HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-0352 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH
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ROBERT ROMO
OTN: F 195055
: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
: CHARGE: UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A
SMALL AMT. OF MARIJUANA
: No. 99-0352 CRIMINAL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE OLER, J.
ow, or
day of July, 1999, upon consideration of Defendant's omnibus
pretrial motion for relief in the form of a motion to suppress, following a hearing and for the
reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the motion is granted to the extent that evidence
resulting from the affiant's pat down of Defendant's person is suppressed.
BY THE COURT,
Will I. Gabig, Esq.
Senior Assistant District Attorney
For the Commonwealth
Aria M. Waller, Esq.
Assistant Public Defender
For the Defendant
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. : CHARGE: UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A
: SMALL AMT. OF MARIJUANA
:
ROBERT ROMO :
OTN: F 195055 : No. 99-0352 CRIMINAL TERM
IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION
BEFORE OLER, J.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
OLER, J., July 14, 1999.
For disposition in this criminal case in which Defendant is charged with possession
of a small amount of marijuana is an omnibus pretrial motion for relief in the form of a
motion to suppress filed on behalf of Defendant. The premise of the motion is that a seizure
of alleged marijuana from Defendant's person by a police officer occurred during an
investigative detention which was not supported by reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot, and in the course of a pat down which was not supported by reasonable
suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous.
A hearing was held on Defendant's motion on Thursday, July 8, 1999. Based upon
the evidence presented at the hearing, the following Findings of Fact, Discussion and Order
of Court are made and entered.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On the evening of Tuesday, September 28, 1998, at about 11:30 p.m., the affiant, a
Carlisle Borough police officer, observed Defendant and a juvenile on a street in the
borough. The officer, who was in uniform and in an unmarked police car, was familiar with
the juvenile's age, knew him to be violating a borough curfew ordinance by being out at that
hour, placed him in the police car for purposes of transport to the police station, briefly
questioned him as to his activities that evening, and proceeded to detain and question
Defendant. An aroma of marijuana was discemible to the officer from both individuals.
The bases for the investigative detention of Defendant were the officer's awareness
that a theft of videotape items from a location within several blocks of Defendant's presence
had been reported to borough police earlier that day, that Defendant was at this time carrying
a plastic bag containing videotape items,~ and that the officer~had on an earlier occasion
received information from fellow officers leading him to believe that a bench warrant might
be outstanding for Defendant as a consequence of his failure to appear in court on an appeal
from summary conviction.2
The officer was aware of an incident in Defendant's past in which he had become
disorderly when arrested for public drunkenness. One of Defendant's legs was trembling
during the detention. However, he was cooperative with the officer and nothing in his
conduct can be said to have been threatening or unruly.
In questioning Defendant, the officer perceived that Defendant's account of how long
he had been with the juvenile that evening did not coincide with the juvenile's. In addition,
Defendant indicated that he had gotten the videotape items at the residence of his brother's
girlfriend nearby, but was unable to provide her precise street address. The officer subjected
Defendant to a pat down for the purpose of promoting the officer's safety, during the course
of which the alleged marijuana upon which the charge is based was discovered.
DISCUSSION
In a hearing on a suppression motion, the Commonwealth has the burden of going
forward with the evidence and of establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained
in violation of the defendant's rights. Pa. R. Crim. P. 323(h). The standard of proof is
preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Stoops, 723 A.2d 184, 186 (Pa. Super. Ct.
~ It transpired, apparently, that the videotape items being carded by Defendant were not
related to the theft.
2 It transpired, apparently, that this bench warrant had not yet been processed so as to be
capable of execution by law enforcement authorities.
2
1998).
"It is well-settled that a police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop of an
individual if the officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude,
in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot." In the Interest ofS. J., 551 Pa.
637, 642, 713 A.2d 45, 47 (1998). Stated otherwise, "[i]n order to justify [an investigative
detention] under the Fourth Amendment, the police must point to specific and articulable
facts that, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably indicate
that criminal activity may be afoot." Commonwealth v. Diaz, 442 Pa. Super. 238, 252, 659
A.2d 563,570 (1995) (citation omitted).
In the present case, the reported theft of videotape items earlier in the day in the
neighborhood where Defendant was found at 11:30 p.m. carrying a bag of such items, and
information from other officers which reasonably caused the affiant to conclude that a bench
warrant may have been outstanding for Defendant, constituted specific and articulable facts
which, in the court's view, led to a rational belief on the officer's part that criminal activity
might be afoot and justified a brief detention of Defendant to investigate the matter further.
For this reason, the court is unable to agree that evidence against Defendant should be
suppressed as the result of an unlawful investigative detention.
It also appears to be the law in Pennsylvania that justification for a pat down of a
suspect's outer garments for an officer's safety during the course ora lawful investigative
detention is dependent upon the existence of specific and articulable facts leading the officer
"to reasonably believe that the suspect may be armed and dangerous." In the Interest ofS. J.,
551 Pa. 637, 643, 713 A.2d 45, 48 (1998). The officer's good faith with respect to his
conduct is not an issue. Commonwealth v. Mesa, 453 Pa. Super. 147, 152, 683 A.2d 643,646
(1996).
On this point, the court concludes that the Commonwealth has failed to meet its
burden of proof. There was no special likelihood on the occasion of Defendant's detention
that he was armed and dangerous, and to hold otherwise would, in the court's view, fail to
3
adhere to the principle recited above out of respect for the officer's obvious good faith in
acting as he did. For this reason, the following order will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 14th day of July, 1999, upon consideration of Defendant's omnibus
pretrial motion for relief in the form of a motion to suppress, following a hearing and for the
reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the motion is granted to the extent that evidence
resulting from the affiant's pat down of Defendant's person is suppressed.
BY THE COURT,
Will I. Gabig, Esq.
Senior Assistant District Attorney
For the Commonwealth
Arla M. Waller, Esq.
Assistant Public Defender
For the Defendant
/s/J. Wesley Oler, Jr.
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.