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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-1740 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA VS. ; .- PAUL ARTHUR LANEY : 97-1740 CRIMINAL IN RE: POSTSENTENCE MOTIONS OF DEFENDANT OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER Paul Laney has filed post-sentence motions pursuant to Pa.R.Crim. P 1410 following a conviction by a jury on two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of recklessly endangering another person, and possession of a firearm charge. Trial was held before the Honorable Edgar B. Bayley in January of 1998. Judge Bayley sentenced the defendant on March 3,1 998. Laney contends in his motion in arrest of judgment that the undersigned erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss his charges based on a violation of Section 110 of the Crimes Code (18 Pa.C.S. Section 110), and the double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The facts relevant to the defendant's motion were adduced at a hearing held on January 13, 1998. On July 12, 1997, at around 11:57 p.m., a fire policeman was shot near the comer of Pitt and North streets in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Among other police officers, David Fones, a detective with the Carlisle Police department, arrived at the scene at around 12:30 a.m.. He then went to the hospital to interview the victim, and returned to the scene around 1:00 a.m.. Upon his return, Fones noticed that the defendant was standing among a crowd of people on the opposite comer of the intersection where the victim was found. The defendant was 97-1740 CRIMINAL wearing a walkman and was yelling obscenities at the police, such as "Fuck the police." The defendant was not arrested for his conduct at that point because the chief of police did not want escalate the incident. On July 18th, however, a criminal complaint was filed charging the defendant with disorderly conduct. He pled guilty to this charge on October 28, 1997. Over the remainder of July and through the month of August, the police department discovered that Laney was most likely the person responsible for the shooting. A criminal complaint containing the charges in this case was filed on September 3, 1997. Section 110 provides in pertinent part: Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statute than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances: (1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in Section 109 of this title (referring to when a prosecution is barred by a former prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for: (ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of commencement of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of a single court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense... The sole question in this case in regard to Section 110 is whether the disorderly conduct offense and the offenses in this case relating to the shooting of the fire policeman can be characterized as being part of a "single criminal episode." We do not think they can. 2 97-1740 CRIMINAL The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that "where a number of charges are logically and/or temporally related and share common issues of law and fact, a single criminal episode exists, and separate trials would involve substantial duplication and waste of scarce judicial resources. Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 485, 458 A.2d 177, 183 (1983). It is true that the two events, the shooting and the disorderly conduct, were fairly close together in time and proximity, but we find that the events can be entirely separated concerning issues of fact and law. The events do not concern the same legal issues; one deals with a crime against a single person and the possession of a weapon while the other deals with a crime against public order. Moreover, the factual bases for the offenses are clearly distinct. Furthermore, we disagree with the defendant's second argument that the second criminal proceeding violates the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and the Pennsylvania Constitutions because it is a second prosecution for the same offense. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has very recently reaffirmed that the proper test for determining whether a prosecution is the "same offense" for double jeopardy analysis, is the "same-elements" test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See Commonwealth v. Caufman, __ Pa. __, 662 A.2d 1050 (1995). "The same-elements test, sometimes referred to as the Blockburger test, inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the 'same offense' and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution..."In this case it is abundantly clear that disorderly conduct involves elements not included in the charges in this case, and likewise the charges in this case involve elements 3 97-1740 CRIMINAL different from those constituting disorderly conduct. For the foregoing reasons, we filed our order of January 15, 1998, denying the defendant's motion to dismiss this case as a successive prosecution. May 7' ,1998 M. L. Ebert, Jr., Esquire District Attorney Timothy Clawges, Esquire Assistant District Attorney :rlm 4