HomeMy WebLinkAbout95-1712 CIVIL TERMJAMES H. BEST,
Plaintiff
VS.
JANE H. BEST,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
95-1712 CIVIL TERM
IN DIVORCE
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925
In this case, James H. Best, plaintiff in the above matter, has appealed our order of
September 16, 2002, wherein we denied his petition for termination of alimony. The factual
background is relatively uncomplicated.
Mr. Best's obligation to pay alimony stems from an agreement reached at the time of the
divorce of the parties. A divorce complaint was filed on April 4, 1995. At the master's hearing,
on December 2, 1997, a seventeen-paragraph agreement was placed on the record. Paragraph 12,
dealing with alimony, reads as follows:
Husband shall pay, through the Domestic Relations
Office of Cumberland County, alimony for wife in
the amount of $928.00 per month until modified or
terminated by the Court. In the event that either of
the parties receives a bonus or there is any other
significant change in their income in the future,
either party has the right to petition the Court for
the modification of the alimony, and the alimony
payments can be modified in accordance with the
Supreme Court guidelines for spousal support or
alimony pendent elite then in effect. The alimony
payments will start 1 January 1998, whether the
parties are then divorced or not. Any payments
made prior to the date of final divorce will be
considered by the parties to be alimony pendente
lite. Payments shall be considered alimony by both
parties, which means that wife will include those
payments in her income for federal tax purposes,
and husband may deduct them for federal tax
purposes. The alimony payments will terminate
95-1712 CIVIL
upon the death of either party or upon wife' s
remarriage or cohabitation.
Following entry of this agreement, there were modifications in the amount of alimony in ensuing
years. Finally, in July of 2000, alimony was set in the amount of $749.00 per month. The order
setting this amount was appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed. It is this order that is the
one under which Mr. Best is paying.
Since July of 2000, the youngest son of the parties, Michael, has graduated from high
school. Thereafter, Mr. Best provided substantial financial support to Michael and another son,
Charles, while they were in college. Other than college expenses, Mr. Best has not incurred any
other major liabilities. While he has experienced peaks and valleys in his income since 1997, his
circumstances today are not materially different from when the alimony agreement was made.
At the time of the divorce Mrs. Best was a school teacher. She continues to be in that
employment. We see nothing in the economic circumstances of the parties which represents a
material change.
It is important to note that the petitioner, James Best, is seeking termination of the
alimony order and not modification. It is true that the financial circumstances of the parties
could change so dramatically as to warrant termination. That is, however, not the case here. In
any event, the December 1997 agreement of the parties provides that modification may be made
in the alimony upon changed financial circumstances in accordance with the Supreme Court
guidelines for spousal support. The agreement indicates that alimony payments will terminate,
however, only upon the death of either party or upon the wife' s remarriage or cohabitation.
None of these latter events have come to pass. We are satisfied that the provisions of the
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alimony agreement regarding termination are not subject to modification by the court. 23
Pa.C.S.A. 3105(c). It is for this reason that we entered our order of September 16, 2002.
December 9, 2002
Kevin A. Hess, J.
Bradley L. Griffie, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Jane H. Best, Pro Se
:rlm
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