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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-6119 CivilFRANCINE WEIMER, Executrix of the Estate of David Weimer, Deceased, Plaintiff Vo FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY; GEORGE HARTMAN; CHRISTIN[A] BARTON; and CHRISTY LENGYEL, Defendants 99 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 97-6119 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY AND GEORGE HARTMAN BEFORE BAYLEY and OLER, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this :l day of December, 1999, upon consideration of the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the motion is denied. BY THE COURT, IWesley Oler, ~c~ J' ~" Keith E. Kendall, Esq. 3207 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorney for Plaintiff David E. Stem, Esq. WOLF, BLOCK, SCHORR & SOLIS-COHEN 350 Sentry Parkway, Bldg. 640 P.O. Box 3038 Blue Bell, PA 19422-0757 Attorneys for Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman Glorianna Noreika Maenner, Esq. 138 East Market Street P.O. Box 2588 York, PA 17405-2588 Attorney for Defendant Christina Barton John M. Popilock, Esq. 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 999 Harrisburg, Pa 17108 Attorney for Defendant Christy Lengyel :rc FRANCINE WEIMER, : Executrix of the Estate of : David Weimer, Deceased, : Plaintiff : Vo FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY; GEORGE HARTMAN; CHRISTIN[A] BARTON; and CHRISTY LENGYEL,: Defendants · IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW NO. 97-6119 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY AND GEORGE HARTMAN BEFORE BAYLEY and OLER, JJ. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J., December 9, 1999. In this civil case, the personal representative of a decedent has sued (a) his former employer, a former superior, and two other individuals for libel and (b) the two other individuals for tortious interference with contractual relations.~ The gist of Plaintiff's (second amended) complaint is that a false report of misconduct on decedent's part was generated from within and without the company and that the company used it to support his involuntary termination.2 Plaintiff's second amended complaint, paragraphs 1-26. Id. For disposition at this time is a motion for summary judgment filed by the former employer and former superior, with respect to the claim of libel.3 The rather general basis of the motion for summary judgment is stated in the following paragraphs: 14. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint contains only one Count against Petitioning Defendants: Count I-Libel. 15. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to allege the necessary elements required under 42 Pa. C.S.A. {}8343 to sustain a cause of action against Petitioning Defendants for libel. 16. Even if Plaintiff was permitted to further amend the Second Amended Complaint, no such cause of action for libel would be sustainable against Petitioning Defendants. 17. Because there are no factual issues which remain unresolved, Petitioning Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 The motion for summary judgment was argued on October 13, 1999. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the motion will be denied. STATEMENT OF FACTS On a motion for summary judgment, the record includes the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and reports of expert witnesses. Pa. R.C.P. 1035.1. In considering such a motion, the court will 3 Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman's Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1035.1 et seq., filed June 30, 1999. 4 Id. at3. 2 "view the record in the light most favorable to ... the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue~ of material fact must be resolved against the moving party." Washington v. Baxter, 553 Pa. 434, 437 n.1,719 A.2d 733, 735 n.1 (1998). "[A]ll inferences must be resolved in favor of ... the nonmoving party .... "Id. at 447, 719 A.2d at 740. The allegations of Plaintiff's (second amended) complaint may be summarized, in pertinent part, as follows. Plaintiff's decedent, David Weimer, was employed by Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company, a corporation, for twenty-six years prior to his termination on August 22, 1997.5 He died on January 4, 1999.6 Defendant George Hartman, an employee of Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company in a position superior to that of Plaintiff's decedent,? received and/or solicited and/or procured false written information to the effect that Plaintiff's decedent was participating in a fraud upon his employer? the false information was provided by Defendants Christina Barton and Christy Lengyel.9 The false Plaintiff's second amended complaint, paragraphs 2-4. !d., paragraph 5. See id., paragraph 4. Id., paragraphs 7, 9. Id. 3 information resulted from a conspiracy among the three individual defendants,~° and was supplied and acted upon with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless indifference to their falsity, l~ Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company used the false information to terminate the employment of Plaintiff's decedent, through his discharge by Defendant Hartman.~2 As a consequence of the defamation, Plaintiff's decedent suffered damage to his reputation, loss of health, and loss of income and benefits, including a life insurance death benefit in excess of $450,000.00.~3 The allegations recited above in Plaintiff's (second amended) complaint are supported in part by affidavits comprising the allegedly defamatory statements on the part of Defendants Barton and Lengyel. The affidavits indicated that the affiants were employed by a certain automobile dealership which did business with Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company, and that Plaintiff's decedent, an employee of Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company, tipped the dealership off as to impending audits of the dealership by the decedent's employer.~4 10 Plaintiff's second amended complaint, paragraph 19. ~ ~ Id., paragraPhs 10-14. ~2 Id., paragraph 17. 13 /rd., paragraphs 20-21. 14 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman's Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1035.1 et seq., at 8; deposition of Christina Barton (August 11, 1998), Exhibit 1. 4 In a deposition, Defendant Barton described a scheme whereby her then employer, the said automobile dealership, financed its purchase of vehicles through Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company, sold some financed vehicles without repaying the credit company, and concealed this fact from the credit company.~5 She testified that her affidavit implicating Plaintiff Weimer, an employee of the credit company, in the scheme had been prepared by Defendant Hartman (also an employee of the credit company),~6 that she had not wanted to sign the affidavit,~? and that Defendant Hartman had asked her to sign it 30 times before she relented and signed it.~8 She denied that she had been untruthful in the affidavit.~9 In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and Hartman make the following arguments: Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company did not make or publish the allegedly defamatory communications. Defendant Hartman, as an agent and servant of Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company, could not have published the allegedly defamatory communications to Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company. 15 Deposition of Christina Barton (August 11, 1998), at 13-32. ~6 Id., at 10-11. ~? Id., at 50-51. la Id., at 46. ~9 Id., at 35. The alleged communications are incapable of a defamatory meaning. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any malice on the part of Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company and Defendant Hartman. Any communications made by Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company and Defendant Hartman concerning the allegedly defamatory statements were absolutely privileged.2° Plaintiff's response to the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and Hartman contends that the motion is premature because discovery on the issues presented has not been completed,2~ and contests Defendants' positions on the merits? DISCUSSION Statement of Law Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides as follows: After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law 2o Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman's Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1035.1 etseq., at 3-13. 2~ See Plaintiff's Motion To Stay Motion for Summary Judgment and To Dismiss Motion, filed July 29, 1999; Order of Court, August 4, 1999. 22 Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman's Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1035.1 et seq., at 1-3. (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or (2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. "[T]he mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for a trial." Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93, 100, 674 A.2d 1038, 1042 (1996). "Oral testimony alone, either through testimonial affidavits or depositions, of the moving party or the moving party's witnesses, even if uncontradicted, is generally insufficient to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Note, Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2; see Pa. R.C.P. 1035.3(b). On a motion for summary judgment, a court "should not attempt to resolve conflicting contentions of fact or conflicting inferences, which may be drawn from such facts .... Summary 7 judgment is an 'eyes-only' procedure, which does not allow for a factual hearing." 6 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d, 32:113, at 257 (1994) (emphasis added).23 With respect to defamation, the usual elements of the tort have been set forth by the Pennsylvania Superior Court as follows: [I]n an action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defamatory character of the communication; (2) publication by the defendant; (3) its application to the plaintiff; (4) understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning; (5) understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; (6) special harm to the plaintiff; and (7) abuse of [any applicable] ... privileged occasion. Miketic v. Baron, 450 Pa. Super. 91, 97, 675 A.2d 324, 327 (1996); see Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, §2, 42 Pa. C.S. §8343(a). "[I]t is well-settled law that a communication which ascribes to another conduct, character, or a condition that would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of his business, trade, or profession, is defamatory .... "Pelagatti v. Cohen, 370 Pa. Super. 422, 438-39, 536 A.2d 1337, 1345 (1987). Where there is any doubt that the communication disparages or harms the complainant in his business or profession, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the complainant; even where a plausible innocent interpretation of the communication exists, if there is an alternative defamatory 23 "[I]f a motion for summary judgment is made on the grounds that an adverse party, who will bear the burden of proof at trial, has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense, [Pennsylvania] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 1035.2 requires that the motion be made only after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion .... "3 Goodrich-Amram 2d §1035.2:7, at 326 (1998). In view of the court's disposition of Defendants' motion, it is unnecessary to consider Plaintiff's additional argument that the motion should be denied on the ground that discovery on the issues raised has not been completed. 8 interpretation, it is for the jury to determine if the defamatory meaning was understood by the recipient. Id. at 439, 539 A.2d at 1337. Finally, it is recognized in Pennsylvania that under certain circumstances one who procures the publication of a defamatory statement may be liable for the harm done, even though the actor did not personally publish the statement. See Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93,674 A.2d 1038 (1996). Application of Law to Facts With respect to the moving Defendants' contention that the statements allegedly elicited by them were "incapable of a defamatory meaning," the court is unable to agree that an allegation that an employee of a credit company alerted a debtor of the company to impending audits is susceptible of a benign construction only. A reasonable argument can be made that it imputed improper conduct to him in the performance of his business duties. With respect to the moving Defendants' arguments concerning a lack of publication on their part of the statements in question, the record contains evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the Defendants procured production of the written statements by two third parties and then acted upon the defamatory contents of the documents to the detriment of Plaintiff's decedent. Given this possible interpretation of the events sub judice, the court is not in a position upon the record as it exists to hold as a matter of law that Plaintiff can not recover under any theory of publication. 9 With respect to the moving Defendants' arguments concerning an absence of malice and the existence of an absolute privilege, it may be noted that actual malice is not a prerequisite to liability in every action for defamation,TM and there is no absolute privilege on the part of an employer to cause a third party to tortiously defame an employee of the employer. Without in any way suggesting that a trier of fact will find that such occurred in this case, it would be premature to summarily dispose of Plaintiff's action herein on the basis of an absence of malice or the doctrine of absolute privilege. For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 9th day of December, 1999, upon consideration of the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the motion is denied. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 24 See Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166 (1971); Rutt v. Bethlehems' Globe Publishing Co., 335 Pa. Super. 163, 484 A.2d 72 (1984); Wilson v. $latalla, 970 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, {}2, 42 Pa. C.S. {}8344 (1978). 10 Keith E. Kendall, Esq. 3207 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorney for Plaintiff David E. Stem, Esq. WOLF, BLOCK, SCHORR & SOLIS-COHEN 350 Sentry Parkway, Bldg. 640 P.O. Box 3038 Blue Bell, PA 19422-0757 Attomeys for Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman Glorianna Noreika Maenner, Esq. 138 East Market Street P.O. Box 2588 York, PA 17405-2588 Attorney for Defendant Christina Barton John M. Popilock, Esq. 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 999 Harrisburg, Pa 17108 Attomey for Defendant Christy Lengyel :rc 11