HomeMy WebLinkAbout21-1998-629 Orphans'IN RE: ESTATE OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
HOWARD C. GALE : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
:No. 1998-629 ORPHANS' COURT
IN RE: ADJUDICATION and OPINION OF COURT
OLER, J., September 19, 2008.
In this decedent's estate matter, several grandchildren of the decedent
(Petitioners) have filed a petition for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration
that the decedent's interest in five parcels of real estate was encompassed by a gift
in the decedent's will of the decedent's interest in a certain corporation,
notwithstanding that a different corporation was legal owner of the parcels.' An
interested beneficiary, decedent's widow (Respondent), has opposed the petition.3
A hearing was held on the petition on March 13, 2008, and June 18, 2008,
with the record being supplemented thereafter by a stipulation of counsel filed on
July 28, 2008. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the petition will be denied.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The decedent with respect to this estate is Howard C. Gale, who died testate
on January 19, 1998,4 the date of his most recent will having been January 2,
1998.5 Among his survivors were his spouse of 32 years, Respondent, Julie F.
Gale, now 87 years old ,6 a son named Howard C. Gale, Jr.,' from whom he had
' Petition for Declaratory Judgment, filed May 22, 2007.
2 At a hearing on the petition for declaratory judgment, counsel indicated that the testator's
widow was the current executrix of the estate. N.T. 71, Hearing, March 13, 2008. However, the
docket entries do not support a conclusion that she, or any other person, has been appointed to
serve as the decedent's personal representative following the initial executor's death.
s Answer of Respondent, Julie F. Gale, to Petition for Declaratory Judgment, filed August 22,
2007.
4 N.T. 25, 57, Hearing, June 18, 2008.
s Petitioners' Ex. 1.
6 N.T. 39, Hearing, June 18, 2008.
N.T. 12, 15, Hearing, June 18, 2008.
been estranged for many years,' and four children of Howard C. Gale, Jr.,
Petitioners herem.9
At the time of his death, the testator was the majority shareholder in two
corporations: Howard C. Gale Development Co., Inc., and Country Club Park
Development Co., Inc.10 With respect to disposition of his interest in the first
corporation, the third item of the testator's will provided as follows:
I give, devise and bequeath my entire interest in the Howard C. Gale
Development Co., Inc. to my wife, Julie F. Gale and all of the shares of
stock in my name shall be transferred or reissued in her name. Both she
and my attorney, Robert J. Trace, Esq. shall determine the future of the
Howard C. Gale Development Co., Inc."
With respect to disposition of his interest in the second corporation, the
fourth item of the testator's will provided as follows:
I give, devise and bequeath my entire interest in the Country Club
Park Development Co., Inc. to Robert J. Trace, Esq., IN TRUST
NEVERTHELESS, with the provision that all of the net income shall be
paid over to my wife Julie F. Gale, for the remainder of her life and at her
death, the Trust shall cease and the principal and the assets reduced to cash
and the sum realized shall be divided equally among my grandchildren and
step grandchild....'Z
At the time of the testator's death, and for many years prior thereto, the first
corporation, Howard C. Gale Development Co., Inc. (the testator's interest in
which passed to his spouse, Respondent, under the will), had been the owner of
various parcels of realty in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, including the
following five Cumberland County properties which are the subject of the present
dispute: 6 Fargreen Road, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania; 55 Circle Drive, Camp Hill,
Pennsylvania; 22 Country Club Place West, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania; 49 Circle
Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania; and 530 Fairway Drive, Camp Hill,
s N.T. 15, 17-18, 44, 62, Hearing, June 18, 2008.
9 N.T. 20, Hearing, June 18, 2008; Petition for Declaratory Judgment, filed May 22, 2007.
10 Respondent's Ex. 6; Petitioners' Ex. 55.
" Petitioners' Ex. 1.
1
2 Petitioners' Ex. 1.
2
Pennsylvania. 13 This corporation, which had been incorporated by the testator and
two others in 1960,14 had the following designated corporate purpose:
To deal in real estate, building material and supplies including the
improvement and development of land, to construct and repair, buy, sell,
exchange and lease dwelling houses, apartments and commercial
establishments, and to make loans for these purposes."
Evidence at the hearing on Petitioners' Petition for Declaratory Judgment
indicated that the testator had frequently, although not always, 16 treated the
properties as being owned by the second corporation, Country Club Park
Development Co., Inc., instead of the first corporation, Howard C. Gale
Development Co., Inc. .17
In addition, the testator's estranged son testified that,
prior to the estrangement, his father had told him he wanted the disputed
properties to go to his grandchildren. 18 On the other hand, another witness
testified that, despite the commingled and convoluted nature of his business
operations, the testator "had it all in his head."19
DISCUSSION
"The testator's intent is the polestar in the construction of every will and
that intent, if it is not unlawful, must prevail." In re Estate of Elkins, 2005 PA
Super. 375, ¶10, 888 A.2d 815, 823. However, just as there is an objective theory
" N.T. 11, Hearing, March 13, 2008. These properties were previously owned by an entity
known as Country Club Park, Inc. N.T. 73-74, Hearing, June 18, 2008; Respondents' Exs. 2-5.
Country Club Park, Inc., was merged into Howard C. Gale Development Co., Inc., effective
December 31, 1973. Respondents' Ex. 2.
14 Respondent's Ex. 6.
is Respondent's Ex. 6 (emphasis added).
16 See Respondent's Ex. 1 ( March 1, 1997, lease of 530 Fairway Drive, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania,
by Howard C. Gale Development Co., Inc., executed by testator as president of lessor)
17 See, e.g., Petitioners' Exs. 2 (lease for 6 Fargreen Road), 3 (lease for 55 Circle Drive), 4 (lease
for 22 Country Club West), 5 (lease for 49 Circle Drive).
" N.T. 13, Hearing, June 18, 2008.
19 N.T. 59, Hearing, June 18, 2008.
3
of contracts applicable to the determination of the intent of contracting parties, 20
there is a well-settled principle that, when the language of a will is clear and
unambiguous, parol or extrinsic evidence may not be utilized to aid in the
construction of the will. In re Estate of Daniel A. Kelly, 473 Pa. 48, 54, 373 A.2d
744, 747 (1977); In re Hartman's Estate, 320 Pa. 321, 329, 182 A.2d 234, 238
(1936).
Furthermore, in this context any "ambiguity in a will must be found without
reliance on extrinsic evidence before the extrinsic evidence is admissible." In re
Estate of Daniel A. Kelly, 473 Pa. 48, 54, 373 A.2d 744, 747 (1977). "[E]xtrinsic
evidence of surrounding facts must relate to the meaning of ambiguous words of
the will. It cannot be received as evidence of testator's intention independent of
the written words employed." In re Estate of Beisgen, 387 Pa. 425, 431, 128 A.2d
52, 55 (1956).
The rationale for this rule has been variously expressed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court as follows:
The dangers inherent in admitting parol evidence to prove a testator's
intention—namely, opening the door to fraud, changing or defeating the
testator's intention, or nullifying the provisions of the Wills Act requiring
Wills to be in writing and signed by testator at the end thereof—make
clear the reasons for the exclusion of such evidence .21
It is not satisfactory procedure to accept parol testimony to explain
unambiguous language in a will. Aside from the monumental fact that the
testator is not present to rebut any quotation improperly imputed to him,
such an uncontrolled practice would make for unutterable confusion and
chaos in the devolution of property.zz
20 "Pennsylvania law follows the objective theory of contracts ...." Great Northern Ins. Co. V.
ADT Sec. Services, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 723, 740 (W.D. Pa. 2007). Under this theory,
"resolution of a dispute [as to the interpretation of a contract] depends upon the intent of the
parties as evidenced by the language of the document, or, where ambiguity exists, by extrinsic
evidence.... Intentions not expressed in the agreement are irrelevant to a determination of the
rights and obligations of the contracting parties and proof of them is barred by the parol evidence
rule ...." In re marriage of Fletcher and O'Kain, 214 Or. App. 585, 599, 167 P.3d 984, 991
(2007) (citations omitted).
21 In re Beisgen's Estate, 387 Pa. 425, 432, 128 A.2d 52, 55 (1956).
22 Umberger's Estate, 369 Pa. 587, 593-94, 87 A.2d 290, 293 (1952)
11
A latent ambiguity can exist only when necessary to identify the
subject matter or object of a devise. And if there is in existence a subject
or object that satisfies the terms of the will, and to which they are
applicable, there is no occasion for the introduction of parol evidence, and
a doubt suggested by extrinsic circumstances cannot be permitted to affect
its construction. To do so would, in effect, amount to changing the will of
the testator, and writing a new one for him, rather than interpreting the will
of his making.zs
The statute, when it required all wills to be in writing signed by the
testator and attested by witnesses, certainly intended, that the evidence and
the whole evidence of the disposition of property by will, should be the
will itself, that the evidence of the intent of the devisor should be derived
from the writing signed by him, and solemnly attested; otherwise
innumerable would be the cases where evidence of mistake would be
claimed and proved ....1124
Mr. Jarman, in his valuable Treatise on Wills ... says: "As the law
requires wills both of real and personal estate ... to be in writing, it cannot
consistently with this doctrine permit parol evidence to be adduced, either
to contradict, vary, add to or [subtract from] the contents of such will; and
the principle of this rule demands an inflexible adherence to it, even where
the consequence is the partial or total failure of the testator's intended
disposition; for it would have been of but little avail to require that a will
ab origine should be in writing, or to fence a testator round with a guard of
attesting witnesses, if, when the written instrument failed, to make a full
and explicit disclosure of his scheme of disposition, its deficiencies might
be supplied, or its inaccuracies corrected, from extrinsic sources. No
principle connected with the law of wills is more firmly established, or
more familiar in its application, than this. ,25
In short, for a number of sound reasons, a court "may not ... , under guise
of construction or under general powers of equity assume to correct or redraft [a]
will in which the testator has expressed his intentions." In re Estate of Kelly, 473
Pa. 48, 55, 373 A.2d 744, 748 (1977).
In the present case, the subject matter of the testator's gifts in the third and
fourth items of his will—his interests in two extant corporations, respectively
21 _[n
re Estate ofKelly, 473 Pa. 48, 54, 373 A.2d 744, 747 (1977) (citation omitted).
24 Wallize v. Wallize, 55 Pa. 242, 248, 1867 WL 7520 at 5 (1867) (citation omitted).
25 Wallize v. Wallize, 55 Pa. 242, 249-50, 1867 WL 7520 at 7 (1867) (emphasis added).
E
was in existence, as were the designated recipients of the gifts. The language of
disposition utilized by the testator to those recipients was clear and unambiguous.
At most, it can be said that, had the testator been more conversant with the details
of his estate, he might have written a different willan observation that could
probably be applied to many testators.
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that the third and fourth items
of the testator's will contain latent or patent ambiguities which would permit the
court to reform the will on the basis of extrinsic evidence. For the foregoing
reasons, the following order will be entered:
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 19th day of September, 2008, upon consideration of the
Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed by several grandchildren of the testator,
Howard C. Gale, seeking a declaration that properties in Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania, with addresses of 6 Fargreen Road, 55 Circle Drive, 22 Country
Club Place West, 49 Circle Drive, and 530 Fairway Drive, Camp Hill, owned by
Howard C. Gale Development Co., Inc., were encompassed by a gift to them in
the testator's will of his interest in Country Club Park Development Co., Inc., and
were not encompassed by a gift to the testator's spouse in the testator's will of his
interest in Howard C. Gale Development Co., Inc., following a hearing held on
March 13, 2008, and June 18, 2008, and for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, the petition is DENIED.
Bret Keisling, Esq.
219 Pine Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Attorney for Petitioners
0
BY THE COURT,
s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr.
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Adam L. Seiferth, Esq.
1011 Mumma Road
Suite 201
Lemoyne, PA 17043
Attorney for Respondent
Julie F. Gale
IN RE: ESTATE OF : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
HOWARD C. GALE : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
:No. 1998-629 ORPHANS' COURT
IN RE: ADJUDICATION and OPINION OF COURT
ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 19th day of September, 2008, upon consideration of the
Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed by several grandchildren of the testator,
Howard C. Gale, seeking a declaration that properties in Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania, with addresses of 6 Fargreen Road, 55 Circle Drive, 22 Country
Club Place West, 49 Circle Drive, and 530 Fairway Drive, Camp Hill, owned by
Howard C. Gale Development Co., Inc., were encompassed by a gift to them in
the testator's will of his interest in Country Club Park Development Co., Inc., and
were not encompassed by a gift to the testator's spouse in the testator's will of his
interest in Howard C. Gale Development Co., Inc., following a hearing held on
March 13, 2008, and June 18, 2008, and for the reasons stated in the
accompanying opinion, the petition is DENIED.
BY THE COURT,
J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J.
Bret Keisling, Esq.
219 Pine Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101
Attorney for Petitioners
Adam L. Seiferth, Esq.
1011 Mumma Road
Suite 201
Lemoyne, PA 17043
Attorney for Respondent
Julie F. Gale