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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-2159 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH V. WILLIAM H. REISINGER IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2001-2159 CRIMINAL TERM Guido, J., April IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO 1925(b) ,2002 The defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct by District Justice Paula Correal. After a hearing de novo, we found him guilty of the same offense. ~ He was sentenced to pay a fine of $200 and placed on supervised probation for 90 days.2 Defendant has filed this timely appeal in which he contends: (1.) The evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. (2.) His conduct was not the type of conduct prohibited by the statute. (3.) The Commonwealth violated various rights guaranteed to him under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. (4.) The sentence was illegal.3 We can discern no distinction between the first and second contentions. Furthermore, since we were never asked to rule upon the constitutionality of the government's action, it would be inappropriate to address the third contention. Therefore, this opinion will speak only to the first and fourth issues. ~ He was charged with, and found guilty of, violating Section 5503(a)4 of the Crimes Code. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). : The supervised probation was designed to determine whether a program of anger management counseling would be appropriate and, if so, to make sure he completes it. 3 See defendant's "Concise Statement" filed pursuant to Pa. Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. NO. 2001-2159 CRIMINAL Sufficiency of the Evidence. The standard to be applied in reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, are sufficient to establish all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 536 Pa. 355, 639 A.2d 763, (Pa. 1994). The defendant was charged with violating Section 5503(a)(4) of the Crimes Code which provides as follows: A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). We were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Commonwealth had proven all of the elements of that offense. At about 1:30 p.m. on Friday afternoon, March 13, 2001, the defendant stopped for gas at the Hess station in Carlisle. intersection of High and York Streets. The station is located on a small lot at the The defendant pulled in behind an elderly lady who was using a self serve pump. After the elderly lady had finished purchasing her gas, she indicated her desire to exit the station on the High Street side. While she could have left the station by pulling forward onto York Street, she could only travel west on that road. If she were to leave on the High Street side, she could travel in either direction. However, in order for her to access the High Street exit, the defendant would have to back up. What occurred next can only be described as a childish, senseless, and potentially dangerous, "Mexican Standoff". NO. 2001-2159 CRIMINAL The defendant adamantly refused to back up to allow the elderly lady to exit onto High Street. The elderly lady was just as adamant in her refusal to pull forward to exit onto York Street. Neither party was willing to give ground. After about 20 minutes, the station manager called the Carlisle Police. Officers Rogers and Latshaw responded to the scene. Officer Latshaw attempted to persuade the elderly lady to pull forward. Officer Rogers attempted to persuade the defendant to back up. The police spent 10 to 15 minutes trying to persuade either party to move. Officer Rogers advised the defendant several times that he would be cited for disorderly conduct if he did not move his truck.4 The officers' shift supervisor, Sergeant Karen Finkenbinder, eventually arrived. She also attempted to get the defendant to move his truck. She threatened to charge him with disorderly conduct if he refused. He refused. Since the "Mexican Standoff" had been going on for over 40 minutes, Sergeant Finkenbinder advised her officers to arrest both parties for disorderly conduct and to move their vehicles. Officer Rogers gave the defendant one last chance to move his truck before he would be cited for disorderly conduct. Since he again refused, he was cited.5 The "Mexican Standoff" in which the defendant was an active participant created both a hazardous and physically offensive condition. It effectively blocked access to the York Street side of the gas station on a busy Friday afternoon. It tied up two police officers in a potentially volatile situation. The defendant did not offer, and we could not 4 Because of the size of his truck, and its position behind the elderly lady's car, no other cars could exit or enter the station on the York Street side. While the elderly lady could exit onto the York Street side, the other York Street exit/entrance was substantially blocked by defendant's truck, making it difficult, if not impossible, to safely get around him. 5 The elderly lady was also cited for the same offense. NO. 2001-2159 CRIMINAL find, any conceivable legitimate purpose for his conduct. Furthermore, the defendant's repeated refusal of the police officers' entreaties to move his truck and to end the standoff evidenced a reckless disregard for the public inconvenience and annoyance caused by his conduct. Therefore, we found him guilty of disorderly conduct. Illegality of Sentence. After sentence was imposed, the defendant asked that we stay its execution to give him the opportunity to file an appeal. He contended that the stay was mandated by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 462. The Rule, which, inter alia, governs sentencing after de novo summary trials, provides for an automatic thirty-day stay of"a sentence of imprisonment"fi Defendant's counsel argued that supervised probation amounted to "imprisonment" under the rule. Since we did not agree, we refused to grant his request.? While he did not cite any specific authority, counsel made reference to a line of cases which hold that "restraints on liberty" amount to imprisonment. We assumed that he was relying upon the recent case of Commonwealth v. Chiappini, 566 Pa. 507, 782 A.2d 490 (2001), and the cases cited therein. The reliance was misplaced. In Chiappini, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the defendant was entitled to credit against his prison sentence for time spent on electronic monitoring as a condition of bail. Pursuant to Section 9760 of the sentencing Code a defendant is 6 The relevant portion of the rule provides as follows: (3) if a sentence of imprisonment has been imposed, direct the defendant to appear for the execution of sentence on a date certain unless the defendant files a notice of appeal within the 30- day period; Pa. Rule of Crim. Procedure 462(G)(3) (emphasis added). 7 However, upon learning of the appeal, we immediately stayed the execution of sentence. NO. 2001-2159 CRIMINAL entitled to such credit "for all time spent in custody." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9760(1). The majority held that the defendant's subjection to electronic monitoring "provided sufficient constraints on his liberty to constitute time spent in custody for purposes of Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code." 782 A.2d at 501. However, the Chiappini court recognized that imprisonment is a narrow term, narrower even than the concept of custody. As the Court stated: The terms imprisonment and custody, although synonymous, are not identical. The term custody is broader than the term imprisonment. Imprisonment is but one form of custody. 782 A.2d at 500. Based upon the above, we were satisfied that our sentence of"supervised probation" did not amount to a sentence of"imprisonment". Therefore, an automatic stay under Pa. Rule of Criminal Procedure 462(G)(3) was not required. DATE: Edward E. Guido, J. District Attorney Karl E. Rominger, Esquire For the Defendant :sld