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Home My WebLink AboutCP-21-CR-0296-2008 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : GEORGE RAY BROOKS, JR. : CP-21-CR-0296-2008 IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., June 19, 2008:-- 1 George Ray Brooks, Jr., is charged with driving under the influence. He filed a motion to suppress evidence upon which a hearing was conducted on June 17, 2008. We find the following facts. On October 10, 2007, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Officer Joseph Hallisey of the Middlesex Township Police Department was on patrol in a marked patrol car on Route 11 in his Township. As he passed the Pike Motel, which he described as a place where there were often drug transactions, he saw a group of people on the sidewalk in front of one of the rooms. They were aggressively gesturing and pointing fingers at each other. Several people were on one side and three people were on the other. Office Hallisey turned and drove into a parking lot of a business across Route 11 from the motel. He stopped and looked toward the motel and saw two people gesturing toward one person. He started to drive across Route 11 and saw several people who he had previously seen get into a van. They did not include the three people he had just seen. There are two outlets at the Pike Motel for access to and from Route 11, each of which is the width of one vehicle. Officer Hallisey drove into one of these outlets which blocked the __________ 1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) and 3802(b). CP-21-CR-0296-2008 van from continuing to leave, forcing the driver to stop. Officer Hallisey immediately got out of his patrol vehicle, went up to the van, and asked the driver, defendant George Brooks, for identification. Ultimately, Officer Hallisey arrested Brooks for driving under the influence. Defendant maintains he was unlawfully detained and as a result all evidence obtained by Officer Hallisey during the course of his detention must be suppressed. The Commonwealth maintains there was no detention, or in the alternative, Officer Hallisey had reasonable suspicion to warrant an investigative detention. Officer Hallisey testified that he believed he had observed disorderly conduct and he drove into the motel parking lot to determine if he had more. Clearly, defendant was detained. He was driving on the motel parking lot toward the outlet to Route 11; Officer Hallisey drove into that outlet causing him to have to stop; and the officer immediately got out of his patrol car and asked Brooks for Commonwealth v. identification. Defendant was not free to leave at that point. In McClease, 750 A.2d 320 (Pa. Super. 2000), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated: In determining whether a ‘mere encounter’ has risen to the level of an ‘investigative detention,’ the focus of our inquiry is on whether a ‘seizure’ of the person has occurred. Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 552 Pa. 484, 715 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1998). Within this our courts employ the following objective standard to context, discern whether a person has been seized: ‘[W]hether, under all the circumstances surrounding the incident at issue, a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave.’ Commonwealth v. Smith, 732 A.2d 1226, 1232 (Pa.Super.1999) (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 672 A.2d 769, 774 (1996). (Emphasis added.) -2- CP-21-CR-0296-2008 In the present case, Brooks was seized. An investigative detention constitutes a seizure of the person and must be supported by reasonable suspicion that the person Commonwealth v. McClease, being detained is engaged in criminal activity. 750 A.2d 320 (Pa. Super. 2000). The Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S. Section 5503, provides: (a) Offense defined.— A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; (2) makes unreasonable noise; (3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or (4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor. * * * (c) Definition.— As used in this section the word “public” means affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, any neighborhood, or any premises which are open to the public. Commonwealth v. Hock, In 728 A.2d 943 (Pa. 1999), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: The offense of disorderly conduct is not intended as a catch-all for every act which annoys or disturbs people; it is not to be used as a dragnet for all the irritations which breed in the ferment of a community. It has a specific purpose; it has a definite objective, it is intended to preserve the public peace. . . . Commonwealth v. Maerz, In 879 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 2005), the Superior -3- CP-21-CR-0296-2008 Court noted: “The mens rea requirement of Section 5503 demands proof that appellant by her actions intentionally or recklessly created a risk [of causing] or caused a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 449 Pa.Super. 450, 674 A.2d 284 (1996). The specific intent requirement of this statute “may be met by a showing of a reckless disregard of the risk of public inconvenience,” annoyance, or alarm, even if the appellant’s intent was to send a message to a certain individual, rather than to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. See Commonwealth v. Kidd, 296 Pa.Super. 393, 442 A.2d 826 (1982). In the present case as to defendant Brooks, what Officer Hallisey saw for a very short period of time as he drove by the Pike Motel was a group of people on the sidewalk in front of a motel room who were aggressively gesturing and pointing fingers at each other. Then in the short time it took the officer to turn into the parking lot of a business on the opposite side of Route 11, stop and look again toward the motel, only two people were gesturing toward another one. As Officer Hallisey started to drive across Route 11 he saw several people who he had first seen, one of which turned out to be Brooks, get into a van that started to go out of the parking lot. He then inexplicably detained Brooks, who was driving the van, rather than go up to the three people who were still having some kind of an argument. Put succinctly, for a few seconds, Officer Hallisey saw several people, one of which it turned out was Brooks, arguing on a sidewalk in front of a motel room. When he detained Brooks, he did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that the limited conduct of any of the persons in the group he had seen when he first drove by the Pike Motel constituted disorderly conduct. Accordingly, the following order is entered. -4- CP-21-CR-0296-2008 -5- CP-21-CR-0296-2008 ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of June, 2008, the motion of defendant to IS GRANTED. suppress evidence, All evidence obtained by Officer Hallisey after he IS SUPPRESSED. detained defendant, By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Daniel Sodus, Esquire Assistant District Attorney Duane P. Stone, Esquire For Defendant :sal -6- COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : GEORGE RAY BROOKS, JR. : CP-21-CR-0296-2008 IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of June, 2008, the motion of defendant to IS GRANTED. suppress evidence, All evidence obtained by Officer Hallisey after he IS SUPPRESSED. detained defendant, By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Daniel Sodus, Esquire Assistant District Attorney Duane P. Stone, Esquire 33 Western Road Dillsburg, PA 17019-9715 For Defendant :sal