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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-0773 Criminal? x COMMONWEALTH VS. ADAM SHAFFER · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · 97-0773 CRIMINAL .IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER Before us is a motion by the defendant, Adam Shaffer, to dismiss the charge against him for driving under the influence as an individual below the age of twenty-one. He claims that 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3731 (a)(4)(ii), part of the statute he is charged with violating, is unconstitutional; namely that subsection which provides that a person under the age of twenty-one shall not drive a vehicle if the amount of alcohol by weight in the person's blood is .02% or greater. The amount triggering criminality for an adult is. 10%. On March 26, 1997, the defendant was placed under arrest for driving while under the influence. He was transported to the Harrisburg Hospital for a blood sample test. His blood alcohol content registered at .07%, and since he was 18 at the time of the arrest he was charged under Section 3731, specifically subsections (a)(1) and (4)(ii). On August 12, 1997, the defendant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. On September 11, 1997, the motion before us was filed. The defendant's sole argument in the motion is that Section 3731 (a)(4)(ii)-violates his rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions' Equal Protection Clauses, specifically, Article I, Section 26, of the 97-0773 CRIMINAL Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. First, we note that there is a strong presumption in the law that an Act of the General Assembly does not violate the constitution. Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 247, 470 A.2d 1339, 1340 (1983). As such, legislation will not be declared unconstitutional unless it "clearly, palpably, and plainly" violates the constitution. Id.__~. (citing Snider v. Thomburgh, 496 Pa. 159, 166, 436 A.2d 593,596 (1981)). Furthermore, we note that the equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution are analyzed by the same standards used by the United States. Supreme Court when reviewing equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Love v. Borough of Stroudsbur~, 528 Pa. 320, 325, 597 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1991). The well-established standard used to analyze an equal protection claim is set forth in James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 505 Pa. 137, 477 A.2d 1302 (1984): Under a typical fourteenth amendment analysis of governmental classifications, there are three different types of classifications calling for three different standards of judicial review. The first type--classifications implicating neither suspect classes nor fundamental rights--will be sustained if it meets a "rational basis" test. In the second type of cases, where a suspect classification has been made or a fundamental right has been burdened, another standard of review is applied: that of strict scrutiny. Finally, in the third type of cases, if "important," though not fundamental rights are affected by the classification, or if "sensitive" classifications have been made, the United States 97-0773 CRIMINAL Supreme Court has employed what may be called an intermediate standard of review, or a heightened standard of review. Id__~. at 145,477 A.2d at 1305-1306 [citations omitted]. Our first determination, therefore, is whether the challenged section of the Motor Vehicle Code affects a suspect (or "sensitive") class or a fundamental (or "important") right. The defendant concedes that the classification in the statute does not involve a suspect class, since it is settled that age is not a suspect class. Frantz v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transportation, 168 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 35,649 A.2d 148 (1984). The defendant argues, however, that a fundamental right is affected by the provision. The fundamental right at issue, according to the defendant, is the fundamental right of liberty, specifically, freedom from confinement. The defendant argues that since the potential sentence under the new provision is greater than six months, there is a fundamental right being affected. For support, the defendant cites the Supreme Court case Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1962), which laid the foundation for a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial if the potential sentence is greater than six months. The defendant submits that the right to a jury trial is predicated upon whether a defendant's fundamental right to liberty is implicated by the potential sentence. The United States has fairly recently defined "fundamental rights" in the context of equal protection analysis: In determining whether a class-based denial of a particular right is deserving of st_Ii,ct,scrutiny under 3 97-0773 CRIMINAL the Equal Protection Clause, we look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed has its source, explicitly or implicitly, therein. plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). The Supreme Court's determination in Duncan that there is a right to a jury trial for "serious" offenses is supported by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees that there is such a right in criminal cases. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, either explicitly or implicitly, which provides that an individual has a fundamental right not to be imprisoned for over six months, or for that matter, any amount of time.~ In fact, it is well established that all states have police powers, and that one's right to liberty may be impaired to ensure the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). The fundamental right, rather, is that our liberty not be impaired without due process. It is our belief, therefore, that the provision in question does not affect a suspect class or a fundamental right, and, therefore, the legislative classification must be sustained unless it is 'patently arbitrary' and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 693 (1973). We note that the defendant's entire argument is that this legislation should be analyzed under strict scrutiny, and that he concedes that there is There is, of course, a prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but it does not create a right for individuals to be free from incarceration. Furthermore, we note that the defendant has not presented an argument that the potential punishment of the provision in question is cruel and unusual. 97-0773 CRIMINAL a rational basis for the law. Regardless, we briefly mention that the classification in this law is not arbitrary. Individuals under the age of twenty-one are not legally allowed to consume alcohol. Despite the prohibition against underage drinking, however, in 1996 there were over 1,000 accidents in Pennsylvania involving individuals under twenty-one who were drinking. See Commonwealth Exhibit 3. The new law may be strict, but the interest which Pennsylvania has in preventing these sorts of accidents is considerable. ORDER AND NOW, this q' ~ day of February, 1998, the motion of the defendant to dismiss as count of 75 Pa.C.S. 373 l(a)(4) is DENIED. John Abom, Esquire Assistant District Attorney William Braught, Esquire Assistant Public Defender BY THE COURT, ~v~H'ess, :rim