACTS On December 8, 1999, around 1:00 a.m., Carlisle Borough Police Officers Eric Dale and Jeffrey Kurtz were traveling in their police vehicle on Lincoln Street, in an area of high crime activity, in the borough.4 They observed a Toyota Avalon, situated by itself on the side of the street, with its windows steamed up.5 The vehicle was not one with which the officers were familiar, and they observed people going in and out of the car, leading them to suspect that someone was dealing drugs out of the car.6 The officers, suspecting such criminal activity, then decided to drive around the vehicle; however, by the time they reached the location where the car was parked the vehicle was moving.? The officers followed the vehicle and observed it make a right turn without a turn signal, a violation of the Vehicle Code, at which Defendant's Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, filed March 30, 2000. N.T. 4-6, 15, Hearing on Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion, June 23, 2000 (hereinafter N.T. __). N.T. 26. N.T. 29-30. N.T. 26, 29. point the officers decided to stop the vehicle.8 At the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, Officer Kurtz testified as follows regarding the underlying motivation for the stop: COURT Did your suspicion of illegal activity, other than the turn, play a part in your decision to stop the car? KURTZ Yes. COURT KURTZ How much of a part? In other words, would the car have been stopped had you not had that suspicion? No.9 After stopping the vehicle, the officers approached the car and elicited information as to the driver's name, operator's license, vehicle registration, and so forth,l° The driver of the vehicle was Stanley Jay Shannon, the Defendant.l~ A beer bottle was recovered by the officers from the passenger compartment of the vehicle.12 The investigation progressed into a driving-under-the-influence case and the Defendant was so charged.~3 No charge was flied for the turn signal violation. ~4 Defendant filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking to suppress all evidence obtained following the stop of the vehicle, including Defendant's identity, opinions and observations of police, results of field sobriety tests, and results of chemical tests.~5 Defendant contended that the traffic stop was without a lawful basis, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States 8 N.T. 7, 26-27, 38, 49. With regard to the absence of a turn signal, the court found the testimony presented by the Commonwealth to be credible. 9 N.T. 24-25. 10 N.T. 7. l~ N.T. 5, 8. ~2 N.T. 18. 13 N.T. 8. 14 N.T. 60. is Defendant's omnibus pretrial motion. Constitution and his rights Constitution. ~ 6 under Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania DISCUSSION Statement of Law Burden of Proof and Standard of Review. When a defendant files a motion to suppress, the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible. Commonwealth v. Benton, 440 Pa. Super. 441,444, 655 A.2d 1030, 1032 (1995); Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 530 Pa. 299, 301,608 A.2d 1030, 1031 (1992). Constitutional Protections. The language of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions is similar with respect to searches and seizures. Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures .... " The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " Where Pennsylvania and federal constitutional provisions are substantially similar, as a general rule a party contending that the state constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart is expected to proffer compelling reasons for a departure from federal jurisprudence. See Commonwealth v. Hoak, 700 A.2d 1263, 1266 (Pa. Super. 1997), aff'd, 557 Pa. 496, 734 A.2d 1275 (1999). Vehicle Code Violation. For the stop of a motor vehicle for a violation of the Vehicle Code to be valid, the police officer must have reasonable and articulable grounds to believe that a violation of the Code has occurred. Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 530 Pa. 299, 303-04, 608 A.2d 1030, 1032 (1992); Commonwealth v. McElroy, 428 Pa. Super. 69, 76, 630 A.2d 35, 39 (1993), appeal denied, 543 Pa. 729, 673 A.2d 335 (1996). An officer must be able to articulate 16 Defendant's omnibus pretrial motion, para. 7. the specific facts that led him or her to believe that a provision of the Vehicle Code was violated and such facts must reasonably support such a belief. Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545,550, 668 A.2d 1113, 116 (1995). In a provision regarding the signaling of turns, the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code provides as follows: "Upon a roadway no person shall turn a vehicle ... without giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this section." 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3334(a). In addition, an officer need not stop a vehicle only where he or she intends the stop to result in a citation or complaint. Commonwealth v. Benton, 440 Pa. Super. 441,445,655 A.2d 1030, 1033 (1995). Pretextual Stoles. In federal jurisprudence, the test for whether the stop of a motor vehicle is valid under the United States Constitution is based on the police officer's objective legal basis for the stop. United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007, 116 S. Ct. 2528, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1052 (1996) (holding that the district court erred in applying the "usual police activities test" rather than the "authorization test" in deciding that the basis for the vehicle stop was a pretext to search for drugs). In ~lohnson, in reviewing the stop of a motor vehicle for a violation under the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, the Circuit Court considered the application of the "would" and "could" tests. Id. at 246. Under the "would" test, also known as the "usual police activities" test, the court asks if the police officer would have made the traffic stop in the absence of an invalid purpose. Id. at 246. Under the "could" test, also known as the "authorization test", the court asks whether the officer could have made the stop, focusing on an objective legal basis for the stop. Id. at 246-47. The ~lohnson court held that the "could" test is the appropriate test to determine whether a stop of a motor vehicle is violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 247. A year after the decision in ~lohnson, the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that a pretextual stop is not violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution if the officer had cause to stop the vehicle for a suspected traffic violation, regardless of the officer's subjective 5 beliefs. See United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), appeal docketed, 324 U.S. App. D.C. 197, 111 F.3d 956 (1997), cer! denied, 522 U.S. 1119, 118 S. Ct. 1059, 140 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1998). In explaining its holding, the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment requires only that the stop not be "unreasonable" under the circumstances, and that the decision to stop an automobile where the police have cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred is reasonable. Id. at 809-10, 116 S. Ct. at 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 95. After considering previous cases regarding pretextual stops, arrests, and searches, the Court stated that the cases "foreclosed" any argument that constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depended on the actual motivations of the individual police officers involved. Id. at 811-13, 116 S. Ct. 1773-74, 135 L. Ed. 2d 94-96. Application of Law to Facts The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code clearly establishes that a driver's failure to properly signal before turning constitutes a violation. Police Officers Dale and Kurtz both testified that they saw Defendant make a right turn without signaling, and this testimony was found to be credible by the court,i? Under 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3334(a), the officers' observations were sufficient for them to believe that a violation of the Vehicle Code had occurred. They therefore had a lawful basis to stop Defendant's vehicle, in an objective sense. Based upon the foregoing authority, the existence of reasonable and articulable grounds to stop Defendant's vehicle, based on Defendant's violation of the Vehicle Code for failure to properly signal a turn, led the court to conclude that Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were not violated, regardless of the officers' alternative motivations for the stop. Evidence obtained subsequent to the stop was therefore not suppressible under the United States Constitution. 17 N.T. 6, 27. Defendant argued, nevertheless, that the stop was unlawful under Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, because the Pennsylvania Constitution should be construed to provide greater protection than its federal counterpart. Compelling reasons for such a variance from federal jurisprudence, however, were not, in the court's view, presented. Given the substantial similarity in language of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutional provisions in question, the persuasiveness of the logic of the unanimous opinion in Whren,~* and the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, the court was not able to adopt Defendant's position that Article 1, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution should be construed to afford greater relief than its federal counterpart in this context. For the foregoing reasons, the issue set forth at the beginning of this opinion was decided in the negative, and Defendant's omnibus pretrial motion in the form of a motion to suppress was denied. BY THE COURT, J[.~esley Oler.,~., J. Jonathan R. Birbeck, Esq. Chief Deputy District Attorney David E. Hershey, Esq. 2233 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorney for Defendant ~8 517 u.s. 806; 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), appealdocketed, 324 U.S. App. D.C. 197, 111 F.3d 956 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119, 118 S. Ct. 1059, 140 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1998).