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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-0207 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. : FRANKIE DONALD RELEFORD : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 98-0207 CRIMINAL IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE AND NOW, this defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is GRANTED BY THE COURT, :rlm NATURE OF A MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE HESS, J. ORDER John H. Broujos, Esquire For the Defendant day of August, 1998, the omnibus pretrial motion of the Travis Gery, Esquire Assistant District Attorney COMMONWEALTH VS. FRANKIE DONALD RELEFORD : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 98-0207 CRIMINAL IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION OF DEFENDANT IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER This is a case in which the defendant, Frankie Releford, has been charged with possession of a firearm without a license, a violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 6106. The defendant has moved to suppress all evidence obtained following a legal traffic stop, arguing that the arresting officer unlawfully detained him after the stop was completed. The defendant argues that, because the consent to search the defendant's car was given while he was unlawfully detained, the consent was invalid and evidence subsequently seized should be suppressed. We find the following to be'the facts of the case. Sometime after 5PM on January 19, 1998, the defendant was stopped on Interstate 81 by Trooper Rudy for traveling in excess of a posted speed limit. After receiving the defendant's licence and registration, and after ascertaining that they were valid and that there were no outstanding warrants against the defendant, Tpr. Rudy approached the defendant, returned the documents to him, and stated that "the traffic stop is complete." Sometime prior to Tpr. Rudy's returning the defendant's documents, a second officer, Tpr. Walbridge, arrived on the scene. Immediately following Tpr. Rudy's statement to the defendant regarding the traffic stop, Tpr. Rudy proceeded to question the defendant, first asking the defendant if he would mind answering a few questions. The defendant 98-0207 CRIMINAL agreed, after which Tpr. Rudy informed the defendant that I-81 was a common passage for drug trafficking. Tpr. Rudy then asked the defendant if he had any drugs in the car. The defendant responded that he did not, after which Tpr. Rudy requested consent to search the car. The defendant agreed to the search, and Tpr. Rudy then asked the defendant to step out of his car and to stand in front of the patrol car. At this point Tpr. Walbridge stood next to the defendant while Tpr. Rudy entered the defendant's car from the driver's side. Then, realizing that the defendant had not signed a consent form, Tpr. Rudy exited the defendant's vehicle without conducting a search and retrieved a consent form from his patrol car. The defendant signed the "consent to search" form under the observation of both troopers. Tpr. Rudy then proceeded to search the defendant's car. While searching the trunk Tpr. Rudy discovered over $19,000 in cash, at which point Tpr. Rudy asked Tpr. Walbridge to handcuff the defendant, thus taking him into custody. After this Tpr. Rudy continued to search the car, discovering a 9 mm handgun. Defendant was then taken to the State Police Barracks and was preliminarily arraigned sometime around 1 OPM. The relevant statute in this case is 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 6106: Section 6106. Firearms not to be carded without a license (a) Offense defined. -- No person shall carry a firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a license therefore as provided in this subchapter. The defendant argues that the questioning by Tpr. Rudy following the completion of the traffic stop gave rise to an unlawful detention, and because the "consent to search" form was 2 98-0207 CRIMINAL signed by the defendant during this unlawful detention, the consent given can not be viewed as valid. The defendant also submits that when the defendant was handcuffed following the discovery of the $19,000 that this was in fact an arrest, that the mere discovery of cash was not sufficient cause to place the defendant under arrest, and thus the arrest was unlawful. The defendant contends further that following his arrest any consent that may have existed expired, and that the subsequent search was incident to an unlawful an'est. The first issue is whether the arrest of the defendant was in fact lawful. At the time the defendant was handcuffed the only suspicious item the search of the car had produced was the $19,000 in cash. Upon discovery of the cash, Tpr. Rudy instructed Tpr. Walbridge to handcuff At this point, the defendant was under arrest using the standard stated in Com. v. the defendant. White: We have defined an arrest as any act that indicates an intention to take the person into custody and subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest..." Com. v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 54, 669 A.2d 896, 901 (1995) (quoting .Com. v. Duncan, 514 Pa. 395, 400, 525 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1987)). Clearly, the defendant was placed under arrest upon discovery of the $19,000 and only on that basis, as this was the only evidence of any kind that had been recovered as a result of Tpr. Rudy's search. However, the discovery of cash alone, regardless of how suspicious it may seem, is not sufficient evidence of a crime to place a person under arrest. Com. v. Marshall~ 548 Pa. 495,698 A.2d 576, 577 (1997). In that case, the court found that not only was the discovery of cash insufficient to give rise to an arrest, it was also 98-0207 CRIMINAL insufficient to allow the Commonwealth to enforce a civil forfeiture of discovered funds without a "nexus between the [cash] and some type of drug activity." Marshall at 496, 698 A.2d at 579. Therefore, we must conclude that at the time the defendant was handcuffed he was unlawfully arrested. The next question, therefore, is whether the continued search of the defendant's car was pursuant to the "consent to search" form that the defendant had signed or was, instead, performed incident to the defendant's unlawful arrest. We are satisfied that the continued search of the car following the arrest of the defendant, without his renewed consent, in light of the drastically changed circumstances, was not lawful. In Commonwealth v. Paredes-Rosaria, the Superior Court upheld a consent given after arrest but noted: In Com. v. White, 543 Pa. 45,669 A.2d 896 (1995), our high court held that police may not conduct a warrantless search of an automobile after its occupants have been arrested and are in police custody without the presence of exigent circumstances and probable cause. It is reasonable to say that [the defendant] was not free to leave, and he was subject to the control of the officers on the scene, once he came out of the vehicle to speak to [the officer]. Had he attempted to leave, it seems likely that he would have been restrained... (emphasis added) Com. v. Paredes-Rosaria, Pa. Super. ,700 A.2d 1296, 1299 (1997). In the instant case, the defendant was in custody and no exigent circumstances or probable cause existed. Thus, the continued search of the car without a warrant was unlawful. The above conclusions essentially end our inquiry. We, nonetheless, briefly address the 98-0207 CRIMINAL question of whether the "consent to search" form was signed while the defendant was unlawfully detained, therefore rendering it invalid. The issue of whether a consensual encounter is in fact a seizure has been addressed several times by the courts of this Commonwealth. In Commonwealth v. Helm, the Superior Court 'stated: It is well settled that police may have a mere encounter with an individual at any time, and are not required to have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot unless the nature of the encounter escalates to the level of an investigatory stop. Com. v. Jackson, 428 Pa. Super. 246, 630 A.2d 1231 (1993), allocatur denied, 537 Pa. 647, 644 A.2d 733 (1994) (emphasis added). Com. v. Helm, 456 Pa. Super. 370, 375, 690 A.2d 739, 742 (1997). Thus, when the defendant is detained beyond a completed traffic stop there exists a need for reasonable suspicion in order to conduct an investigatory stop. Id._~. The essential distinction, in turn, between a mere encounter and an investigatory stop is whether the defendant felt free to leave. This distinction, or standard, is again viewed in light of the totality ot/ the circumstances confronting the defendant. Commonwealth v. Hoak, 700 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Super. 1997). In Hoak, the court, quoting the United States Supreme Court in U.S.v. Mendenhall,-446 U.S. 544, 555, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), stated: Individuals had been seized only if there is an objective reason to believe they are not free to end their conversation with police and proceed on their way. 5 98-0207 CRIMINAL Hoak at 1271. "The crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.'" Id__~. at __, 700 A.2d at 1272 (quoting Florida v. Bostwick, 501 U.S. 429, 11 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)). Hoak was a case in which the defendant had been issued a traffic warning and was then told that he was free to leave. In this case, unlike Hoak, the defendant was stopped and was issued a citation. Another police officer was then summoned to the scene. Thereafter, the defendant was told only that the "traffic stop" was "complete." Despite reference to the fact that the traffic stop was "complete," a discussion concerning the search of the defendant's automobile ensued. The officers' indirectness and obscurity of speech and conduct raise considerable doubt that the defendant understood that his earlier detention had now reverted to a mere encounter. In fact, it is disingenuous to suggest that a reasonable person, under these circumstances, would have felt free to leave. ORDER AND NOW, this ? ,-/' · day of August, 1998, the omnibus pretrial motion of the defendant in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is GRANTED. BY THE COURT, 98-0207 CRIMINAL Travis Gery, Esquire Assistant District Attorney John H. Broujos, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm 7