Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-0624 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH V. MICHAEL VRAIM OTN: E906575-5 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-0624 CRIMINAL TERM CHARGE: (1) DUI (2) DUS (3) DRIVING VEHICLE AT SAFE SPEED (4) PURCH, CONSUMP, POSS, OR TRANSP OF MALT OR BREWED BEV IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~day of February, 1998, after careful consideration of Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a motion to suppress, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant's motion is GRANTED and all evidence obtained following Defendant's detention by an officer of the Shippensburg University Police Department is SUPPRESSED. BY THE COURT, Wiiliam I. Gabig, Esq. Assistant District Attorney H. Anthony Adams, Esq. Assistant Public Defender COMMONWEALTH V. MICHAEL VRAIM OTN: E906575-5 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-0624 CRIMINAL TERM CHARGE: (1) DUI (2) DUS (3) DRIVING VEHICLE AT SAFE SPEED (4) PURCH, CONSUMP, POSS, OR TRANSP OF MALT OR BREWED BEV IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT Oler, J., February 9, 1998. In the present criminal case, Defendant is charged with driving under the influence and various other related offenses. For disposition at this time is Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a Motion To Suppress. A hearing on this matter was held on October 21, 1997. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the following Findings of Fact, Discussion, and Order of Court are made and entered. FINDINGS OF FACT At all times pertinent to the present case, Officer Stephanie Berger worked as a police officer for the Shippensburg University Police Department.~ She had worked in this capacity for over five years.2 Shippensburg University is in Shippensburg Township, Cumberland County.3 On the night of February 15, 1997, and the N.T. 4. Id. N.T. 26. morning of February 16, 1997, Officer Berger was on patrol on the grounds and in the vicinity of Shippensburg University.4 Officer Berger was on duty, in uniform, and was driving a Shippensburg University police car.~ Officer Berger did not carry weapons.6 As part of her patrol duties, Officer Berger drove to a storage building owned by the university which was not connected to the main university grounds. The storage building was located on Fogelsanger Road in Cumberland County.? Shippensburg University police have jurisdiction over the storage building.8 Fogelsanger Road is a public highway.9 At approximately 4:05 a.m. Officer Berger saw a 1988 Chevrolet sedan~° approximately five feet off the left side of Fogelsanger Road.~ The car was located in Southampton Township, Cumberland County.~2 Southampton Township is not within the jurisdiction of the Shippensburg University Police; it is within the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania State Police.~3 The vehicle was completely off 4 N.T. 4. ~ N.T. 4-5. 6 N.T. 22. 7 N.T. 5. 8 N.T. 6. 9 N.T. 5-6. ~0 N.T. 5, 13. ~ N.T. 7. ~2 N.T. 12, 26. ~3 N.T. 12. the road, pointed in a direction against traffic.TM Its left front tire was flat.~ Officer Berger testified that she saw Defendant Michael Vraim in the car in the driver's seat.~6 A passenger was standing outside the car.~? According to Officer Berger, Defendant was attempting to back up the car, but could not go anywhere because of the flat tire.~8 Officer Berger stopped her car on the opposite side of the road. She turned her lights on to warn oncoming traffic that her car was parked on the road.~9 Officer Berger exited her vehicle and went over to Defendant's vehicle to determine whether anyone was injured.2° Officer Berger asked Defendant if he was "OK.''2~ Defendant indicated to her that he was "OK."22 At this time the officer "smelled alcohol" on Defendant's breath.23 Officer Berger also noted that Defendant's eyes were glassy and red.24 N.T. 8. Id. Id. Id. N.T. 11. N.T. 9, 13. 20 N.T. 9-10. N.T. 10. Id. N.T. 11. N.T. 24. Defendant testified that his car had just gone off the road before Officer Berger arrived.2s He testified that his left front tire had gone flat on a turn, causing his car to cross the center line of Folgelsanger road and stop on the soft-dirt shoulder of the road on the opposite side.26 Defendant testified that he told Officer Berger that he. was going to change his tire and leave.~7 Defendant had a spare tire in his trunk.~8 Officer Berger told Defendant that he could not change his tire and that he must stay with his vehicle and wait.~9 Defendant also asked Officer Berger if he was allowed to walk to his house, which was located within walking distance.3° Officer Berger told Defendant that he could not walk home and that he must stay with his vehicle and wait until the state police arrived.3~ Officer Scott Wolfe of the Mid Cumberland Valley Regional Police Department regularly monitored the university police channels.~2 Defendant testified that Officer Wolfe arrived on the scene approximately five to ten minutes after Officer Berger told 2s N.T. 33. 26 N.T. 35. 27 N.T. 30. 28 N.T. 32. 29 N.T. 30. 3o Id. 3~ N.T. 20-21, 30. 32 N.T. 11. 4 Defendant that he must wait in his car.33 The Mid Cumberland Valley Regional Police have jurisdiction over the Borough of Shippensburg and Shippensburg Township.34 Southampton Township was not within Officer Wolfe's jurisdiction.3s Officer Wolfe was in uniform and was driving a marked police car.36 Officer Wolfe carried a weapon and had it on.~7 Officer Wolfe parked his car directly in front of the Defendant's car; however, Officer Berger did not believe he was blocking Defendant's vehicle in.TM Officer Wolfe activated the lights on his patrol car when he stopped.~9 Defendant testified that he asked Officer Wolfe if he could change his tire or walk home.4° Officer Wolfe told Defendant that he must wait in his car until the state police arrived.4~ Both officers stayed with Defendant at the scene. The officers waited outside their patrol cars and Defendant and his passenger waited inside Defendant's car.42 Officer Berger did not take out her handcuffs or take ~ N.T. 31. ~4 N.T. 19. ~s N.T. 12. ~6 N.T. 21. 37 N.T. 22. 38 N.T. 21. ~ Id. 40 N.T. 31. 4~ N.T. 14, 16, 18, 20, 31. 42 N.T. 16. 5 Defendant's keys.43 She did not recall whether Officer Wolfe took Defendant's keys.4" Officer Berger did not conduct an investigation at the scene, nor did she make any measurements.~s She did not call any medical personnel or fire companies to the scene.~6 Officer Wolfe called the state police to assist.~7 The state police arrived at the scene twenty-three minutes later, at 4:28 a.m.48 At this point, Trooper Todd J. Rudy of the Pennsylvania State Police assumed command. Defendant was arrested by the state police for driving under the influence and a variety of other offenses.49 Trooper Rudy, assigned to Troop H in Carlisle,so had been a state trooper for approximately five years,s~ Officer Berger left the scene when Defendant was taken into custody by Trooper Rudy.s2 When Trooper Rudy arrived, Defendant and his passenger were in Defendant's car and Officers Berger and Wolfe were standing outside ~3 N.T. 15. ~ Id. ,s N.T. 23. ~ Id. "7 N.T. 12. ~8 N.T. 13-14, 25. "9 N.T. 14. s0 N.T. 25. ~ Id. s2 N.T. 14. 6 their patrol cars.s3 Both patrol cars had their emergency lights on.54 Officer Berger informed Trooper Rudy of the situation and Trooper Rudy began his investigation,ss Another trooper, by the name of Yunk, assisted Trooper Rudy with the investigation,s6 Defendant contends that Officer Berger's actions in detaining him constituted an illegal exercise of police authority beyond Officer Berger's territorial boundaries and that all evidence resulting from Defendant's detention must therefore be suppressed. DISCUSSION In a suppression hearing, the Commonwealth has the burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion. Pa. R. Crim. P. 323(h). The standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth ex. rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968). Following the hearing, the court is directed to "enter on the record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant's rights, or in violation of these rules or any statute and ... make an order granting or denying the relief sought." Pa. R. Crim. P. 323(i). An interaction between a citizen and a police officer may be classified as a mere encounter, an investigative detention, or an arrest (custodial detention). Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285, N.T. 26. N.T. 29. N.T. 27. Id. 7 293-94, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (1995). A mere encounter is simply a request for information. It does not have to be "supported by any level of suspicion [and] carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond." Id. An investigative detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion, while an arrest or custodial detention must be supported by probable cause. Id. at 294, 662 A.2d at 1047. During an investigative detention, a suspect must stop and submit to a period of detention. Id. An investigative detention involves a lesser degree of coercion than an arrest or custodial detention,s7 Id. This case does not involve a mere encounter. Officer Berger was in uniform and was driving a marked police car which had its lights activated. She told Defendant that he was not free to leave and that he had to wait with his car until the state police arrived. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person in Defendant's position would not have felt free to leave the scene. Therefore, Defendant was subjected to a state of detention as opposed to a mere encounter. Based upon an examination of the law as it applies to the jurisdiction of campus police officers, the court is constrained to s7 Among the factors generally considered in determining wh~ther an investigative detention or an arrest has occurred are: the basis for the detention (the crime suspected and the grounds for suspicion); the duration of the detention (public or private); whether the suspect was transported against his will (how far, why); the method of detention; the show, threat, or use of force; and, the investigative methods used to confirm or dispel suspicions." Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa. 337, 356-57, 549 A.2d 1323, 1332 (1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 601, 562 A.2d 824 (1989). 8 conclude that Officer Berger did not have the authority to detain Defendant under the circumstances of this case. The authority of campus police officers is set forth in the Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, ~ 2416, as amended, 71 P.S. ~ 646.s8 Campus police may exercise their powers off-campus only within the municipality in which the school is located and only "in emergency situations occurring within [that] municipality, upon the request of the mayor or other executive authority and under the direction of the local law enforcement authorities." Id.,71 P.S. ~ 646(h). In this case, Officer Berger exercised her authority as a police officer off-campus in the absence of any request from municipal authorities that she respond to an emergency situation. The court is unable to escape the conclusion that, in detaining Defendant, Officer Berger exceeded her statutory authority. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has approved suppression of evidence in cases with fact patterns similar to that of the instant case. In Commonwealth v. Bienstock, 449 Pa. Super. 299, 673 A.2d 952 (1996), a Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement Officer was on duty in an unmarked car when he observed a motorist driving erratically. The officer activated his siren and stopped the motorist. After finding the motorist to be incoherent, the officer radioed the Pennsylvania State police for assistance. The State s8 The Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. ~ 8951 et seq., provides that under six specific circumstances municipal police officers are permitted to act beyond the territorial limits of their primary jurisdiction. However, the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act is inapplicable to campus police. See Commonwealth v. Savage, 403 Pa. Super. 446, 589 A.2d 696, appeal dismissed, 529 Pa. 633, 600 A.2d 953 (1991). Police arrived at the scene, administered field sobriety tests, and arrested the motorist. The Superior Court noted that Liquor Control Enforcement Officers are not statutorily authorized to stop individuals for traffic violations. The Superior Court held that, because the officer "was acting under color of state law, without the authority to stop [the motorist] for a traffic violation, the initial stop by [the officer] was illegal making the subsequent arrest by [a state trooper] fatally flawed." Id. at 304, 673 A.2d at 955. The Superior Court reasoned that, if the officer had not acted beyond his statutory authority, the motorist would not have been stopped, and the subsequent arrest by the state trooper would not have occurred. Therefore, the Court held that suppression was appropriate, notwithstanding an otherwise lawful arrest by the state trooper, due to the illegal stop. In Commonwealth v. Savage, 403 Pa. Super. 446, 589 A.2d 696, appeal dismissed, 529 Pa. 633, 600 A.2d 953 (1991), an on-duty campus police officer observed a pick-up truck run a red light at an intersection located off-campus and proceed the wrong way down a one-way street which was also located off-campus. The officer left the campus and entered the municipality adjoining the campus in order to pursue the pick-up truck. During the pursuit, the piqk-up truck stopped and the driver fled on foot. The officer apprehended a person he found hiding in the bushes near the pick-up truck, and arrested him for driving under the influence. Noting that the officer had exercised police powers off- campus, in an adjoining municipality in a non-emergency situation, 10 and that an executive authority of the municipality had not requested the officer's help and the officer was not under the direction of municipal law enforcement authorities, the Superior Court found "that the conduct of ... [the] campus police officer, was a true substantive violation of 71 P.S. ~646." Id. at 454, 589 A.2d at 700. Therefore, the Superior Court determined that suppression of the evidence was the appropriate remedy. The Superior Court reasoned that, "[h]ad the officer complied with the ... statutory mandate, [the defendant] would never had been stopped and arrested and was, therefore, truly prejudiced by the noncompliance." Id. Additionally, the Superior Court noted that "[a]n opposite result ... would, in effect, grant a license to campus police officers to patrol the surrounding municipalities without invitation and in usurpation of the powers of municipal police. This [a court] cannot do, as such ruling would be in clear violation of 71 P.S. ~646(h)." Id. at 454-55, 589 A.2d at 700. The Commonwealth Court has reached a similar conclusion as to the extent of authority of a campus police officer. In Horton v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 694 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. 1997), a campus police officer observed a motorist commit a traffic offense on a public street not within the officer's primary jurisdiction. The officer stopped the motorist. After observing the motorist's demeanor and detecting the odor of alcohol on his breath, the officer arrested the motorist for driving under the influence. Noting with approval the reasoning of Savage, the Commonwealth Court found that the officer's actions in Horton were 11 not authorized pursuant to 71 P.S. ~646. In the instant case, the court is constrained to conclude that Officer Berger exceeded her statutory authority when she detained Defendant and refused to allow him to leave the scene. If Officer Berger had not detained Defendant, the subsequent arrest by Trooper Rudy would not have occurred. Based on the foregoing discussion, the evidence following the detention must be suppressed. Based on the foregoing, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 9th day of February, 1998, after careful consideration of Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a motion to suppress, following a hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, Defendant's motion is GRANTED, and all evidence obtained following Defendant's detention by an officer of the Shippensburg University Police Department is SUPPRESSED. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. William I. Gabig, Esq. Assistant District Attorney H. Anthony Adams, Esq. Assistant Public Defender 12