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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-1009 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. WILLIAM LEE SIMMS, JR. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-1009 CRIMINAL CHARGE: CRIMINAL HOMICIDE - MURDER IN THE THIRD DEGREE AFFIANT: DET. SGT. RICHARD KOPKO IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 On August 26, 1997, this court sentenced the defendant, William Lee Simms, Jr., to a term of state imprisonment of not less than twelve nor more than twenty-five years. This sentence followed the defendant's earlier plea of guilty to"a count of murder in the third degree. The charge arose out of an incident that occurred on February 15, 1993. At that time, the defendant was caring for one-year old Lucas Minnich, the son of the defendant's live-in girlfriend, Heidi Minnich. In an effort to stop the child from crying, the defendant forcefully held a towel over the face of the child causing the child to suffocate and die. At the time of the offense, the maximum penalty for third degree murder had been increased from twenty to forty years. The sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, however, reflected the former maximum sentence of twenty years. The guidelines incorporated the statutory maximum penalty into the standard range sentence. After the commission of the offense but prior to sentencing in this case, the sentencing guidelines were changed to reflect the new statutory maximum. Despite the statutory change, we proceeded to sentence acknowledging that the prior (and by then outdated) guidelines applied. Accordingly, we complied with the requirement of explaining, on the record and in writing, our reasons for deviating from the guidelines. We 97-1009 CRIMINAL opined that given the youth of the victim and the fact that he was in the care and trust of the offender suggested that a minimum sentence of less than twelve years would be inappropriate. The other reason for our deviation was that, at the time of Lucas' death, the penalty for third degree murder was double what it had been in former times, reflecting a clear legislative intent that the penalty be enhanced for this offense. The fact that the guidelines had not yet been amended to reflect the statutory change was, in our opinion, mere happenstance. This is a case, therefore, where the guidelines in effect at the time of the offense reflected an outdated statutory maximum penalty. In sentencing outside the guideline range, we took cognizance of the fact that the legislature had seen fit to increase the maximum penalty. The issue of whether we were correct in doing so appears to be a matter of first impression. While deviation from the guidelines is permitted, the sentencing Code requires that the court place of record its reasons for such deviation. Com. v. Byrd, 441 Pa. Super. 351,657 A.2d 961 (1995). At the sentencing proceeding held on August 26, 1997, the sentencing guidelines were extensively discussed and the reasons for deviation from the then applicable guidelines were outlined explicitly. Even though one may comply with the procedural requirements, the adequacy of the reasons for deviation are subject to appellate review. Com. v. Mills, 344 Pa. Super. 200, 496 A.2d 752 (1985). The question becomes whether sentencing outside the guidelines was "unreasonable." In making that determination, the court must look at the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, the presentence investigation report, findings on 97-1009 CRIMINAL which the sentence was based, and the sentencing guidelines. Com. v. Septac, 359 Pa. Super. 375,518 A.2d 1284 (1986). In this case, we had the benefit of a presentence investigation report. We were able to observe the defendant and observe that, despite his initial denials, he had since become cooperative in this case and had expressed remorse. Counsel argued several factors in mitigation, including the care for the child and his mother which the defendant had displayed prior to the incident resulting in the child's death. We not only listened to this argument but agreed, on the record, that these factors militated against the recommendation of the Commonwealth that we impose a sentence of seventeen to thirty-five years. In considering the nature of the offense, however, we could not overlook the fact that the then applicable maximum sentence was forty years. Also, in considering the guidelines, we could not ignore the fact that they were clearly linked to an outdated statutory maximum. In conclusion, we believe that, in sentencing outside the then applicable guidelines, we considered all of the factors required of us. Moreover, at the time of sentencing and now with an even greater opportunity to reflect, we are satisfied that the sentence imposed was not unreasonable. January t3 ~' ,1998 K~J~. H;ss, j~..~ 3 97-1009 CRIMINAL M. L. Ebert, Jr., Esquire District Attorney Myles Kauffman, Esquire For the Defendant :rim 4