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HomeMy WebLinkAbout98-0960 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. RANDAL RAEUCHLE AND NOW, this GUILTY. Jaime M. Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attomey Thomas R. Miller, Esquire For the Defendant :rim IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 98~0960 CRIMINAL CHARGE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY: ANIMALS AT LARGE AFFIANT: PTL. TRACY KING IN RE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY BEFORE HESS, J. ORDER day of October, 1998, we find the defendant NOT BY THE COURT, es , . COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : vs. : 98-0960 CRIMINAL : CHARGE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY: : ANIMALS AT LARGE RANDAL RAEUCHLE : AFFIANT: PTL. TRACY KING IN RE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER On March 30, 1998, the defendant, Dr. Randal Raeuchle, was cited for permitting his dog, Champ, to run at large upon the public streets in violation of New Cumberland Ordinance No. 391-1. On May 5, 1998, a hearing was held in the office of the district justice, and the defendant was found guilty. After an appeal, we conducted a hearing at which the following facts were adduced. The defendant is eighty-three years old and due to various medical conditions, including a hearing problem and heart problem, utilizes a service dog, Champ. Champ is an eight-year-old German Shepard trained to respond to voice and hand commands, and specifically to alert the defendant to door bells, telephones, horns and oncoming vehicles and to summon attention in the event that the defendant were to need help due to his heart condition. In order to exercise Champ, Dr. Raeuchle regularly allows him to walk beside or in front of the defendant's car as it travels down the street at a slow pace. This takes place in a residential neighborhood. On the morning of March 29, 1998, the defendant had let Champ out of the car and allowed him to run along side of the car on the sidewalk. At one point in the walk, a car positioned behind the defendant's vehicle blew his horn to signal that he wanted to go around the 98-0960 CRIMINAL defendant's vehicle. The defendant directed Champ to sit on the left side of the car in the street so that the defendant could fully see and control the dog while the motorist passed the defendant's stopped car. The dog then moved to the other side of the curb, but stopped and sat when commanded by the defendant in order to allow other cars to pass between the defendant's car and Champ. After this last incident, the defendant was approached by a New Cumberland police officer and cited for a violation of Ordinance 391-1. Section 1 of New Cumberland Ordinance No. 391 states as follows: No dog, cat or other domesticated animal or any non-domesticated animal shall be suffered or permitted to run at large in this borough either upon the public streets or highways or upon property other than the owner of such dog, cat or other animal. Therefore, this case turns on the issue of whether the defendant permitted Champ to run at large. The application of the term "at large" to the facts will, of course, determine the outcome of this case. Black's Law Dictionary defines "at large" as "[n]ot limited to any particular.place, district, person, matter, or question; .... Free; unrestrained; not under corporal control; as a ferocious animal so free from restraint as to be liable to do mischief." Black's Law Dictionary __ (6th ed. 1990). Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "at large" as "an animal wandering, roving or rambling at will and unrestrained." Ballentine's Law Dictionary __ (3d ed. 1969). Case law defining "at large" is very limited, but one county case has specifically addressed this term. In it Judge Gates of Lebanon County applied the Dog Law of December 22, 1965, P.L. 2 98-0960 CRIMINAL 1124, to a situation involving a dog which was both a family pet and working farm animal. The dog had been observed in the highway which bisected the defendant's farm. In the case of Com. v. Heller, Judge Gates essentially adopted Ballentine's definition by stating that "running at large" meant "an animal wandering, roving, or rambling at will and unrestrained." 45 D. & C.2d 41, 44 (1968). He went on to hold that, because the dog was subject to control by the owner, even by voice, it was not "at large." We believe that Champ was always under the control of the defendant on the day in question. The testimony at trial was undisputed that the dog responded immediately whenever the defendant gave a command. A leash was not necessary in order to exercise reasonable control over the dog. It is clear that Champ was under the defendant's immediate control and was, therefore, not "at large." There are, of course, options open to the borough to draft an ordinance which will address In the meantime, we decline to interpret the existing ordinance to mean that which its concerns. it does not. AND NOW, this GUILTY. ORDER day of October, 1998, we find the defendant NOT BY THE COURT, 98-0960 CRIMINAL Jaime M. Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Thomas R. Miller, Esquire For the Defendant :rim