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HomeMy WebLinkAbout01-771 CivilJAMES M. KELLER and ELAINE N. KELLER, Plaintiffs V. BARRY L. SHEALER and MARLENE A. SHEALER, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2001-0771 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION - LAW LAND EASEMENT DICKINSON TOWNSHIP BEFORE GUIDO, J. OPINION AND DECREE NISI F1NDINGS OF FACT Almost 90 years ago George W. Paxton acquired title to 15 lA acres of mountain land in Dickinson Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. The tract had slightly more than 400 feet of frontage along Pennsylvania Route 34 (also known as the Gettysburg Road). Over the next decade Mr. Paxton sold off three parcels containing in the aggregate just under 4 lA acres and all of the frontage along the Gettysburg Road. The third and final outparcel was conveyed in 1924. It consisted of a little more than one acre and contained the remaining 238 feet of road frontage. The sale of that third tract gives rise to the litigation currently before us. Since the conveyance effectively landlocked his remaining 11 acres, Mr. Paxton reserved access thereto with the following language in the deed: In consideration of the above tract of land the Grantor reserves a roadway from the Carlisle and Gettysburg Public road to a point on the eastern end of the said tract for his use or his assigns for a period of time unlimited, or as long as grass grows and water runs. NO. 2001-0771 CIVIL TERM A 60 foot long single family residential dwelling was eventually built on the outparcel in question. The residual mountain land has remained in its original unimproved state. The easement has not been used. Plaintiff Marlene A. Shealer is the great granddaughter of George W. Paxton. She and her husband acquired title to the residual tract from her father's estate in 1995. The defendants purchased the outparcel with improvements in March of 2000. Plaintiffs desire to subdivide their land into a seven lot residential development. However, in order to be in compliance with the applicable township ordinances and Penn DOT regulations, ~ they must construct a 50 foot wide public road across defendants' land. They contend that this contemplated use is permitted under the terms of the easement. Understandably, the defendants do not want a 50 foot wide public road running across their property. They contend that no such use was ever contemplated and that a private road 12 to15 feet wide is all that plaintiffs are entitled to under the terms of the original reservation.2 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (1.) Plaintiffs have an express easement across defendants' land to Pennsylvania Route 34. (2.) The parties to the original grant did not intend the "roadway" to be 50 feet wide or to be dedicated to the public. ~ No such ordinances or regulations existed at the time of the original grant. : A 15 foot wide private road would be sufficient to allow for the construction of a single family residence on the tract. NO. 2001-0771 CIVIL TERM (3.) Plaintiffs, as owners of the dominant tenement, are entitled to an easement of sufficient width to accommodate the reasonable and lawful use of their land without creating an unreasonable burden on the defendants' servient tenement. (4.) Plaintiffs proposed construction of a 50 foot wide road and its subsequent dedication to the township for public use would unreasonably burden the servient tenement. (5.) The construction of a 15 foot wide private roadway would not unreasonably burden the servient tenement. DISCUSSION We have been asked to determine the nature and scope of the easement retained by George Paxton in the 1924 deed to defendants' predecessors in interest.3 The Superior Court summarized the law on this issue as follows: When a right-of-way is expressly granted, its scope is determined by ascertaining the intention of the parties to the grant. Lease v. Doll, 485 Pa. 615, 403 A.2d 558 (1979). The easement is construed in favor of the grantee where the terms of the grant are vague, so as to permit reasonable use and enjoyment. Id. This is so because a right-of-way is generally granted of necessity, providing the owner of property landlocked by subdivision with access to the public road. The landlocked property would otherwise be rendered virtually useless. Piper v. Mowris, 466 Pa. 89, 351 A.2d 635 (1976). Although the extent of an easement is limited to that which has been granted, our courts have consistently permitted express easements to accommodate modern developments, so long as the use remains consistent with the purpose for which the right was originally granted. This is based upon a presumption that advances in technology are contemplated in the grant of the easement. Smith v. Fulkroad, 305 Pa. Super. 459, 451 A.2d 738 (1982). Thus Lease, supra, and Piper, supra, allowed easements granting ingress and egress to the dominant tenements across the servient 3 Although the language is also silent as to the location of the easement, that issue has been resolved by agreement of the parties. NO. 2001-0771 CIVIL TERM tenements to expand from footpaths to ways permitting passage of motor vehicles. The use, or more appropriately, purpose, remained the same-- access to landlocked property. Only the extent of that use reasonably increased. Hash v. Sofinowski, 337 Pa. Super. 451,454, 487 A.2d 32, at 33-34 (1985). Applying the above law to the case before us, we are satisfied that the width of the easement across defendants' land should not exceed 15 feet. Intention of the Parties. The intention of the parties "is determined by a fair interpretation and construction of the grant and may be shown by the words employed construed with reference to the attending circumstances known to the parties at the time the grant was made." Lease v. Doll, supra, 403 A.2d at 561 (quoting Merri// v. Manufacturers Light andHeat Co., 409 Pa. 68, 73, 185 A.2d 573,575 (1962)). In the instant case, we find that the parties did not intend the easement to be 50 feet wide nor did they intend it to be dedicated to the public. In the first instance, the grant of a 50 foot wide easement would have been both unusual and unnecessary in 1924. A 50 foot easement would contain more than 20 per cent of the road frontage conveyed with the servient tenement. We would clearly expect such a large easement to be expressly stated in the grant. Furthermore, any conceivable need for ingress and egress to the mountain tract retained by Mr. Paxton could have been accomplished with a 12 or 15 foot wide easement. Additionally, the reservation for use of the roadway was personal to Mr. Paxton or "his assigns." Had the parties intended it to be used by the public, or dedicated to the township, it is reasonable to assume that the language in the reservation would have so NO. 2001-0771 CIVIL TERM indicated. Furthermore, if Mr. Paxton had intended to dedicate 50 feet of frontage along the Gettysburg road to public use, he is more likely to have retained title to it rather than simply reserving an easement. This is particularly true if he had intended to develop the remaining land, which we conclude he did not.4 There is no basis to conclude that the parties to the 1924 deed intended the easement to be for anything other than the personal use of the owner and future owners of the remaining mountain land. All developable property and road frontage was sold off relatively quickly. A private roadway was retained for access to otherwise inaccessible mountain land. To conclude that the parties intended that access to be 50 feet wide and public is not supported by reason or common sense. Modern Developments. Plaintiffs argue that "subdivision of land for sale is a reasonable part of modern land ownership".6 Therefore, they contend, the case law requires us to construe this easement broadly enough to accommodate the proposed residential subdivision. We disagree. It is true that the cases have consistently allowed the reasonable expansion of express easements for ingress and egress to accommodate modern developments, "so long as the use remains consistent with the purpose for which the right was originally 4 We are satisfied that Mr. Paxton had no intention of developing the remaining land at the time he sold the last vestiges of road frontage. The most reasonable conclusion is that he intended to use the remaining land as a mountain retreat for which an easement would suffice. s Citing the ancient Supreme Court case ofRespublica v. Arno/d, 3 Yeates 417, plaintiffs argue that the word "roadway" means a road for public use. We disagree. See for example the much more recent Supreme Court case of Garan v. Bender, 357 Pa. 487, 55 A.2d 353, (1947) in which the word "road" was used to describe an easement for private use. 6 Plaintiff's brief, p. 10. NO. 2001-0771 CIVIL TERM granted." Hosh v. Sofinowski, 487 A2d at 34. The cases most often cited in support of this proposition are Piper v. Mowris, and Lease v. Doll, supra. However, the underlying premise in each case was that denial of the requested expansion would render the landlocked parcel virtually useless. In the instant case, a single family residence can be constructed on the plaintiffs' land so long as a 15 foot private way provides access to the Gettysburg Road. Therefore, the land can be used gainfully, albeit not as profitably, with the easement as originally intended. Furthermore, the cases recognize that the expanded use must not "unreasonably interfere with the use of the servient tenement". Lease v. Doll, 403 A.2d at 563, Piper v. Mowris, 351 A.2d at 641. Requiring the defendants to allow the construction of a 50 foot wide public road across their land would unreasonably interfere with their use of that property. Therefore, we will enter the order that follows. DECREE NISI AND NOW, this 16TM day of OCTOBER, 2002, it is ordered and decreed that the plaintiffs, their heirs and assigns, have a perpetual 15 foot wide easement for purposes of ingress and egress to Pennsylvania Route 34. Said easement is appurtenant to the land described in Cumberland County Deed Book 127, page 1160 and runs across the land of defendants as described in Cumberland County Deed Book 216 page 428. This decree shall become final unless either party files exceptions within ten (10) days. By the Court, Richard C. Snelbaker, Esquire Hubert X. Gilroy, Esquire s/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J.