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HomeMy WebLinkAbout96-1745 CivilMICHAEL J. MEENAN, Plaintiff VS. CLEMENT D. ALLSHOUSE, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 96-1745 CIVIL JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. ORDER AND NOW, this z z.~ for summary judgment is DENIED. day of December, 1998, the motion of the defendant BY THE COURT, James J. Kayer, Esquire For the Plaintiff Richard H. Wix, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm MICHAEL J. MEENAN, Plaintiff VS. CLEMENT D. ALLSHOUSE, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 96-1745 CIVIL JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER This matter arises out of a motor vehicle accident on October 6, 1994. The plaintiff, Michael J. Meenan, had a limited tort coverage policy. Under that policy, the plaintiff is precluded from recovering non-economic damages unless there is "a personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement." 75 Pa.C.S. Sec. 1702. The defendant, Clement D. Allshouse, has filed for summary judgment, claiming that this court should determine that the plaintiff's injuries do not reach the threshold of serious injury as a matter of law. The standard for summary judgment was clearly stated recently in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Baxter: In examining this matter, as with all summary judgment cases, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issues of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Pennsylvania State University v. County. of Centre, 532 Pa. 142, 615 A.2d 303 (Pa. 1992). In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party "must adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and an which he bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor. Failure to adduce this evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 96-1745 CIVIL as a matter of law." Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 674 A.2d 1038, 1042 (Pa. 1996). Finally, we stress that summary judgment will be granted only in those cases which are free and clear from doubt. Marks v. Tasman, 527 Pa. 132, 589 A.2d 205 (1991). Washington v. Baxter, 1998 WL 751456 (Pa. 1998). We apply this standard to the case at bar. In limited tort cases such as this one, the question is whether the plaintiff's injuries are of a nature that under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (hereafter "MVFRL") the plaintiff can recover non-economic damages. In the past this has been referred to as the "serious injury threshold." Dodson v. Elvey, 445 Pa. Super. 479, 665 A.2d 1223. The defendant, in moving for summary judgment, relies on the Superior Court's reasoning in Dodson v. Elvey. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently addressed the Dodson. decision in Washington v. Baxter and rejected much of the Dodson reasoning. Washington v. Baxter, 1998 WL 751456 (Pa. 1998). The Washington decision analyzed the history of the MVFRL and its intent. Washington at 5. The court examined whether the legislature intended to leave the "serious injury" determination to the trial judge as a matter of law or to a jury as a question of fact. Id at 6. The court looked at two attempts by the legislature to include as part of the statute's language a provision that would have made the serious injury determination a matter of law, and concluded that "both houses of the General Assembly considered making the issue of whether there had been a serious injury a purely legal determination which could be resolved only by a trial court, and specifically rejected placing such a requirement into Act 6." Id at 6. The court decided, given that the legislature flatly rejected making the determination a matter of law, that the 96-1745 CIVIL decision should be "left to a jury unless reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of whether serious injury had been sustained." Id at 6. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in no uncertain terms that "the ultimate determination should be made by the jury in all but the clearest of cases." Id at 6. The court then defined what constituted a serious bodily injury: The "serious impairment of body function" threshold contains two inquiries: a) What bodily function, if any, was impaired because of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident? b) Was the impairment of the body function serious? The focus of these inquiries is not on the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected a particular body function. Generally, medical testimony will be needed to establish the existence, extent, and permanency of the impairment .... In determining whether the impairment was serious, several factors should be considered: the extent of the impairment, the length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant factors. An impairment need not be permanent to be serious. Id at 6. Viewing the facts in light of the Washington standard, and viewing those same facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we find that the defendant's motion for summary judgment lacks merit. Using the definition of serious permanent injury stated in ~, we find that this case is not clear enough to determine the question as a matter of law. The plaintiff contends that he suffered serious injury to his neck, shoulder, arm and head. Although the plaintiff, prior to the accident, was collecting disability and not employed, he was leading what could be considered an active lifestyle including archery, lifting weights and chores 96-1745 CIVIL around his house. The plaintiff has offered testimony that these activities have been affected to some extent since the accident. Furthermore, the plaintiff has offered medical testimony that he will have to change his lifestyle to accommodate those injuries. In light of this, we believe there remains an issue of material fact that must, as a matter of law, be left for a finder of fact to decide and, therefore, deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment. ORDER AND NOW, this :' ~' ~d day of December, 1998, the motion of the defendant for summary judgment is DENIED. James J. Kayer, Esquire For the Plaintiff Richard H. Wix, Esquire For the Defendant BY THE COURT, ¢~H;ss, J~.~ :rim 4