Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-2355 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. MARY JANE HODGE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-2355 CRIMINAL IN RE: DEFENDANT'S POSTTRIAL MOTION BEFORE HESS, J. ORDER AND NOW, this Z "day of July, 1998, the posttfial motions of the defendant are DENIED. Travis Gery, Esquire Senior Assistant District Attorney James K. Jones, Esquire For the Defendant :rim BY THE COURT, COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : VS. : 97~2355 CRIMINAL : MARY JANE HOD~3E : IN RE: DEFENDANT'S POSTTRIAL MOTION BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER The events giving rise to the above captioned charge occured on July 16th, 1997. Trooper Gordon, a state police officer working undercover investigating drug trafficking, on that date was motioned over to the curb by the defendant Mary Jane Hodge. Trooper Gordon was operating an umnarked vehicle. Trooper Gordon then purchased three rocks of crack cocaine from the defendant at a cost of fifty dollars. Trooper Gordon later identified the defendant from a photo array at the Carlisle barracks. At trial, Trooper Gordon again identified the defendant as the individual from whom he purchased the crack cocaine. The defendant was found guilty, by a jury, of delivering cocaine and conspiracy. The defendant's posttrial motion raises two issues: 1) Was the jury's verdict against the weight of the evidence, requiring the granting of a new trial by this court; and 2) was the trial court's decision not to specifically instruct the jury as to the weight that should be given to a police officer's testimony an error that requires that the defendant be granted a new trial? First we address whether the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We are satisfied that it was not. The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial on 97-2355 CRIMINAL the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is solely in the trial court's discretion, so long as that discretion is not abused. Com. v. La, 433 Pa. Super. 432, 461,640 A.2d 1336, 1351 (1994). The standard for granting a new trial requires that the evidence must be "so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court." Com. v. L._~a at 461,460 A.2d at 1351 (quoting Com. v. Edwards, 399 Pa. Super. 545, 554, 582 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1990), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 640, 600 A.2d 1258 (1991)). When the sole issue is the credibility of a witness, the trier of fact retains the discretion to make the determination with respect to that credibility. Com. v. Rochon, 398 Pa. Super. 494, 504, 581 A.2d 239, 244 (1990). In the instant case, the jury chose to accept.Trooper Gordon's testimony. We find nothing of concern in that. Trooper Gordon positively identified the defendant both in court and immediately following the encounter with the defendant. These identifications were supported further by the corroborating testimony of at least two Carlisle police officers. At trial those officers offered testimony that they had observed the defendant on the same street comer in the clothes described by Trooper Gordon on July 16th, 1997, shortly after Trooper Gordon's transaction with her. Clearly, the verdict in this case was not against the weight of the evidence. The second issue that the defendant raises is whether the court should have included a specific instruction regarding the weight that jurors should give testimony offered by police officers. The defendant contends that the court should have instructed the jury that the testimony of a police officer is to be given no more or less weight than any other witness simply because the witness is a police officer. In her proposed jury instruction No.3, the defendant relies on Com. v. Gay for authority. However, in that case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it 2 97-2355 CRIMINAL was not error to give the instruction, not that there was a requirement to do so. Com. v. Gay, 489 Pa. 17, 413 A.2d 675,678 (1980). The trial court in Gay had stated that the jury had no right to defacto credit or discredit a police officer's testimony based solely on the fact that the witness was a police officer. Com. v. Gay at 17, 413 A.2d at 678. The Supreme Court agreed that this was a correct statement of the law despit, e the defendant's objection. Id~ at 17, 413 A.2d at 678. What is at issue in this case is whether our decision to not specifically instruct the jury in this manner was an abuse of discretion. We believe that it was not. The Commonwealth's case was based to a great extent on Trooper Gordon's testimony. The defendant had ample opportunity at trial to question the trooper's credibility. Furthermore, the court did instruct the jury on the issue of the credibility of witnesses generally. The instruction given directed the jury to evaluate the testimony offered by all witnesses according to several criteria. These, taken as a whole, were more than sufficient to allow the jury to reach its own conclusions regarding the credibililty of the witnesses at trial, including police office~s. ORDER AND NOW, this Z~ay of July,'1998, the posttrial motions of the defendant are DENIED. BY THE COURT, 3 97-2355 CRIMINAL Travis Gery, Esquire Senior Assistant District Attorney James K. Jones, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm 4