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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-7133 CivilMARK ANTHONY BRIDGES, Petitioner VS. COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Respondent IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-7133 CIVIL LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 On June 20, 1997, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, sent Mark A. Bridges correspondence notifying him that effective July 25, 1997, his driving privileges were to be suspended for a period of one year as mandated by 1532(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code. The suspension was due to his conviction on May 29, 1997, in New Jersey, of an offense which occurred on March 15, 1997, which offense the Department believed was "equivalent to a violation of 3731 [driving under the influence] of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code." The defendant has appealed from this license suspension. In his statement of matters complained of on appeal, the petitioner contends that the New Jersey Driving While Intoxicated Statute is not an equivalent offense to Pennsylvania's driving law pursuant to the Driver Licensing Compact and, assuming that it is, the application of the compact violates the petitioner's double jeopardy and equal protection rights. The identical issues raised by the petitioner in this case were raised in the case of Karen A. Gnazzo v. Com. of Pa., Dept. of Trans., Cumberland County, 97-548 Civil. In that case, in our written opinion and order dated February 12, 1998, we ruled in favor of the Commonwealth. We attach hereto and incorporate by reference herein our opinion in the Gnazzo case as explanation and justification of our order in the matter sub judice. June 30, 1998 Stephen D. Kulla, Esquire For the Petitioner George H. Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rim KAREN A. GNAZZO, Plaintiff VS. COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-5408 CIVIL APPEAL FROM LICENSE SUSPENSION IN RE: APPEAL FROM DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION BEFORE HESS, J. ORDER AND NOW, this day of February, 1998, for the reasons stated in our opinion filed of even date herewith, the appeal of Karen A. Gnazzo from the suspension of her driver's license is DENIED. BY THE COURT, David E. Hershey, Esquire For the Appellant K7I-Iess, J. George Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rlm KAREN A. GNAZZO, Plaintiff VS. COMMONWEALTH OF PA., DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-5408 CIVIL APPEAL FROM LICENSE SUSPENSION IN RE: APPEAL FROM DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION BEFORE HESS. J. OPINION AND ORDER Before us is the appeal by Karen A. Gna?vo fi:om the one-year suspension of her Pennsylvania driver's license by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). By official notice, dated and mailed September 4, 1997, PennDOT notified Gna?~.o that her license was being suspended pursuant to Section 1581 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. Section 1581 states in relevant part: (a) The licensing authority in the home state, for purposes of a suspension, revocation, or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the conduct reported, pursuant to Article 3 of this compact, as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state in the case of convictions for: (2) driving a motorvehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which rendezs~he., driver incapable of safely driving a mot.0~vehicle. PennDOT had i-eceived notice 6~-A '_ugrtSvi i;-i-9977il~atGnazzo-was convicted of driviag 97-5408 CIVIL while intoxicated in New Jersey on June 18, 1997, in violation of Title 39 New Jersey Statute Section 4-50. Accordingly, it determined that the New Jersey conviction was equivalent to a violation of Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, relating to driving under the influence, and, therefore, enforced the one-year driving suspension mandated by Section 1532(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code. Petitioner is a Pennsylvania resident who, other than the offense stated above, has no prior record. Additionally, in the incident which gave rise to Petitioner's conviction in New Jersey, there was no accident involved and there was no act in conjunction with the offense in New Jersey which would have constituted a violation of any of the specific offenses enumerated under Section 1542 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code had the conduct occurred in Pennsylvania. Petitioner's driving privileges were suspended in New Jersey for six months, she received a fine, and was directed to comply with a program deemed satisfactory by the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center in New Jersey. Petitioner now raises several arguments concerning the impropriety of having her license suspended for a year. First, she claims a violation of her right to equal protection under the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions. Second, she claims that her right against double jeop.ardy has been violated under the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions. Third, she claims that PennDOT incorrectly determined, pursuant to Section 1581 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, that her violation in New Jersey was equivalent to Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code. Finally, sh~ contends that her rights to due process and equal protection, and against double 2. 97-5408 CIVIL jeopardy have been violated under the New Jersey Constitution. Plainly read, the above cited Part of Section 1581, requires the Pennsylvania Department -of Transportation to look at the conduct reported (i.e. that an individual was driving under the influence), and to give the same effect (i.e. license suspension) to the conduct as if the conduct had occurred in Pennsylvania. The petitioner argues, however, that her conduct which resulted in a driving while intoxicated conviction in New Jersey would have very likely placed her in an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program in Pennsylvania. And although ARD programs are handled differently in many counties in Pennsylvania, generally, the license suspensions which DOT must effectuate in ARD programs are six months or less. As such, the petitioner argues that her right to equal protection is violated, since she has received a one-year suspension whereas the same conduct in Pennsylvania would have almost surely resulted in a suspension of six months or less. We agree that ARD is generally offered to a first time violator of Pennsylvania's driving under the influence statute, and therefore there existed a good possibility that, had the petitioner been arrested in Pennsylvania for the same conduct, she would have been allowed to enter an ARI? program. We do not think, however, that PennDOT, pursuant to Section 1581, violated the petitioner's right to equal protection. The wording of Section 1581 creates a problem of interpretation. If PennDOT is supposed to "give the same effect to the conduct reported," then should not the Department 3 97-5408 CIVIL consider that such conduct, had it occurred in Pennsylvania, might have resulted in an ARD disposition? In resolving this question, we resort to the well-established laws of statutory interpretation. In attempting to ascertain the meaning of a statute, the court is required to consider the intent of the legislature, and is permitted to examine the practical consequences of a particular interpretation. The court is to presume that the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. Commonwealth v. Lon~, 395 Pa. Super. 495,577 A.2d 899 (1990). We are satisfied that it would be virtually impossible for PennDOT to give the same effect to the conduct involved in an out-of-state conviction, as would probably be given for the same conduct (without a conviction) in Pennsylvania. It is possible, of course, that the Department of Transportation could determine an average suspension period for first-time DUI offenders in this Commonwealth, and apply that suspension to out-of-state offenders. This potential resolution, however, is plagued with other problems. Suffice it to say, in any case, that such an interpretation of the statute could not have been intended by the legislature. Rather, we believe it is apparent that the statute requires PennDOT to treat out-of-state conduct resulting in a conviction, just as it would treat a conviction in Pennsylvania based on the same conduct. Since PennDOT is treating the petitioner as it treats every person who is convicted of violating Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, there is clearly no violation of the 97-5408 CIVIL equal protection clause under either the Pennsylvania or the Federal Constitutions.~ The petitioner next argues that the suspension is a second punishment in violation of her right against double jeopardy, relying primarily upon United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides no greater protection than the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, we have only one analysis of the alleged violation. Commonwealth v. Tabb, 491 Pa. 372, 421 A.2d 183 (1980). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple prosecutions for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction and precludes the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense. Sweeny v. State Board of Funeral Directors, 666 A.2d 1137 (Pa. Commw. 1995). See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,399 (1938). In Halper, supra, the Supreme Court concluded that a civil penalty of a large fine for violations of the False Claims Act constituted punishment for purposes of double jeopardy because the amount of the fine was unrelated to the damages suffered by the government and was designed to punish violators. The Court said that a civil sanction may constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes if the sanction "may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as ~We note, once again, that the Dep~artment of Transportation, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. . 'iL I' §1532(b)(3), is required to suspend the hce~e of any driver convicted of 75 Pa.C.S. §3731 for 12 months. -~' 97-5408 CIVIL a deterrent or retribution." Halper, 490 U.S. at 449. The Supreme Court, however, has recently disavowed the test applied in Halper~and reaffirmed the test applied in cases pre-dating Halper such as Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 373 U.S. 144 (1963). Hudson v. United States, No. 96- 976, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 7497 (Dec. 10, 1997)/ The disavowment of the test applied in Halper, however, makes little difference in our analysis here. The Commonwealth Court has already determined, even under the Halper test, that a license suspension does not constitute a criminal sanction. Krall v. Com., Dept. of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 682 A.2d 63 (Pa. Commw. 1996). It is well established that "driver revocation proceedings are remedial sanctions and are civil in nature, designed to protect the public from unsafe drivers." Id__~. at 66, citing Drogowski v. Com, 94 Pa. C0mmw. Ct. 205,209, 503 A.2d 104, 107 (1986). Next, the petitioner contends that violation of New Jersey's driving while intoxicated statute, Title 39 New Jersey Statutes Section 4-50, is not an equivalent offense to Pennsylvania's driving under the influence statute, 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3731. The petitioner points to the fact that in New Jersey driving under the influence is not classified as a felony or a misdemeanor, but more as a summary offense in that there is no right to a jury trial and the maximum term of imp.risonment, even for a repeat offender is six months. In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, dri;ving under the influence is a misdemeanor of the second degree, the accused has a right to trial by jury, and imprisonment of not less than one year must be ordered for third time offenders. See-75 Pa.C,S. SectiOn 3731 (e)(1)(iv). 6 97-5408 CIVIL We are satisfied, however, that the relevant question under the Driver's License Compact is whether the conduct prohibited in the new Jersey statute is of the same type as the conduct prohibited by the Pennsylvania statue -- not whether the offenses are punished equally. In this regard, the Superior Court has already decided that a conviction under the New Jersey statute and a conviction under the Pennsylvania statute are "equivalent offenses" for purpose of sentencing a defendant as a multiple offender. Commonwealth v. Whisnant, 390 Pa. Super. 192, 568 A.2d 259. The Superior Court noted that both statutes define the offense as operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or with a blood alcohol concentration of. 10% or more, and the court also noted that the 'underlying policy of the two statutes is the same. Id__.~. at 195, 568 A.2d at 260. Despite slightly different wording in the two statutes, we believe that the statutes address the same conduct, Therefore, PennDOT appropriately equated the conviction in New Jersey to a violation of Section 3731 of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. The petitioner also argues that PennDOT improperly applied the Driver's License Compact because there is no evidence that the petitioner was convicted of driving under the influence to a degree which rendered her incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle as she believes is required under the Compact. The petitioner, however, has misinterpreted the lang.uage of the statute which applies to convictions for "driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor," and does not further require that the driver have been found incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle. Finally, the petitioner argues that her rights to due process, equal protection, and against 97-5408 CIVIL double jeopardy under the New Jersey Constitution have been violated by this license suspension. We disagree. The petitioner argues that her fights to equal protection and due process were violated because she was not informed that she would lose her license in Pennsylvania when she entered a guilty plea in New Jersey. She claims that because of this lack of information her guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. See State v. Samuels, 253 N.J. Super. 335,601 A.2d 784 (1991). It is axiomatic, however, that a licensee may not collaterally attack an underlying criminal conviction in the context of a civil license suspension proceeding. Com. v. Duffy, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174 (1994). We need not address the petitioner's other arguments concerning a violation of the New Jersey Constitution as we know of no authority whereby a resident of Pennsylvania may challenge the actions of a Commonwealth agency based on the constitution of another state. ORDER AND NOW, this t :, ~ day of February, 1998, for the reasons stated in our opinion filed of even date herewith, the appeal of Karen A. Gnazzo from the suspension of her driver's license is DENIED. BY THE COURT, 97-5408 CIVIL David E. Hershey, Esquire For the Appellant George Kabusk, Esquire For PennDOT :rlm