Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout354 S 2007 ELLEN M. COLEMAN, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : CIVIL ACTION -LAW V. : : SCOTT M. COLEMAN, : DOCKET NO. 00354 S 2007 Defendant : PACSES NO. 246109153 ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW , this 28 day of May, 2008, upon consideration of Petitioner’s Exceptions to the Support Master’s Report and Recommendations, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED thatthe Exceptions of DISMISSED Ellen M. Coleman are . BY THE COURT, M.L. Ebert, Jr. J. Michael R. Rundle, Esquire Support Master Ellen M. Coleman Pro Se Plaintiff 779 Erford Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Barbara Sumple-Sullivan, Esquire Attorney for Defendant 549 Bridge Street New Cumberland, PA 17070 ELLEN M. COLEMAN, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : : CIVIL ACTION -LAW V. : : SCOTT M. COLEMAN, : DOCKET NO. 00354 S 2007 Defendant : PACSES NO. 246109153 IN RE: EXCEPTIONS TO SUPPORT MASTER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BEFORE EBERT, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Ebert, J., May 28, 2008 - In this child support case, Petitioner Ellen M. Coleman filed written exceptions to the August 8, 2007, Final Order of the Court, Report and Recommendations. A hearing was held before the Support Master and an Interim Order was entered based on the Master’s Report and Recommendations. For the reasons stated in this opinion, Petitioner’s exceptions to the Master’s Report and Recommendations are dismissed. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On May 10, 2007, Plaintiff, Ellen M. Coleman, filed for child support and spousal support. Subsequently, on June 13, 2007, an initial Support Order in the amount of $1,331.08 per month was entered by the Conference Officer against Defendant, Scott N. Coleman, for the support of Tyler R. Coleman (born January 12, 1994), Drew M. Coleman (born May 15, 1997), and Samantha N. Coleman (born October 13, 1999). Defendant was also made responsible for providing health insurance and paying 67% of 2 unreimbursed medical expenses incurred by the children as defined by Pa. R.C.P 1910.16-6 (c). Plaintiff was responsible for the first $250.00 in unreimbursed medical expenses for each child annually and 33% thereafter. Defendant contested any spousal support entitlement based upon the adultery committed by the Plaintiff during the marriage, which continued through the parties’ separation. Plaintiff withdrew her claim for spousal support at the initial conference. At this time, no award has been entered for spousal support. Defendant then filed a timely request for a de novo hearing regarding the initial Support Order of June 13, 2007. Defendant challenged his liability for child support for Drew and Samantha based upon information he had received that they may not be his biological children. Genetic testing was demanded. On August 7, 2007, a de novo hearing was held before the Support Master. Subsequently, on August 8, 2007, the Support Master entered his Report and Recommendations requiring Drew and Samantha to appear for genetic testing to confirm the paternity of the children. On August 27, 2007, Plaintiff timely filed exceptions to the Support Master’s Report and Recommendations. On November 16, 2007, an Order was entered denying Plaintiff’s Exceptions and allowing the genetic testing provided for in the August 8, 2007, Order of Court. On December 18, 2007, genetic testing took place. On December 21, 2007, genetic test results confirmed that Defendant was excluded as the natural father of Plaintiff’s two children, Drew and Samantha. The Support Master’s Report and Recommendations required Defendant to pay child support for the parties’ only natural child, Tyler M. Coleman, in the amount of $727.00 per month. Additionally, Defendant 3 was responsible for providing health insurance for Tyler and paying 66.5% of unreimbursed medical expenses incurred for him as defined by Pa. R.C.P 1910.16-6 (c). Plaintiff was responsible for the first $250.00 in unreimbursed medical expenses for Tyler annually and 33.5% thereafter. This order was made effective May 10, 2007. Due to the inclusion of Plaintiff’s other two children in the prior order, Defendant had a large credit. The monthly award was reduced to $600.00 per month until the credit was extinguished. On January 18, 2008, Plaintiff timely filed exceptions to the Support Master’s Report and Recommendation asking for relief based on a theory of “estoppel.” STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 12, 1992, and separated May 4, 2007. Their separation was the result of Defendant’s discovery of an extra- marital affair between Plaintiff and Randy Rager. It is admitted that Mr. Randy Rager is not the putative father of the children that are the subject of this action. There is no dispute that the parties’ first born child, Tyler, is the biological son of Defendant and that Defendant is responsible for child support for this child. There is also no dispute as to the parties’ income and the amount of support owed by Defendant. It is clear that for support purposes Plaintiff’s monthly income is $1,405.51 and Defendant’s net monthly income is $2,791.19. Defendant provides for the children’s medical insurance at no cost. There is a tuition expense for the three children of $7,800.00 per year and a uniform expense of $400.00 per year. Additionally, upon the parties’ stipulation, an order was entered on June 13, 2007, that support for the children would be $1,331.08 per month. 4 It has been confirmed that Drew and Samantha are not Defendant’s natural children. Defendant had acted as the children’s father since their birth and always believed all three children were his natural children. Plaintiff and Defendant were having sexual relations during the time of both conceptions. In April 2007, the affair between Plaintiff and Mr. Rager became know. Soon after this disclosure, another man, Scott Fingerhoot, approached Defendant and told him that Drew and Samantha may not be Defendant’s children. Mr. Fingerhoot had been a family friend of the Plaintiff and had lived with the parties for almost eleven years during the marriage. Defendant questioned Plaintiff regarding any affair she may have had with Mr. Fingerhoot. Plaintiff denied any extramarital relations. Defendant presented credible testimony by Scott Fingerhoot that a sexual relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Fingerhoot had taken place during most of the parties’ marriage. Fingerhoot testified that he and Plaintiff were having sexual relations at the time that the children, Drew and Samantha, were conceived. Plaintiff told Fingerhoot that he was the natural Father of Drew and Samantha. In addition, Plaintiff sent Father’s Day cards to Fingerhoot from these children. Fingerhoot further testified that once they determined that she was pregnant by him, Plaintiff told Fingerhoot that she would have to (and did have) sexual relations with Defendant so he would not question whether the child conceived was his. Plaintiff has now timely filed exceptions to the Support Master’s Report and Recommendations. Plaintiff’s claimed exceptions are stated as follows: A. The Support for Drew and Samantha Coleman should not be dismissed due to the fact that Mr. Coleman does indeed intend to seek Custody of these two children because their biological father does not intend to or cannot afford to file for custody of these children. 5 B. The support for Drew and Samantha Coleman should not be dismissed because Mr. Coleman intends to use these children as his own for all other purposes except support. C. The support for Drew and Samantha Coleman should not be dismissed due to the fact that there would be a significant difference in the support amounts and the children would suffer financially. D. The support for Drew and Samantha should not be dismissed because the children may not be able to attend Private School and the cost would not be the same. The children have attended Private School since Kindergarten and would suffer greatly if they could not attend Private School in the future. E. The support for Drew and Samantha Coleman should not be dismissed because they will have no insurance coverage and the would need to switch doctor’s offices if they were to use state medical coverage due to the fact that the children’s doctor does not accept state medical coverage. The children have been cared for by this doctor’s office since their date of birth. F. The support of Drew and Samantha Coleman should not be dismissed because Mr. Coleman refuses to sign off on the birth certificates still acknowledging that he wants to be the father of these children except for support issues. G. The support of Drew and Samantha Coleman should not be dismissed because of biological origins. The case in whole should be taken into careful consideration that Mr. Coleman has filed for custody to remain as the children’s father but wishes not to provide financial support as a father. If Mr. Coleman intends to file for custody and remain in the role as their father in that aspect then support should also be assigned to Mr. Coleman as their “father” regardless of biological origins. H. The support of Drew and Samantha Coleman should not be dismissed due to the fact that the children have started counseling services and will be unable to continue to receive these much needed service because he children will have no insurance if support is dismissed and the counseling group does not accept state funded medical insurance. I. If Mr. Coleman wishes to remain in the role as father and not to care about biological origins for other purposes then he should remain responsible to support these children financially no matter if he is their biological father or not. The fact that he is not their biological father should not be an issue since he has supported and remain as the children’s father for the last 10 years and 8 years. 6 Plaintiff’s Letter of Exceptions to Support Master’s Ruling and Recommendations, filed 1/18/2008. DISCUSSION First, we note that in matters involving paternity, this Court must first determine if the presumption of paternity applies. See N.C. v. M.H., 923 A.2d 499 (2007). In Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176 (Pa. 1997), the Court set forth the analysis required to determine the paternity of a child conceived or born during marriage: “The essential legal analysis in these cases is twofold: first, one considers whether the presumption of paternity applies to a particular case. If it does, one then considers whether the presumption has been rebutted. Second, if the presumption has been rebutted or is inapplicable, one then questions whether estoppel applies. Estoppel may bar either a plaintiff from making the claim or a defendant from denying paternity. If the presumption has been rebutted or does not apply, and if the facts of the case include estoppel evidence, such evidence must be considered.” Id. at 180. Initially, in the case at hand there is a presumption of paternity. All three of the Coleman children were born during the marriage of the Plaintiff and Defendant. Significantly, Drew M. Coleman (born May 15, 1997), and Samantha N. Coleman (born October 13, 1999) were conceived and born during the course of the marriage. However, we note that the policy underlying the presumption of paternity is the preservation of marriage, and the presumption only applies in cases where that policy would be advanced by the application. See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (1999). When there is no intact marriage that can be preserved, the presumption of paternity is 7 inapplicable. N.C. v. M.H, 923 A.2d 499 (2007); citing Fish v Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (1999). The parties separated on May 4, 2007, and there is no chance of reconciliation. Defendant has filed for a divorce. See Scott M. Coleman v. Ellen M. Coleman, Docket No. 07-3331. Plaintiff filed an Affidavit of Consent to the divorce and a Waiver of Notice to Request Entry of Divorce Decree on November 1, 2007. Here, there is no intact family or marriage to preserve; hence, the presumption of paternity is not applicable.Accordingly, we must determine whether the estoppel doctrine applies, which depends upon the particular facts of each case. Gebler v. Gatti, 895 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super. 2006). The doctrine of paternity by estoppel is merely the legal determination that because of a persons’ conduct, that person regardless of his true biological status, will not be permitted to deny parentage. Dipaolo v. Cugini, 811 A.2d 1053 (Pa.Super. 2002). Paternity by estoppel “is based on the public policy that children should be secure in knowing who their parents are,” Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180 and, as such, it is designed to protect the best interests of minor children. See Fish, 741 A.2d at 724. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[I]f a certain person has acted as the parent and bonded with the child, the child should not be required to suffer the potentially damaging trauma that may come from being told that the father he has known all his life is not in fact his father.” See Brinkley Supra. As noted, Defendant, having no reason to believe otherwise, held Drew M. Coleman (born May 15, 1997), and Samantha N. Coleman (born October 13, 1999) out as his own children, from their births until genetic testing excluded him as the father in December 8 2007. Here, Defendant argues that the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable because Plaintiff’s fraudulent conduct was the basis for his treating the two children as his own. “When allegations of fraud arise in a paternity action, an estoppel analysis must proceed in a different manner than it would without such averments.” McConnell v. Berkheimer, 781 A.2d 206, 211 (Pa.Super.2001). Evidence of fraud “must be considered by the trial court in whether to apply paternity by estoppel.” Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1284 (Pa.Super.2003) (quoting Sekol v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d 405, 410 (Pa.Super.2000)). The test for fraud is: (1) misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance, (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient will thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation, and (5) damage to the recipient as a proximate result. Sekol, 763 A.2d at 411. After a thorough review of the record this court holds that the evidence is sufficient to establish fraud on the part of the Plaintiff and subsequently invalidate the estoppel. In April 2007 when Defendant became aware of the affair, he questioned Plaintiff regarding any affair she may have had with Mr. Fingerhoot. Plaintiff denied same. Defendant then presented credible testimony by Scott Fingerhoot that a sexual relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Fingerhoot had taken place during most of the parties’ marriage. Fingerhoot testified that he and Plaintiff were having sexual relations at the time that the children, Drew and Samantha, were conceived. Plaintiff told Fingerhoot that he was the natural father of Drew and Samantha. In addition, Plaintiff sent Father’s Day cards to Fingerhoot from these children. Fingerhoot further testified that once they determined that she was pregnant by him, Plaintiff told Fingerhoot that she would have to (and did 9 have) sexual relations with Defendant so he would not question whether the child conceived was his. Close examination of the Plaintiff’s exceptions reveals her attempt to alter the legal focus of this case from her fraud and deception to the negative impact upon the children if Defendant does not pay support and speculation about the Defendant’s future actions in regard to custody of these children. These things are simply not relevant at this time. Plaintiff’s proven fraud and deception negates her use of estoppel. Defendant is not the biological father of these children and therefore has no obligation to support them at this time. In reality, it is Plaintiff’s own bad conduct which has created the negative consequences for her children. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that Defendant, as an interested third party, under the legal theory of in loco parentis may indeed be eligible to obtain custody of these children. Plaintiff’s past bad conduct, the relationship of the two children with sibling Tyler, (the only child conceived by Plaintiff and Defendant), Father’s stability, and the wishes of the children may all impact on a custody decision. These matters, however, are not before the Court at this time and are irrelevant to the conclusion that Plaintiff is not entitled to establish Defendant’s paternity by estoppel. CONCLUSION Based on the evidence, it is apparent that Plaintiff committed fraud by her misrepresentation. She uttered the misrepresentation to the Defendant with the intent that the Defendant would be induced to act as if the children were his. Defendant justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation, and as a proximate result was damaged. Therefore, the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable. Accordingly, the following order will be entered: 10 ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW , this 28 day of May, 2008, upon consideration of Petitioner’s Exceptions to the Support Master’s Report and Recommendations, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED thatthe Exceptions of DISMISSED Ellen M. Coleman are . BY THE COURT, M.L. Ebert, Jr. J. Michael R. Rundle, Esquire Support Master Ellen M. Coleman Pro Se Plaintiff 779 Erford Road Camp Hill, PA 17011 Barbara Sumple-Sullivan, Esquire Attorney for Defendant 549 Bridge Street New Cumberland, PA 17070 11