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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-6119 CivilDAVID WEIMER, Plaintiff Vo FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY; GEORGE HARTMAN; CHRISTINE BARTON; and CHRISTY LENGYEL, Defendants · IN THE COURT OF COMMONPLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY,, pENN.S..YLVANIA · CIVIL ACTION -- LAW · No. 97-6119 CIVIL TERM IN RE: pRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY AND GEORGE HARTMAN TO PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS and OLER, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 15th day of September, 1998, upon consideration of the preliminary objections of Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman to Plaintiffs' amended complaint, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, it is ordered and directed as follows: 1. Defendants' deumurrers to Count III ("prima facie tort"), Count IV (breach of "covenant of good faith and fair dealing"), and Count V (wrongful discharge) are sustained, and those counts are dismissed to the extent that they relate to either Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company or Defendant George Hartman. 2. Defendants' remaining preliminary objections are dismissed. BY THE COURT, J~C/esley Ole~.;J. '(./ ' Keith E. Kendall, Esq. 3207 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorney for Plaintiff David E. Stem, Esq. Building 640 350 Sentry Parkway Blue Bell, PA 19422 Attorney for Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman Gloriana Noreika, Esq. 138 East Market Street P.O. Box 2588 York, PA 17405 Attorney for Defendant Christine Barton Timothy I. Mark, Esq. Sixth Floor 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 999 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Attorney for Defendant Christy Lengyel DAVID WEIMER, Plaintiff FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY; GEORGE HARTMAN; CHRISTINE BARTON; and CHRISTY LENGYEL, Defendants · IN THE COURT OF COMMONPLEAS OF · CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA · CIVIL ACTION -- LAW · No. 97-6119 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY AND GEORGE HARTMAN TO PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., HESS and OLER, JJ. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT OLER, J., September 15, 1998. In this civil case, Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully discharged from his employment following the publication of defamatory statements suggesting that he was involved in a scheme to financially defraud his employer. Causes of action advanced against various defendants are libel, tortious interference with contractual relations, "prima facie tort," breach of a covenant of "good faith and fair dealing," and wrongful discharge. Preliminary objections in the nature of demurrers have been filed with respect to Plaintiff's amended complaint by Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company (Plaintiff's alleged employer) and Defendant George Hartman (Plaintiff's alleged supervisor or superior). For the reasons stated in this opinion, the preliminary objections will be sustained in part and dismissed in part. STATEMENT OF FACTS The pertinent facts alleged in Plaintiff's amended complaint may be summarized as follows: Plaintiff is David Weimer, a resident of Mechanicsburg, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania) Defendants are Ford Mot6r Credit Company (FMCC), a corporation with a business address in Mechanicsburg, Cu~berland County, PeflnSylvania,2 .'George Hartman, a residsnt of"'MechariicsburgT'Cu-mbe~and~C-~Uhty~-~P~nns3/lvania?~Ghrisfine .Barton,_ a .......... resident of Minersville, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania,4 and Christy Lengyel, an individual of unknown residence? Plaintiff was employed by Defendant FMCC on August 16, 1971;6 he was, at least initially, an at-will employee.7 He remained with Plaintiff for 26 years, until his termination, s At some point during this employment, Defendant Hartman, "who was an agent and servant of Defendant FMCC,''9 received written statements from Defendants Barton and Lengyel alleging that Plaintiff was involved in a scheme to financially defraud Defendant FMCC.1° On the basis of these allegations, Defendants FMCC and Hartman terminated Plaintiff's employment on August 22, 1997. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, paragraph 1. Id., paragraph 2(a). Id., paragraph 2(b). Id., paragraph 2(c). Id., paragraph 2(d). Id., paragraphs 3-4. See id., paragraph 41. Id., paragraph 4. Id., paragraph 16. lo Id., paragraph 28. ~ Id., paragraphs 3-4. De~ndant Hartman "voluntarily published ... and/or solicited" these statements~2' "with knOWledge that the statements were false, ~iid/~it with reckless -indifference to their falsity, and with'nO ihvesfigation of~he truthx~r~aecuracy.of the ~statements,~3 ~Defe~dant~ ~.~ ...... Hartman terminated Plaintiff "with the intent to injure Plaintiff ... and without justification for his actions?4 Defendant FMCC also "failed or refused to investigate the falsity of the statements?5 Count I of Plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for libel against all four defendants, and alleges that the defamatory information was false,ia Count II of Plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations against Defendants Barton and Lengyel. Count III of Plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for "prima facie tort"against Defendants FMCC and Hartman, and alleges that Defendant Hartman terminated Plaintiff to injure him and that Defendant FMCC was legally responsible for Defendant Hartman's actions.17 Count IV of Plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for "breach of [al covenant of good faith and fair dealing." This claim is brought against Defendant FMCC, and asserts that "[a] duty [on the part of Defendant and Plaintiff] to deal with each other in good faith resulted from Plaintiff's 26-year employment contract with Defendant FMCC?8 Count V of Plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for wrongful discharge against ~z Id., paragraph 11. ~3 Id., paragraph 13. ~4 Id., paragraph 29. ~5 Id., paragraph 14. ~6 Id., paragraph 8. ~7 Id., paragraphs 29-30. ~8 Id., paragraph 34. Defendant FMCC. This count is based' upon the premise that an otherwise ~at-will emPloym~'fit- may not be terminated cofi~f~-~ry tO'public policy,-and thatsuch '~undet-~the-~present circumstances contra, v~ned ~pubtic~ti~y~'by~epri~ing~aintiff~of constitutionally-protected right of reputation? Plaintiff asserts that he has "suffered a substantial loss of income and the benefits flowing from his employment from Defendant FMCC.''~° He requests compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants' preliminary objections read as follows, in pertinent part: The Civil Action is legally insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain any cause of action against [Defendants FMCC and Hartman] The Civil Action, as a matter of law, cannot be amended to state any cause of action against [Defendants FMCC and Hartman] [Plaintiff has] alleged that Defendant, George Hartman, is an agent and/or employee of Ford Credit .... All of the allegations in [Plaintiff's] Civil Action relate to Plaintiff, David Weimer's, discharge as an employee of Ford Credit [Plaintiff has] failed to allege the nature of David Weimer's alleged "contract" of employment with Ford Credit .... [Plaintiff has] not alleged any specific public policy basis for precluding David Weimer's discharge as an employee at will .... [Plaintiff has] alleged that Ford Credit and/or Hartman participated in defamatory conduct in the nature of "libel" [Plaintiff's] Civil Action fails to allege the necessary ~9 Id., paragraphs 40-43. According to Plaintiff, the right to protection of one's reputation is found in Article I, Section 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. Z°Id., paragraphs 19, 24, 32, 37, 44. 4 elements to sustain a cause of action for libel Even if [Plaintiff] were permitted tO amend the Civil Action, no such cause of action fo[.!ibe! o~£.w~r~ng~ul~..~!s_._charge would be sustainablez~ Plaintiff has alleged two (2) separate Counts against Hartman in the Amended Complaint: count I -- Libel, and Count III -- Prima Facie Tort. In each of the Counts brought against Hartman, Plaintiff has specifically alleged that "[a]t all times relevant hereto, Defendant Hartman was an agent and servant of Defendant FMCC." Under. Pennsylvania law, an agent is not liable for lawful acts done within the scope of his authority for and on behalf of a disclosed principal. Plaintiff has failed to allege any conduct on the part of Hartman for which individual liability exists. Plaintiff has specifically admitted in the Amended Complaint that Hartman's acts were done solely as "an agent and servant" of Ford Credit. Plaintiff has not alleged that Hartman had taken any action on his own behalf, or that Hartman committed fraudulent or illegal actions on his own behalf which would permit Plaintiff to disregard the corporate entity employing Hartman. Even if Plaintiff was permitted to amend his Amended Complaint, no cause of action would be sustainable? 2~ Preliminary Objections of Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman in the Nature of a Demurrer, filed March 23, 1998 (incorporated by reference, Preliminary Objections of Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman to Amended Complaint in the Nature of a Demurrer, paragraph 6. zz Preliminary Objections of Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman to Amended Complaint in the Nature of a Demurrer, paragraphs 7-15. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has addressed' the standard by which demurrers should be evaluated: -~:- ~ ' ~ A demUrrer can onl[.~e sustainedwhere thecomplaint is clearly insufficient to establiSh the pleader's right to relief. For purposes of testing the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits as true all well-pleaded, material, relevant facts. Since the sustaining of a demurrer results in the denial of the pleader's claim or dismissal of his suit, a preliminary objection should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. If the facts as pleaded state a claim for which relief may be granted under any theory of law then there is sufficient doubt to require the preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to be rejected. Allegheny Counfy v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360, 372, 490 A.2d 402, 408 (1985) (citations omitted). With respect to Plaintiff's claim for libel, the usual elements of defamation have been set forth by the Pennsylvania Superior Court as follows: [I]n an action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defamatory character of the communication; (2) publication by the defendant; (3) its application to the plaintiff; (4) understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning; (5) understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; (6) special harm to the plaintiff; and (7) abuse of [any applicable] ... privileged occasion. Miketic v. Baron, 450 Pa. Super. 91, 97, 675 A.2d 324, 327 (1996). In the present case, although Plaintiff's amended complaint might have been drafted with more specifics, it would be premature, in the court's view, to terminate Plaintiff's cause of action for defamation at this stage of the proceedings. Questions as to the extent of publication and the nature of any privilege can be more fully answered as more facts are 6 developed in the record.23 --.: ~ With 'respect to Plaintiff's claim for "prima facie tort," the court iS' not pr.epar6d iri the present case to recognizea new cause of action where one or more established tOrts- ~ean~be:. pled under the circumstances alleged. Cf. Evans v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 411 Pa. Super. 244, 601 A.2d 330 (1991). As Judge Learned Hand observed in a different context, it is not "desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant .... "Spector Motor Service v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944) (dissenting opinion), rev'd, 323 U.S. 101, 69 S. Ct. 152, 89 L. Ed. 101 (1944).24 With respect to Plaintiff's claim for breach of "a covenant of good faith and fair dealing," it is noted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in DiBonaventura v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 372 Pa. Super. 420, 539 A.2d 865 (1988), held that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not implicit in an at-will employment relationship, in the absence of special circumstances from which such a covenant could be inferred. This court has not found authority for the proposition that extended length of employment, without more, will generate such an inference. Accordingly, Defendants' preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to this claim of Plaintiff appears to be meritorious. Finally, with respect to Plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge, it has been said that "Pennsylvania has thus far escaped the widescale turbulence so common to the field and still 23 The court is unable to agree with Defendants' position that Defendant Hartman is insulated from responsibility for tortious conduct by virtue of his status as an employee. The rule cited by Defendants applies to lawful, not tortious, conduct of an agent on behalf of a disclosed principal. Cf. Montgomery v. Levy, 406 Pa. 547, 177 A.2d 448 (1962). 24 The court is unable to agree with Plaintiff's position that Defendants waived any preliminary objection to this count by having failed to include the objection in an initial set of preliminary objections which preceded Plaintiff's voluntary amendment of the complaint. See Commonwealth, by Preate v. Events International, Inc., 137 Pa. Commw. 271,585 A.2d 1146 (1991). clings to the'at-will presumption." Martin v.' CaPital Oties Media;InC:, 376 PaTSuper. 199; 208, 51Y A.2d 830; 834 (1986). "As ~i~ineral'r:ule; PennSyl~ariia does -not recoghiz6 c°mm°n4aw~ Cause of action f6r termina~t.!.on ~of;~m ~t2Willi-~-PTd.~tfii~fi~-~rol~ionshiP;, Our~ courts have instead protected the employer's 'unfettered right to discharge an at-will employee for any reason or no reason in the absence of a contractual or statutory prohibition.'" McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., __ Pa. Super. __, __, 696 A.2d 173, 176 (1997). An exception to this general rule has arisen where the conduct of the employer contravenes public policy. See id. at ,696 A.2d at 176. In order to fall within the public policy exception, the "public policy at issue must be articulated in the constitution, legislation, administrative regulation or judicial decision." Id. at ,696 A.2d at 177. In support of his contention that his discharge by Defendant FMCC was violative of public policy, Plaintiff has cited the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution entitled "Inherent Rights of Mankind." This section of Article I of the state constitution reads as follows: All men are bom equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness. It appears to the court that almost all allegedly wrongful discharges can adversely affect the offended employee's reputation. To hold that a discharge from an at-will employment situation is actionable if the employee's reputation is injured in the process would be to expand the public policy exception to such a degree that the general rule would be eclipsed. Such a result, if it is to occur, is more appropriately to be directed by the appellate courts. For this reason, Defendants' demurrer to Plaintiff's wrongful discharge count will be sustained. Based upon the foregoing, the following order will be entered: 8 ORDER OF~2OURT AND NOW, this 15th day of September, 1998, upon considera{i°ri-~)f'the~Preii~nary ' ....... objections of Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company~and~George~antO~-Pi~i~iiffS~:~: ~i~ amended complaint, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, it is ordered and directed as follows: 1. Defendants' demurrers to Count III ("prima facie tort"), Count IV (breach of "covenant of good faith and fair dealing"), and Count V (wrongful discharge) are sustained, and those counts are dismissed to the extent that they relate to either Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company or Defendant George Hartman. 2. Defendants' remaining preliminary objections are dismissed. BY THE COURT, Keith E. Kendall, Esq. 3207 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Attorney for Plaintiff David E. Stem, Esq. Building 640 350 Sentry Park Way Blue Bell, PA 19422 Attorney for Defendants Ford Motor Credit Company and George Hartman /s/J. Wesley Oler Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. 9 Gloriana Noreika, Esq. 138 East Market Street P.O. Box 2588 York, PA 17405 Attorney for Defendant Christine Barton Timothy I. Mark, Esq. Sixth Floor 305 North Front Street P.O. Box 999 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Attorney for Defendant Christy Lengyel 10