HomeMy WebLinkAbout95-0380 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH
VS.
JOHN BAKER
IN T~_.~:COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF .
CUM_B_ERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
,~ ..
95-0380 CRIMINAL
IN RE: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
BEFORE HESS, J.
ORDER
AND NOW, this :2 ~' v day of September, 1998, the petition of the
defendant for post-conviction relief is DENIED.
BY THE COURT,
Jaime Keating, Esquire
Sr. Assistant District Attomey
Darrell C. Dethlefs, Esquire
Court-appointed for Defendant
Ky Hess, J.
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COMMONWEALTH
· IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
· CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
vs. ' 95-0380 CRIMINAL
JOHN BAKER ·
IN RE: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
BEFORE HESS, J.
OPINION AND ORDER
This Post-Conviction Relief Act (P.C.R.A.) proceeding arises from defendant John
Baker's September 16, 1995 conviction for delivery, manufacture or possession with intent to
deliver a schedule II controlled substance. The conviction resulted, among other things, from the
seizure of a large quantity of cocaine from an outside storage closet at a home occupied by the
defendant. The trial was without a jury.
The petitioner raises two separate issues, both pertaining to the effectiveness of counsel:
1) that petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel opened the
door to the precluded evidence of petitioner's previous controlled narcotics purchases, and 2) that
petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to present a
defense.
The pertinent portion of 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 9543 states that the petitioner is entitled to
post-conviction relief if "...the conviction or sentence resulted from ... [i]neffective assistance of
counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." 42 Pa.C.S.A.
Section 9543 (2) (ii). According to statute, in order to be eligible for relief a petitioner must
show that 1) he is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, 2) the conviction of sentence
95-0380 CRIMINAL
resulted from one of the enumerated grounds for relief, 3) the allegation of error has not been
previously litigated or waived, and 4) the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial could
not have been the result of any rational, strategical, technical decision by counsel. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
Section 9543 (a).
Petitioner raises two assertions under the P.C.R.A. of ineffective assistance of counsel.
We are satisfied that they fail to meet the standard set forth in the P.C.R.A. and reiterated in
Commonwealth v. Collins:
In the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
defendant must prove that the underlying issue has arguable merit,
that counsel had no reasonable basis for the decision, and that
counsel's error prejudiced the defendant and so undermined the
truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place.
Commonwealth v. Collins, 546 Pa. 616, 687 A.2d 1112, 1113 (1996).
Petitioner's first assertion is that trial counsel, by opening the door to evidence regarding
controlled buys, denied petitioner effective assistance of counsel. In an agreement prior to trial,
defense counsel and the Commonwealth agreed to exclude evidence of previous controlled
narcotics buys by affiant Detective Fones from the petitioner. However, at trial, petitioner's
counsel asked Detective Fones if he had any other information that led Detective Fones to
believe that the cocaine discovered in the shed was the petitioner's, eliciting a response regarding
the controlled buys. This information was'not used, however, to determine the petitioner's guilt.
The reference to controlled buys was fleeting. There was no-indication as to the identity of the
person from whom such buys were made. Clearly, this evidence was of no probative value and,
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95-0380 CRIMINAL
as such, its existence was ignored.
Of interest is the fact that the Superior Court, in upholding
the conviction in this case, made no reference to drug buys in its summary of what the court
described as a "veritable cornucopia" of evidence linking the defendant to the cocaine.
Furthermore, this court presumptively is able to disregard inadmissable evidence. The
Pennsylvania Superior court recently stated that "when the court is sitting as fact-finder it
presumptively is capable of disregarding inadmissable evidence and considering only relevant
and Competent evidence." Commonwealth v. Neal, __ Pa. Super __, 713 A.2d 657 at 662
(1998). Given that this court ignored the evidence of the controlled buys, it cannot be said that
the petitioner's claim has arguable merit. It is also clear that the partial mention of the controlled
buys did not "so undermine the truth determining process [so] that no reliable adjudication of
guilt or innocence could ... take place." Collins, 546 Pa. at 616, 687 A.2d at 1113.
Petitioner's second assertion is that by failing to present a defense at trial his trial counsel
denied him effective assistance of counsel. We agree with the Commonwealth in its treatment of
this issue in its brief.
In order for a defendant to establish that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to present
witnesses he must establish that 1) the witness
existed, 2) the witness was available to testify, 3)
counsel was informed of the existence of the
witnesses or should have known of the witnesses
existence, 4) the witnesses were available and
prepared to cooperate and would have testified on
petitioner's behalf and 5) the absence of the
testimony prejudiced the petitioner. -
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 415 Pa. Super. 65, 608
A.2d 528 (1992). In this regard, the defendant
claims that the trial attorney should have called
95-0380 CRIMINAL
Terra Bunch to testify that ~ was on the lease and
that other people had acce~ the storage closet.
However, such facts were elicited through the
Commonwealth's case. There was no need to put
on any witnesses in order to do that. At the time of
trial, Mr. Harker testified that he did not want to call
Terra Bunch as a witness because he was not certain
that she would tell the truth. In fact, he had testified
that she had given him several different stories as to
the contents of that locker. Likewise, the defendant
has produced no evidence that his "nephew" was
available and prepared to cooperate on the
defendant's behalf. However, it cannot be claimed
that absent the nephew's testimony, there was no
evidence that other people had access to the storage
shed in light of the housing authority
superintendent's testimony that other people had
access to the storage shed. Thus, the defendant has
failed to show any prejudice by failing to present
this evidence.
Commonwealth's Memorandum of Law, pp. 3-4.
A review of the record in this case makes it clear that the defendant was ably represented
in the trial of this case and that, at no time, was the truth-determining process undermined in any
way. Thus, we enter an order denying the request of the defendant for post-conviction relief.
ORDER
AND NOW, this
day of September, 1998, the petition of the
defendant for post-conviction relief is DENIED.
BY THE COURT,
4
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s, ,1.
95-0380 CRIMINAL
Jaime Keating, Esquire
Sr. Assistant District Attorney
Darrell C. Dethlefs, Esquire
Court-appointed for Defendant
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