HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-0014 CivilBARRY D. CLARK,
Plaintiff
GENERAL MILLS, INC.,
Defendant
· IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
· CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
· CIVIL ACTION -- LAW
· No. 99-14 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
BEFORE HESS and OLER, JJ.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 1999, after careful consideration of Defendant's
preliminary objections to Plaintiff's complaint, and for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, the preliminary objections are denied.
Nora S. Gibson, Esq.
McGraw, Hait & Deitchman
4 Liberty Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff
Robert G. Hanna, Jr., Esq.
Sharon M. O'Donnell, Esq.
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin
Fourth Floor
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 803
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0803
Attorneys for Defendant
BY THE COURT,
/~Wesley Olg.r.~Jf.,-J. L- '
BARRY D. CLARK,
Plaintiff
GENERAL MILLS, INC.,
Defendant
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
: CIVIL ACTION -- LAW
;
:No. 99-14 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
BEFORE HESS and OLER, JJ.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
OLER, J., March 23, 1999.
In this civil action, an individual plaintiff has sued a corporate defendant for false
imprisonment and defamation as the result of an alleged incident in which plaintiff was
detained by police following a report by Defendant. Presently before the court are
preliminary objections to the complaint in the nature of demurrers.
The matter was argued on March 3, 1999. For the reasons stated in this opinion,
Defendant's preliminary objections will be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, filed January 4, 1999, may be summarized
as follows. Plaintiff is Barry D. Clark, an individual residing in Carlisle, Cumberland
County, Pennsylvania.~ Defendant is General Mills, Inc., a corporation with its place of
business in Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.2
On August 7, 1998, Plaintiff resigned as an employee of Defendant.3 At the time,
Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph 1.
Id., paragraph 2.
Id., paragraph 6.
Plaintiff was informed that he could return to the premises to mm in his uniform; in addition,
former employees of Defendant were generally permitted to return to the premises to dine
with current employees in Defendant's lunch room.4
On August 9, 1998, a security guard employed by Defendant stopped Plaintiff as he
drove with a companion on a public street abutting Defendant's premises,s Plaintiff's
vehicle was surrounded by police cars "at the behest of Defendant's security guard,''6
Plaintiff was detained by police for fifteen to twenty minutes in view of the general public,7
and he and his companion were subjected to questioning? Specifically, Plaintiff was
questioned as to the reason for his presence in the area of his former employer.9
During the detention, Plaintiff was told that police knew of concerns that he might
return to Defendant's premises and cause damage, and that he was stopped for that reason, l0
However, the report to police was false and malicious,TM and no reasonable basis existed for
Plaintiff's detention.~2
Defendant's preliminary objections to Plaintiff's complaint were filed on January 27,
1999. With respect to the claim for false imprisonment, Defendant's demurrer is premised
4 !d.
Id., paragraph 8.
.Id., paragraph 9.
Id., paragraphs 11, 15.
Id., paragraph 1 I.
Id., paragraph 9.
Id., paragraph 11.
Id., paragraphs 17-19.
Id., paragraph 14.
2
upon the argument that an investigatory detention by police could not rise to the level of false
imprisonment. 13 "There was," according to Defendant's brief, "no arrest, no confinement,
and no charges brought?4
With respect to the claim for defamation, Defendant's demurrer is premised upon
the absence of a specific defamatory statement from the averments of the complaint, Xs and
the absence of a sufficient averment of harm to the Plaintiff.16 Defendant's argument on
these points is as follows:
Pa. R.C.P. 1019(a) requires a plaintiff to plead a
statement, made by the defendant, which he considers to be
defamatory, in a concise and summary form. Plaintiff must
plead that a particular communication was defamatory in nature.
The communication must be attributable to the defendant. Here,
Plaintiff has failed to plead facts describing any statement or
speech specifically attributed to any employee of General Mills.
Instead, in Parg. 11, he claims that one of the officers explained
that there were "concerns about him coming back to General
Mills, and causing damage, and that is why we pulled you over".
After the officer's discussion was complete, there was no
arrest, no confinement, and no criminal charges filed. Whether
or not a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning is a
question for the court. However, even before such a
determination can be made, the Plaintiff must plead facts
describing some harm resulting from an alleged defamatory
statement. Pennsylvania law requires that such harm to, at least,
be alleged to have "blackened the plaintiff's reputation or to
~3 Preliminary Objections of Defendant, General Mills, Inc., paragraphs 7-9.
14 Defendant's Memorandum of Law at 3.
15 Preliminary Objections of Defendant, General Mills, Inc., paragraphs 12-13.
~6 Id., paragraph 14.
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to injure
him in his business or profession".17
DISCUSSION
Preliminary objection in nature of demurrer ~- general. A preliminary objection in
the nature of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without doubt fail
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth,
507 Pa. 360, 372, 490 A.2d 402, 408 (1985). In addition, "a claim should not be ... dismissed
for mere lack of specificity." Garrett Electronics Corp. v. Commonwealth, 46 Cumberland
L.J. 256, 260 (1997), citing Goodrich-Amram 2d § 1017(b): 12, at 256 (1991). Furthermore,
deficiencies of specificity will generally not result in relief on preliminary objections where
"the objecting party may be presumed to have at least as much information as does the
pleader." Borough of New Cumberland v. Gates, 47 Cumberland L.J. 21, 27 (1997); 5
Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d §25:60, at 170 (1993). 18
False imprisonment. The tort of false imprisonment is described in Section 35 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts as follows:
An actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment
if
(a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person
within boundaries fixed by the actor, and
(b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a
confinement of the other, and
Defendant's Memorandum of Law at 4.
~8 A deficiency which is so fundamental as to deprive a pleading of legal sufficiency
can not be disregarded on the ground that the objecting party is probably aware of the
information or that it could be learned in discovery. Gross v. United Engineers and
Constructors, Inc., 224 Pa. Super. 233, 302 A.2d 370, allocatur refused, 302 A.2d 370 (Pa.
1973).
(c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed
by it.19
The confinement may be caused directly or indirectly? It may consist of a custodial
status imposed by legal authority? The geographical area of confinement may be
extensive? A specific duration of constraint is not included in the elements of the tort.
In the present case, if the allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, with no
further record having been developed in the case, and based upon the foregoing authority,
it cannot be said that Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment is meritless. Consequently,
Defendant's preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to Plaintiff's claim for false
imprisonment will be denied.
Defamation. The tort of defamation is described in Section 558 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as follows:
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged[23] publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of
the publisher; and
19 Restatement (Second) of Torts {}35(1) (1965).
20 Id. {}37.
Id. {}41; see, e.g., Renkv. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289 (1994).
22 "The area within which another is completely confined may be large and need not
be stationary." Comment b, Restatement (Second) of Torts {}35 (1965) (example provided
of confinement to state by invalid writ).
23 Privilege, in Pennsylvania, is an affirmative defense. Pa. R.C.P. 1030(a). The
effect of a conditional privilege to defame is, in general, not considered on preliminary
objections. See Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital, Ass 'n, Inc., 340 Pa. Super. 253,
489 A.2d 1364 (1985).
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(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication?
Where a defamatory statement in the form of slander is not actionable per se,25
liability is dependent upon "special harm,''26 inter alia.
Special harm ... is the loss of something having economic
or pecuniary value. In its origin, this goes back to the ancient
conflict of jurisdiction between the royal and the ecclesiastical
courts, in which the former acquired jurisdiction over some
kinds of defamation only because they could be found to have
resulted in "temporal" rather than "spiritual" damage ....
The more modem decisions have shown some tendency
to liberalize the old role, and to find pecuniary loss when the
plaintiff has been deprived of benefit which has a more or less
indirect financial value to him .... The tendency has been in the
direction of finding an indirect benefit to be sufficient.
Special harm must result from the conduct of a person
other than the defamer or the one defamed and must be legally
caused by the defamation?
In the present case, Plaintiff's complaint suggests that an agent of Defendant falsely
and maliciously reported to police that Plaintiff represented a danger to Defendant's
establishment if he came within its vicinity, and that as a consequence Plaintiffwas deprived
of his freedom for fifteen to twenty minutes by authorities. Although more specificity with
respect to the allegedly defamatory statement would be desirable in the pleading, and
although it is not clear at this stage whether the detention, if it occurred, will be shown to
24 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977).
25 See Comment b, Restatement (Second) of Torts §569 (1977).
26 AgFiss V. Roadway Express, Inc., 334 Pa. Super. 295,483 A.2d 456 (1984).
27 Comment b, Restatement (Second) of Torts §575(1977).
6
have been tantamount to economic deprivation, the court cannot on the basis of the complaint
alone hold that Plaintiff clearly and without doubt can not recover for defamation.
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 23rd day of March, 1999, after careful consideration of Defendant's
preliminary objections to Plaintiff's complaint, and for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, the preliminary objections are denied.
BY THE COURT,
/s/J. Wesley Oler Jr.
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Nora S. Gibson, Esq.
McGraw, Hait & Deitchman
4 Liberty Avenue
Carlisle, PA 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff
Robert G. Hanna, Jr., Esq.
Sharon M. O'Donnell, Esq.
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin
Fourth Floor
100 Pine Street
P.O. Box 803
Harrisburg, PA 17108-0803
Attorneys for Defendant
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