HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-1780-2007
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
vs. : CP-21-CR-1780-2007
:
:
JESSICA KASSIRER :
IN RE: DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE HESS, J.
OPINION AND ORDER
On April 14, 2007 Trooper Douglas Howell of the Pennsylvania State Police interviewed
Defendant Jessica Kassirer (“Kassirer”) at the Carlisle Regional Medical Center in order to
gather information regarding Kassirer’s assertion that she had been raped early that morning.
(Notes of Testimony, Hearing on Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 6) (Hereinafter N.T.). Trooper
Howell asked Kassirer a number of questions and believed there were inconsistencies in her
answers. (N.T. 7).
During the next few days Trooper Howell interviewed other people and found further
inconsistencies with Kassirer’s story. (N.T. 8). Trooper Howell called Kassirer and asked her to
come to the station to talk further. (N.T. 8). An appointment was scheduled for the morning of
thth
April 18, but Kassirer called to cancel the appointment early in the morning of the 18. (N.T.
9). Trooper Howell called her back that morning and Kassirer related that she was no longer
interested in pressing charges, but Trooper Howell told her that he still wanted to talk to her and
wanted her to sign a refusal to prosecute form. (N.T. 9). Kassirer agreed to come to the station.
(N.T. 9).
CP-21-CR-1780-2007
Kassirer arrived at the police station, alone, at about eight o’clock in the morning on
th
April 18. (N.T. 10). Trooper Howell, who was dressed in a business suit and not a police
uniform, met her at the front of the station, and walked with her to a large conference room.
(N.T. 32). They sat at the conference table, with the door to the room ajar. (N.T. 15). Kassirer
signed the refusal to prosecute form. (N.T. 10). Trooper Howell then told Kassirer he would like
to talk about some of her prior statements. (N.T. 10). A few minutes into the interview Kassirer
began crying and admitted to lying and making up the report of the rape. (N.T. 11). They
continued to talk for about twenty-five to thirty minutes. (N.T. 28). He then asked her to make a
1
written statement, and left the room while she did so. (N.T. 28). Trooper Howell read the
statement, and because the statement did not absolve the suspect of the crime, Trooper Howell
asked her to be more specific. (N.T. 41). A few minutes later Trooper Howell came back to the
room with Trooper McCombs so that Trooper McCombs could witness Trooper Howell ask
Kassirer a number of questions including whether the form was filled out on her own free will,
and whether the statement was truthful. (N.T. 28).
Kassirer signed her written statement at 8:42 and then left the station. (N.T. 34). She had
not been read her Miranda rights. (N.T. 33). By the same token, she never expressed that she
wanted to leave or that she didn’t want to answer questions or talk to Trooper Howell. (N.T. 17-
18).
1
Kassirer claims that Trooper Howell told her that if she did not write a confession he would put her in jail.
Trooper Howell denies that he made such a threat. (N.T. 44). At the hearing, we resolved this issue of credibility in
favor of the Commonwealth.
2
CP-21-CR-1780-2007
Based on her written statement, Kassirer was charged with False Reports, a misdemeanor
of the second degree. She has moved to suppress her statements on grounds that the statements
were either in violation of Miranda and its progeny, or coerced from her.
We must initially determine whether the interview of Kassirer at the police station on
April 18, 2007, was a “custodial interrogation” in order to determine whether her written
statement was given in violation of Miranda or was coerced from her. This is because
statements made during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible if the interviewee is not first
read her Miranda rights, such statements being otherwise presumed involuntary (coerced).
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 727 A.2d 1089, 1100 (Pa. 1999)
.
We are satisfied that there was no custodial interrogation in this case. In Commonwealth
v. Chacko, 459 A.2d 311, 314 (Pa. 1983), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed the mandate
of the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) and ruled:
The test for determining whether a suspect is being subjected to
custodial interrogation so as to necessitate Miranda warnings is
whether he is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant
way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that
his freedom of action or movement is restricted by such
interrogation.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Levanduski reiterated this point by
holding:
[T]he test for custodial interrogation does not depend upon the
subjective intent of the law enforcement officer interrogator.
Rather, the test focuses on whether the individual being
interrogated reasonably believes his freedom of action is being
restricted.
907 A.2d 3, 24 (Pa.Super. Ct. 2006). Detentions become “custodial” for the purpose of Miranda
when the detention becomes the functional equivalent of an arrest. Commonwealth v. Mannion,
3
CP-21-CR-1780-2007
725 A.2d 196 (Pa.Super. 1999). According to the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Levanduski:
The factors a court utilizes to determine, under the totality of the
circumstances, whether a detention has become so coercive as to
constitute the functional equivalent of arrest include: the basis for
the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was
transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether
restraints were used; whether the law enforcement officer showed,
threatened or used force; and the investigative methods employed
to confirm or dispel suspicions. The fact that a police investigation
has focused on a particular individual does not automatically
trigger “custody,” thus requiring Miranda warnings.
907 A.2d 3, 24 (Pa.Super. Ct. 2006). The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Levanduski applied
these factors to the facts of that case, and determined that there was not a custodial interrogation.
Id. at 26-27. Comparing the facts of the current case to the facts of Levanduski, we come to the
same conclusion here.
First, in Levanduski it was clear that the defendant was the focus of an investigation
during the interview. Id. at 26. In the current case, Kassirer was also the focus of an
investigation. Trooper Howell, satisfied that there was no merit to her story, was investigating
the possibility that Kassirer had made a false report. The fact that a police investigation has
focused on a particular person does not automatically require Miranda warnings. Id. In
Levanduski, the defendant was at the police station for two and a half hours before she was
eventually given Miranda warnings. Id. In the current case, the interview lasted less than
forty-five minutes. In Levanduski, the defendant was placed in an interview room in the police
station. Id. In the current case, the interview took place in a conference room in the police
station. In Levanduski, the defendant voluntarily arrived at the police station, and was not taken
4
CP-21-CR-1780-2007
to the station by the police. Id. at 26-27. In the current case, Kassirer also came to the police
station voluntarily.
In the current case, Trooper Howell was the only officer that interviewed Kassirer. He
was in a suit, his firearm was not prominently displayed or brandished, he never yelled at
Kassirer, never made any threats, and never demanded that she make a statement. In fact, the
interview was so benign that Kassirer did not realize she was inculpating herself with the
statement she was making, as she did not know her actions had been illegal. (N.T. 33, 34). In
short, there is nothing in this case to suggest that the defendant believed, in any way, that her
freedom of movement was restricted or that she was experiencing the functional equivalent of an
arrest.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of February, 2008, the omnibus pretrial motion of the
defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED.
BY THE COURT,
_______________________________
Kevin A. Hess, J.
Daniel Sodus, Esquire
Sr. Assistant District Attorney
Michael Palermo, Esquire
For the Defendant
:rlm
5
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
vs. : CP-21-CR-1780-2007
:
:
JESSICA KASSIRER :
IN RE: DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE HESS, J.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of February, 2008, the omnibus pretrial motion of the
defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED.
BY THE COURT,
_______________________________
Kevin A. Hess, J.
Daniel Sodus, Esquire
Sr. Assistant District Attorney
Michael Palermo, Esquire
For the Defendant
:rlm