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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-2466 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. DEAN WILLIAM CHESTNUT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-2466 CRIMINAL IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION ORDER AND NOW, this ~ ~ day of June, 1998, the omnibus pretrial motion of the defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. Office of District Attomey Patrick F. Lauer, Jr., Esquire For the Defendant BY THE COURT, Kevin A. Hess, J. :rim COMMONWEALTH VS. DEAN WILLIAM CHESTNUT IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-2466 CRIMINAL IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION OPINION AND ORDER This is a case in which the defendant, Dean William Chestnut, has been charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, a' violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3731. The defendant has moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of defendant's arrest, arguing that the arresting officer lacked sufficient probable cause to place the defendant under arrest for driving under the influence. The facts of the case reveal that sometime after 9:00 PM on August 21, 1997, the defendant was involved in a motorcycle accident on Route 944 between Routes 34 and 74. There were no other vehicles involved in the accident. A short while later one Jill Gaito, who was driving home on Route 944 westbound between Routes 34 and 74, observed the defendant staggering along the roadway. When it appeared to Ms. Gaito that the defendant had been in an accident she called 911. The arresting officer, Officer Peterson, responded and found the defendant along Route 944. The defendant had in fact been involved in an accident while operating his motorcycle. The defendant appeared to Officer Peterson to be coherent, he did not slur his speech, and he knew his driver's license number by heart. The defendant informed Officer Peterson that the accident occurred when a deer ran in front of the defendant's motorcycle. 97-2466 CRIMINAL Officer Peterson then noted that the defendant had injured his shoulder, possibly dislocating it, and offered to call an ambulance. The defendant stated that he did not want medical attention, however Officer Peterson summoned an ambulance anyway in light of the defendant's visible injuries and Officer Peterson's concern for other possible unseen injuries. Officer Peterson also observed that the defendant staggered when he walked, that the defendant's eyes were bloodshot, and that there was a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the defendant. Officer Peterson did not at this time conduct any HGN tests, field sobriety tests, or preliminary alcohol tests. Officer Peterson concluded, in light of his observations of the defendant's behavior and appearance, that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and incapable of operating a motor vehicle in a safe manner. When the ambulance arrived Officer Peterson placed the defendant under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendant offers the following arguments to support his motion: 1) that Officer Peterson did not use the defendant's inability to walk as a basis for his probable cause determination because Officer Peterson attributed the stagger to the defendant's injuries; 2) that Officer Peterson failed to determine the exact cause of the defendant's bloodshot eyes, making that element of the defendant's appearance inconclusive; 3) that Officer Peterson did not use the accident as a basis for his probable cause determination because he never challenged the defendant's indication that the accident was caused by a deer in the road; 4) defendant's speech was not slurred; 5) that officer Peterson failed to administer field sobriety tests that he was qualified to administer, and therefore did not have those results to serve as a basis for probable cause; 6) and finally that Officer Peterson's sole basis for probable cause was the odor of an 2 97-2466 CRIMINAL alcoholic beverage emanating from the defendant, which by itself is insufficient to support an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. While there may be merit to these arguments individually, the defendant fails to realize that we must take cognizance of the totality of the circumstances. The statute defining driving under the influence of alcohol provides in pertinent part: Section 3731. Driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance (a) Offense defined. --A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of any vehicle: (1) while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving; (c) Certain arrests authorized.-- In addition to any other powers of arrest, a police officer is hereby authorized to arrest without a warrant any person who the officer has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of this section, regardless of whether the alleged violation was committed in the presence of such officer. 75 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3731. The Pennsylvania Superior court has held that, for the purpose of determining the legality of an arrest under this section, the terms."probable cause" and "reasonable grounds" are used interchangeably. Com. v. Ciefi, 346 Pa. Super. 77, 87, 499 A.2d 317, 322 (1985). As the court noted in Com. v. Welshans., 397 Pa. Super. 439, 580 A.2d 379 (1990): This court has upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless search and seizure under § 1547(a)(1), interpreting the requirement that the officer have 97-2466 CRIMINAL "reasonable grounds" in the belief that the driver was driving under the influence as requiring that the officer have "probable cause" to believe that the driver was under the influence. Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa. Super. 363,388, 324 A.2d 452, 466 (1975). Probable cause exists where the officer has knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that the driver has been driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Commonwealth v. Smith, 382 Pa. Super. 288,555 A.2d 185 (1989) (probable cause existed where defendant smelled of alcohol, had glassy bloodshot eyes). See also Commonwealth v. Hipp, 380 Pa. Super. 345, 551 A.2d 1086 (1988) (probable cause existed where appellant had strong odor of alcohol on his breath); Commonwealth v. Haynos, 363 Pa. Super. 1,525 A.2d 394 (1987) (probable cause existed where arresting officer observed defendant in one-car accident and defendant smelled of alcohol), allocatur denied, 517 Pa. 605,536 A.2d 1329 (1987). Id__~. at 443,444, 580 A.2d at 380-81. In Com. v. Guerry the court also looked at the basis that the arresting officer used to make an arrest without a warrant. Com. v. Guerry, 469 Pa. 20, 364 A.2d 700 (1976). The court found that probable cause, or reasonable grounds, was sufficient when "the arresting officer knew the circumstances of the accident, that [the defendant] admitted that he was driving at the time of the accident, that the [officer] noticed a strong odor of alcohol on [the defendant's] breath.., as well as glassy and bloodshot eyes." Guerry at 21,364 A.2d at 703. "Based on this knowledge, the arresting officer had sufficient probable cause to believe that [the defendant] was operating his motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the accident." Id at 21,364 A.2d at 703. 4 97-2466 CRIMINAL In the present case, Officer Peterson observed the defendant stagger when he walked, that the defendant had glassy eyes, and that there was a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the defendant. Officer Peterson also knew that the defendant had been in a one vehicle accident and that the defendant had refused medical treatment in spite of his obvious injuries. All of these circumstances clearly add up to sufficient probable cause, or reasonable grounds, to arrest the defendant. AND NOW, this ORDER day of June, 1998, the omnibus pretrial motion of the defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. Office of District Attorney Patrick F. Lauer, Jr., Esquire For the Defendant :rlm BY THE COURT, Kevi~/A. Hess, J.