Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout91-1610 CivilRICHARD A. JAMESON, Plaintiff Ve MARGARET A. JAMESON, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 1610 CIVIL 1991 IN DIVORCE OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 Oler, J., February 10, 1998. This was an equitable distribution case in which a claim was also raised for counsel fees, costs and expenses on behalf of the Defendant. Plaintiff, Richard A. Jameson, Esq., is appealing the adjudication of the court, contending that the court erred (1) by incorrectly valuing certain marital assets, (2) by not granting Plaintiff a credit for certain alleged tax obligations, and (3) by awarding Defendant a judgment note from Plaintiff in the amount of $142,247.79.~ Defendant, Margaret A. Jameson (now Smith), is .cross- appealing, contending that the court erred in failing to award her an interest in Plaintiff's law practice or the proceeds of litigation related to the Exxon-Valdez incident in which Plaintiff was professionally involved prior to the date of separation.2 Defendant also contends that the court erred in not awarding her 3 counsel fees, costs and expenses. ~ Plaintiff's Statement of Reasons Complained of on Appeal. 2 Cross-Appellant's Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, paragraph 1. 3 Id., paragraph 2. NO. 1610 CIVIL 1991 This opinion, supplementing an earlier opinion,4 and confined to those issues, is written pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). DISCUSSION Trial in this financially complex case was held October 27, 1995, February 21, 1996, February 23, 1996, February 26, 1996, July 22, 1996, July 24, 1996, and July 29, 1996. By way of preface, it may be noted that, when equitably dividing a marital estate, a court must use its discretion and rely on the evidence presented by the parties at trial. Smith v. Smith, 439 Pa. Super. 283, 297, 653 A.2d 1259, 1265-66, appeal denied, 541 Pa. 641, 663 A.2d 693 (1995). In this case, evidence presented at trial included 981 pages of testimony, contained in seven volumes. Additionally, a large number of exhibits were presented at the trial, most of which were entered into the record without significant elaboration. Under ideal conditions, in an equitable distribution case, the most contemporary information as to valuation of assets would be available to the court. In this case, much of the testimony and other evidence presented at trial related to the date of separation and not to the date of trial. The court, therefore, exercised its best judgment in valuing the marital assets and attempted to provide the most equitable distribution which it could based on the 4 The opinion September 15, 1997. accompanying the adjudication was dated NO. 1610 CIVIL 1991 evidence presented at trial. This meant that, when it was possible, the court considered the value of assets as of the date of trial. However, where the evidence was deficient in regard to the value of a particular asset at the time of trial, the court was constrained to use the date of separation as its reference point for valuation. The court has written an extensive opinion, dated September 15, 1997, on the distribution of the marital estate in this case and incorporates this opinion by reference herein. Breaux Investments Regarding the valuation of Breaux Investments, Plaintiff asserts that the court erred due to (1) a failure to value the asset as close to the date of distribution as possible, (2) a failure to take into account market conditions in determining the value of the asset, and (3) a failure to take into consideration losses Plaintiff sustained in connection with the asset and expenses incurred in covering those losses,s According to 6 Plaintiff, this marital asset should have been valued at zero; additionally, Plaintiff contends that he should have been given a credit for money he invested in the asset.7 5 Section I, paragraph 14. 6 Id., paragraph 13. ~ Id. Plaintiff's Statement of Reasons Complained of on Appeal, 3 NO. 1610 CIVIL 1991 In its adjudication, the court valued Breaux Investments as close to the date of distribution as the evidence allowed. At trial, the court was presented with evidence that Breaux Investments had owned three assets as of the date of the parties' separation. Evidence presented indicated that Breaux Investments received proceeds from the sale of two of those assets. Evidence was also presented regarding the appraisal and disposition in bankruptcy of the third asset. Utilizing the evidence presented at trial, and taking into consideration a mortgagee's judgment lien against the third asset, the court calculated the value of Plaintiff's fifty percent share of Breaux Investments based on the post-separation disposition of the assets which the partnership had held at the date of separation.8 Considering the nature of the evidence presented, the court was of the view that this was the most equitable method for placing a value upon this particular marital asset. The Annuities Regarding the valuation of the several annuities involved herein, Plaintiff maintains that the court erred in "finding these annuities, or the remainder portion thereof, to be marital property due to the nature of the structure of the instruments."9 8 See Opinion of Court, dated September 15, 1997, at 23-25. 9 Plaintiff's Statement of Reasons Complained of on Appeal, Section II, paragraph 2(D). 4 NO. 1610 CIVIL 1991 Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the court erred by valuing the annuities as of the date of separation and failing to grant Plaintiff a credit for providing money for his daughter's college education and for buying his daughter an automobile.~° First, the court notes that marital property includes "all property acquired by either party during the marriage, including the increase in value, prior to the date of final separation, of any nonmarital property acquired [prior to marriage or by gift, bequest, devise or descent]." Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1240, ~2, 23 Pa. C.S. § 3501(a). The annuities were, in accordance with the evidence presented, clearly marital property. Second, as to the valuation of the annuities, the only testimony presented at trial regarding the calculation of the present value of the annuities was that given by C. Edward Rogers, Jr., a certified public accountant.~ The court was, therefore, led to use his calculations in valuing the annuities. "When one party offers uncontradicted evidence of the value of a particular marital asset, [the court] may adopt that value even if the resulting valuation would have been different if more accurate and complete evidence ha~ been presented." Smith v. Smith, 439 Pa. Super. 283, 299, 653 A.2d 1259, 1267, appeal denied, 541 Pa. 641, 663 A.2d 693 (1995). ~0 Plaintiff's Statement of Reasons Complained of on Appeal, Section II, paragraph 2(A), (B). Opinion of Court, dated September 15, 1997, at 27-28. 5 NO. 1610 CIVIL 1991 In addition, the court was not persuaded that Plaintiff's contributions to the college education of his daughter or contributions to the purchase of a car for her should have been credited to him in the equitable distribution portion of the case. Any personal contributions which Plaintiff chose to make to his daughter were simply not pertinent to the equitable division of marital property between Plaintiff and Defendant. The court further notes that it calculated the share of the annuities which was to be distributed to Defendant as of July 1, 1997.~2 SRW Cable Regarding the valuation of SRW Cable, Plaintiff asserts that the court erred due to (1) a failure to value the asset at a date closest to distribution, (2) a failure to consider testimony of market value, and (3) an imposition upon Plaintiff alone of responsibility for assumption of the loss incurred on this investment.~3 In valuing SRW, the court felt that the only credible evidence concerning this asset which was presented at trial indicated that the value of this investment was $50,000.~4 In valuing marital property, the court "is free to believe all, part, or mone of the evidence" presented. Smith v. Smith, 439 Pa. Super. ~2 Opinion of Court, dated September 15, 1997, at 39. ~3 Plaintiff's Statement of Reasons Complained of on Appeal, Section III, paragraph 6. ~4 Opinion of Court, dated September 15, 1997, at 22-23. 6 NO. 1610 CIVIL 1991 283, 293, 653 A.2d 1259, 1264, appeal denied, 541 Pa. 641, 663 A.2d 693 (1995) (quoting Fonzi v. Fonzi, 430 Pa. Super. 95, 99-100, 633 A.2d 634, 636-37 [1993]). The court further notes that Plaintiff has indicated his willingness to let the $50,000 value of SRW stand if the court awards SRW to Defendant instead of to him.~5 Reese and Stevens Notes Regarding the Reese and Stevens notes Plaintiff asserts that the court erred in valuing the notes because it failed "to consider that demand on said notes had in fact been made and the debt disputed.''~6 Plaintiff, however, did not present evidence to support this allegation at trial; the evidence which was presented at trial, in fact, indicated that Plaintiff had failed to make any demand on these notes. Furthermore, the court notes that Plaintiff has requested that the Reese and Stevens notes be awarded to Defendant at the valuation set by the court, along with various other marital assets that Plaintiff claims are valueless, in lieu of the equalization note which the court awarded Defendant. Taxes Regarding taxes, Plaintiff argues that he should have received a credit of $82,157 due to an alleged obligation of $38,784 which ~5 Plaintiff's Statement of Reasons Complained of on Appeal, Section VI, paragraph 5(d)(1). ~6 Plaintiff's Statement of Reasons Complained of on Appeal, Section V, paragraph 1. NO. 1610 CIVIL 1991 he incurred in relation to his ownership of Richard A. Jameson, P.C., and an alleged obligation of $43,373 incurred in relation to an investment in VMS National Residential Portfolio, One, Limited Partnership.~7 The Pennsylvania legislature has indicated that the court is to "equitably divide, distribute or assign ... the marital property between the parties ... in such proportions and in such manner as the [c]ourt deems just after considering all relevant factors .... " Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1240, ~ 2, 23 Pa. C.S. ~ 3502(a). One of the factors which the court is to consider is the "economic circumstances of each party, including Federal, State, and local tax ramifications, at the time the division of property is to become effective." 23 Pa. C.S. ~ 3502(a)(10). As instructed by the legislature, the court took into consideration the tax consequences to Plaintiff of the investments which he made during the marriage when determining the distribution of the marital property.~8 ~7 Plaintiff's Statement of Reasons Complained of on Appeal, Section IV, Paragraph 1. Opinion of Court, dated September 15, 1997, at 37. NO. 1610 CIVIL 1991 Payment to Ms. Jameson of $142,247.79 in a Judqment Note Plaintiff maintains that, in awarding Defendant a note from Plaintiff for $142,247.79, the court failed to consider Plaintiff's ability to pay, his current circumstances, and other alternatives. Initially, the court notes that the award to Defendant was meant to provide for a fair distribution between the parties. The size of the award was due to the fact that Plaintiff had the majority of marital assets in his control following the separation. In the interests of fairness, the court felt that Defendant should be awarded her share of the marital estate in a form which would allow her to most easily utilize the award as she preferred and would allow her to receive the share with as little delay as possible. The court felt that the best method to accomplish this goal was through the award of a $142,247.79 note. Moreover, the record established that Plaintiff had ample sources of income at his disposal.~9 Plaintiff receives substantial income from his law practice. Additionally, Plaintiff receives income from various investment and business ventures as well as certain rental properties which he owns. The court was cognizant ~9 See Opinion, dated September 22, 1997. The record in the parties' divorce trial was combined with the record in the parties' child support case. The court's opinion in the support case detailed Plaintiff's various sources of income; no appeal was taken by either party from the support order. 9 NO. 1610 CIVIL 1991 of Plaintiff's ability to pay the award and his current economic circumstances when it awarded Defendant a portion of her equitable share of the marital estate in this form. Plaintiff's Law Practice and Exxon-Valdez Fees Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to award her an interest in Plaintiff's law practice or the proceeds of litigation related to the Exxon-Valdez with which Plaintiff was involved prior to the date of separation. This issue was, in the court's view, discussed in sufficient detail in its opinion dated September 15, 1997, as to warrant no further treatment.2° Counsel Fees, Costs and Expenses Defendant asserts that the court erred in not awarding her counsel fees, costs and expenses. Again, the issues was, in the court's view, discussed in sufficient depth in its opinion dated September 15, 1997, as to require no further discussion herein.2~ Kenneth A. Wise, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Richard C. Snelbaker, Esq. Attorney for Defendant : rc Opinion, dated September 15, 1997, at 39-41. Opinion, dated September 15, 1997, at 42-43. 10