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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2005-5626 CivilDUANE M. DONISON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : CIVIL ACTION --LAW HCR MANOR CARE, Defendant : NO. 05-5626 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE OLER and EBERT, JJ. ORDER and OPINION OF COURT Oler, J., November 6, 2008 In this civil case, an insured has sued a nursing home for allegedly advising him incorrectly that his insurance would not cover his spouse's expenses at the facility, leading to a certain financial loss on his part.' Plaintiff's claims sound in negligence2 and "detrimental reliance .,3 For disposition at this time is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant, contending that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred .4 The matter was argued on October 22, 2008. For the reasons stated in this opinion, Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff commenced the present action by a praecipe for writ of summons on October 31, 2005.5 Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that he disposed of about $30,000.00 in assets to qualify for Medicaid coverage for care of his spouse at Defendant's facility. It alleges further that Plaintiff did so because Defendant erroneously advised him that certain insurance which Plaintiff had through a ' Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, paras. 14, 16-17, 23-24, filed October 16, 2006. 2 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Claim One, filed October 16, 2006. ' Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Claim Two, filed October 16, 2006. 4 Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant HCR Manor Care, filed August 11, 2008. ' Plaintiff's Praecipe for Writ of Summons, filed October 31, 2005. company called Tricare would not cover her expenses .6 Defendant disposed of the assets, according to the complaint, on or about March 13, 2001.7 He testified at a deposition that he had used the proceeds to buy an automobile,$ an asset which apparently did not adversely affect Medicaid eligibility. In his deposition, Plaintiff conceded that at a meeting on July 17, 2001, a discussion had occurred with his caseworker from the Cumberland County Assistance Office, Lynne Gordon, "about the coordination of benefits and that we should never have gone through the down spend process."9 More specifically, he stated in the deposition that he realized around July 17, 2001, that Manor Care had proceeded incorrectly and that his disposition of assets had been unnecessary: Q And you realized by July 17 of 2001, that it was unnecessary for you to have spent those assets, the $29,900 and some dollars, because Manor Care should have been billing TRICARE, correct? A Something like that, yes.'o According to an April 30, 2003, letter that he wrote to several governmental officials, he was told at a hearing on August 20, 2001, by a welfare hearing officer of the Commonwealth that he "had grounds for a lawsuit against the nursing home. "11 A letter dated October 27, 2003, from Defendant to the Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney General seemed to indicate its ultimate concurrence with Plaintiff's position that Tricare did provide coverage for his spouse during the 6 Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, paras. 1-24, filed October 16, 2006. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, para. 19, filed October 16, 2006. s N.T. 63-64, Deposition of Plaintiff, March 6, 2008 (attached to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as Ex Q. 9 N.T. 67, Deposition of Plaintiff, March 6, 2008 (attached to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as Ex. Q. 'o N.T. 94, Deposition of Plaintiff, March 6, 2008 (attached to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as Ex. Q. " Deposition of Plaintiff, March 6, 2008 (letter attached to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as Ex. A). 2 period in question, according to Plaintiff. 12 A letter to the Office of the Attorney General from Tricare dated December 16, 2003, also confirmed its coverage of Plaintiff s spouse, according to Plaintiff s deposition testimony. 13 As previously noted, the present litigation was commenced by Plaintiff on October 31, 2005. DISCUSSION Statement of the Law Summary judgment. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides as follows: After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or (2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. Statute of limitations burden of proof and discovery rule. "Where the statute of limitations is at issue, the burden of proof falls on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the cause of action is not barred by the passage of time and that his or her failure to file the action in timely fashion is excusable." Jones v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 2006 PA Super 100, ¶11, 900 A.2d 855, 858 (citation omitted). The "discovery rule," with respect to operation of statutes of limitations, has been described as follows: 'Z See Defendant's Answer in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Presented by HCR Manorcare, Ex. B, filed October 15, 2008. " N.T. 109-10, Deposition of Plaintiff, March 8, 2008 (attached to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as Ex. C); see Defendant's Answer in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Presented by HCR Manorcare, Ex. C, filed October 15, 2008. 3 The discovery rule is an exception to the requirement that a complaining party must file suit within the statutory period. The discovery rule provides that where the existence of the injury is not known to the complaining party and such knowledge cannot reasonably be ascertained within the prescribed statutory period, the limitations period does not begin to run until the discovery of the injury is reasonably possible.... The statute begins to run in such instances when the injured party possesses sufficient critical facts to put him on notice that a wrong has been committed and that he need investigate to determine whether he is entitled to redress.... The party seeking to invoke the discovery rule bears the burden of establishing the inability to know that he or she has been injured by the act of another despite the exercise of reasonable diligence. Baselice v. Franciscan Friars Assumption BTM Province, Inc., 2005 PA Super 246, ¶13, 879 A.2d 270, 276 (citations omitted). With regard to the discovery rule, "the point at which the complaining party should reasonably be aware that he has suffered an injury is generally an issue of fact to be determined by the jury." E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 424 Pa. Super. 449, 455, 622 A.2d 1388, 1391 (1993). However, [w]here the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ ... the commencement of the limitations period can be determined as a matter of law.... Additionally, if a party has the means of discovery within his power but neglects to use them, his claim will still be barred. Baselice v. Franciscan Friars Assumption BTM Province, Inc., 2005 PA Super 246, ¶18, 879 A.2d 270, 277. In this context, once the running of the statute of limitations is properly tolled, only where the facts are so clear that reasonable minds cannot differ may the commencement of the limitations period be determined as a matter of law. Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 560 Pa. 394, 404, 745 A.2d 606, 611 (2000) (emphasis in original). Negligence. As a general rule, the statute of limitations for negligence actions is two years. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, §2, as amended, 42 Pa. C.S. §5524(7) (2008 Supp.). The discovery rule normally applies to negligence actions. See, e.g., Szpynda v. Pyles, 433 Pa. Super. 1, 639 A.2d 1181 (1994) (medical malpractice). Detrimental reliance. "Detrimental reliance is another name for promissory estoppel.... Under this theory, a promise which the promisor should reasonably 11 expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise." Matarazzo v. Millers Mutual Group, Inc., 927 A.2d 689, 692 (Pa. Commw. 2007) (citations omitted). "The doctrine of promissory estoppel sounds in contract law and, like other contract actions, is subject to the four-year statute of limitations set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525." Id. As with negligence actions, the discovery rule has been applied to promissory estoppel actions. See Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 560 Pa. 394, 745 A.2d 606 (2000). Application to Facts According to Plaintiff, acting in reliance on a negligent misrepresentation of Defendant he disposed of certain property unnecessarily on March 13, 2001, and suffered some economic loss as a result. Although he conceded in his deposition that he was aware as early as July 17, 2001, that it had been "unnecessary for [him] to have spent those assets ... because Manor Care should have been billing TRICARE," it is his position that the statutes of limitations did not begin to run on his negligence and promissory estoppel claims until Tricare's letter of December 16, 2003, "conclusively" showed that Defendant had made a mistake. 14 However, it appears clear to the court from Plaintiff's own testimony that he had been on notice by July 17, 2001, that his disposition of assets had been unnecessary and that any advice or action on the part of Defendant to the contrary had been erroneous. By August 20, 2001, he had been expressly advised by a state hearing officer that he had a cause of action against Defendant. Under these circumstances, and given (a) the burden of proof upon Plaintiff with respect to statutes of limitations in general and the discovery rule in particular, (b) the necessity under the summary judgment rule for Plaintiff to produce evidence in 14 Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Disposition, at 6, submitted October 15, 2008. E accordance with this burden, and (c) the principle that the discovery rule will not delay the operation of a statute of limitations beyond the point that an injured party possesses sufficient critical facts to put him or her on notice that a wrong has been committed and that he or she needs to investigate to determine whether he or she is entitled to redress, the court is constrained to conclude that Plaintiffs action herein, filed on October 31, 2005, more than four years after the aforesaid events in 2001, is time-barred as a matter of law. For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 6th day of November, 2008, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the motion is granted and Plaintiff s amended complaint is dismissed. Richard R. Gan, Esq. 64 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Plaintiff B. Craig Black, Esq. Patricia Haas Corll, Esq. 1017 Mumma Road Suite 100 Wormleysburg, PA 17043 Attorneys for Defendant 0 BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. DUANE M. DONISON, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. : CIVIL ACTION --LAW HCR MANOR CARE, Defendant : NO. 05-5626 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE OLER and EBERT, JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 6th day of November, 2008, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the motion is granted and Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed. BY THE COURT, J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Richard R. Gan, Esq. 64 South Pitt Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Plaintiff B. Craig Black, Esq. Patricia Haas Corll, Esq. 1017 Mumma Road Suite 100 Wormleysburg, PA 17043 Attorneys for Defendant